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The UK is the second country in the world that has the most significant number of Defined-
Benefit (DB) schemes whose aggregate funding positions have been in a decline since the 
2000s. To reduce the deficit in the schemes, companies are required to make deficit repair 
contributions (DRCs). This thesis focuses on DRCs as one of the deficit funding approaches 
and the role of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) inside 
debt (DB pension) holdings in the deficit funding of DB pension schemes in the UK. 
DB pensions are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the company. This means 
that managers with DB pension holdings are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside 
debtholders of the company. As such, agency theory (Edmans and Liu, 2012; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) suggests that DB pension holdings negatively impact manager risk-appetite. 
To the extent that the manager risks losing accrued DB pensions when there is a deficit in the 
pension scheme (inside debt becomes unsecured when there is a deficit and the manager would 
stand in line with other debtholders if the company bankrupts), it is expected that DB pension 
holdings will incentivise managers to reduce the pension risk in order to increase the security 
of their pension provisions. Building on this argument, this thesis examines whether CEO and 
CFO inside debt holdings are associated with a higher probability of making DRCs. 
Investigating the determinants of the DRCs alone may raise a question of whether these DRCs 
were effective at reducing the deficit in the pension schemes. The anecdotal evidence suggests 
that making DRCs does not always lead to higher funding levels1. Therefore, given the 
 
1 For example, the research conducted by Mercer shows that companies in the FTSE350 paid about £20 billion 
in both normal and deficit reduction contributions during March 2011-March 2012, but the deficit for the same 
period increased by £17 billion (The Economist, 2012). Another example is Carillion, one of the largest 
construction companies in the UK, which failed in 2018. The company was making on average £40 million in 
DRCs each year over the 2010-2015 period. Despite these additional contributions, the deficit had grown from 
250 million to £406 million for the same period. If DRCs payments were effective, the deficit of Carillion’ DB 
schemes should have reduced by about £200 million – from £250 million in 2010 to £50 million by 2015, but 
the deficit not only decreased but increased further. 
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objective of DRCs (DRCs are expected to reduce the deficit in the scheme), this thesis also 
examines whether CEO and CFO inside debt holdings are associated with the higher funding 
levels of DB pension schemes.  
Examining the funding levels of DB pension schemes, this thesis empirically documents a 
positive association between CEO DB pension holdings and the funding levels of DB pension 
schemes. Examining the funding policy of deficit (DRCs), the thesis also documents that CEO 
DB pension holdings are associated with the higher probability of making DRCs. Additional 
analyses suggest that the effects of DB pension holdings are more pronounced when the CEO 
is closer to retirement. However, examining the role of CFO inside debt holdings, the analyses 
fail to find any statistically significant relationship between CFO DB pension holdings and the 
funding levels of DB pension schemes and between CFO DB pension holdings and the 
probability of making DRCs. Overall, the obtained results highlight the importance of CEO 
DB pension holdings in investigating the financial health of DB pension schemes.  
The thesis also addresses the question of whether companies with high debt in the capital 
structure affect the contribution policy of DB schemes. Capital markets theory (Cooper and 
Ross, 2002) suggests that capital markets imperfections may induce a company to make lower 
pension contributions to the scheme (making lower pension contributions is considered as 
borrowing from the scheme members). Existing studies examining the relationship between 
debt and the funding policy of DB schemes provide contrasting results without there being 
provided reasons why companies more likely to underfund or overfund their pension schemes. 
This thesis argues that the pension regulation must be considered when examining the 
relationship between the capital structure and the contribution policy of DB pension schemes 
because the regulation must be regarded as an important motivator or, instead, demotivator for 
companies to use pensions as a source of funding. Given that UK pension regulation is less 
restrictive, which may incentivise companies to use pensions as a source of funding, this study 
7 
 
tests whether UK companies reduce pension contributions when they are financially restricted. 
Consistent with this prediction, empirical analyses document that companies reduce pension 
contributions when they are financially constrained. 
This thesis makes several contributions. First, this thesis contributes to the literature on 
corporate DB pension schemes. In particular, it provides empirically established evidence on 
the determinants of the health of DB schemes by examining whether funding levels and the 
funding policy of deficit are related to CEO and CFO DB pension holdings. Second, this thesis 
also contributes to the literature on the usefulness of inside debt holdings at reducing the risk 
inducing effects.  Third, this study contributes to the literature by documenting that the effects 
of DB pension holdings become more pronounced when the CEO approaches closer to 
retirement suggesting that the importance of pensions increases in the age of the CEO. Fourth, 
this thesis contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between debt in the 
corporate structure and pension contributions. It is worth noting that this thesis is the first that 
examines different types of pension contributions – regular pension contributions and DRCs. 
These contributions differ significantly in their stated objectives, and thus it is important to 
understand the impact of debt on both - regular pension contributions and DRCs. Overall, this 
thesis contributes to a better understanding of the factors that influence the funding positions 
and the funding policy of deficit of DB schemes.  
UK-based literature on DB pension funds is limited, which can be partly attributed to the 
lack of a comprehensive (readily available) database on DB pension characteristics. To this 
end, a unique feature of the thesis is the use of a hand-collected dataset from the companies 
annual reports, which enables to understand the corporate DB pension schemes in the UK.  The 
limited empirical evidence on corporate DB schemes in the UK makes this thesis’s findings 
particularly valuable to the pension regulators, policymakers and the boards who can improve 








Pensions have become an important source of income for retirees. Pension funds also have 
become important economic institutions both in the UK and worldwide. Of the total pension 
liabilities at the end of 2015, employment-related (occupational) pension accounted for about 
£2.3 trillion while state pension accounted for about £5.3 trillion. Together, these pension 
liabilities represented about 400% of UK gross domestic product (GDP) (ONS report from 
20182). However, more than £5 trillion of these pension obligations were unfunded. This means 
that pension assets were worth only about £2 trillion that represented just a quarter of the 
required pension assets needed to finance all these obligations. Although the size of the pension 
assets highlights the vital role of pensions in capital markets, the fact that pension liabilities far 
exceed their assets indicates that the pension industry is in financial trouble.  
The employment-related (occupational) defined-benefit3 (DB hereafter) pension schemes 
have already attracted enough attention of public, policymakers and academics as the funding 
has been in decline over the last decade or so. For example, at the end of 2015 the aggregate 
deficit of the private DB pension schemes estimated at £222.9 billion, which increased from a 
 
2 Pensions in the national accounts, fuller picture of the UK’s funded and unfunded pension obligations: 2010-
2015.  
 
3 There are two major types of occupational pension schemes: defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution 
(DC). Pensions under DB schemes are determined by the formula rather than by the performance of the pension 
as under DC schemes that take into account the years of service, salary in final years and accrual rate of benefits. 
This means that members of DB schemes are expected to receive a pre-determined pension even if pension fund 
underperforms since companies sponsoring these schemes are legally obliged to cover the deficit 
(underperformance). However, members of DC schemes are expected to bear all the losses since pension benefits 




surplus of £97.2 billion at the end of 2003 (The PPF 7800 Index – estimated funding positions 
2003-2015). Moreover, the public has become particularly concerned about the sustainability 
of DB schemes because the deficit significantly increased during 2008/09 and remains high 
even today despite that it is now ten years since the crisis. For example, since August 2011, 
pension liabilities have almost always exceeded the value of pension assets with the highest 
deficit in August 2016 - the point where aggregate underfunding of private DB pension 
schemes reached nearly a half of trillion of pounds.  
Moreover, concerns over the sustainability of pension schemes have further intensified by 
the occurrence of the bankruptcy of large public companies with a large proportion of 
underfunded pension liabilities. For example, British Home Store (BHS) failed in 2016, leaving 
a pension scheme in deficit by more than £500 million. One of the largest UK construction 
company sponsoring over 28,000 members across 13 pension schemes, Carillion, failed at the 
beginning of 2018. Despite that both BHS and Carillion paid additional pension contributions 
to reduce the underfunding in the schemes, the deficit was persistent. For example, for 
Carillion, the deficit grew from around £25 million in 2007 to £240 million in 2010 to £498 in 
2014 and £587 in 2017. According to the Pension Protection Fund (the PPF) estimates, at the 
time of the collapse, the actual deficit estimated to sit at around £900 million (Briefing paper 
(2018), House of Commons). This raised fear among pension scheme members because they 
risk losing pensions when the company bankrupts, and there is a deficit in the DB scheme. 
Moreover, there are growing public concerns that more companies with unfunded pension 
schemes could fail in the future. However, the challenges that private pension schemes face 
today is a global issue rather than the UK-specific problem. According to an OECD report from 
20184, in 2017 the UK and the US alone had a £5 trillion shortfall in private DB pension 
schemes only. The reality is far challenging when both corporate and state pensions are 
 
4 Pension Markets in Focus 2018 
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considered. For example, the shortfall of the 20 largest OECD countries reached a $78 trillion 
that is nearly 2 times higher the value of these countries’ collective debt, and the pension 
deficits have been described as a “global crisis in waiting” (Zalewska, 20185). These 
challenges highlight the need to study pension schemes. 
This thesis focuses on corporate DB pension schemes, and the primary objective of this 
thesis is to study the deficit funding policy, DRCs. There are several aims in this thesis. The 
first aim is to investigate the relationship between CEO inside debt incentives and the funding 
positions of DB pension schemes. It is predicted that companies whose CEOs have inside-debt 
incentives generated by DB pensions are associated with higher funding levels in DB schemes. 
The justification for this prediction lies within agency theory. Agency theory (Edmans and Liu, 
2011) suggests that DB pension holdings counter the risk-shifting incentives that arise as a 
result of compensating the manager with equity. This is because DB pensions are generally 
unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the company and executives with DB pension holdings 
are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside debtholders of the company. To the extent 
that the executive risks losing accrued DB pensions when there is a deficit in the pension 
scheme (inside debt becomes unsecured when there is a deficit and the manager would stand 
in line with other debtholders if the company bankrupts), it is expected that DB pension 
holdings will incentivise executives to reduce the pension risk in order to increase the security 
of their pension provisions.  
The second aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between CFO inside debt 
holdings and the funding levels of DB pension schemes. The extant literature focuses almost 
exclusively on the role of CEOs and how they affect the funding policies of DB pension 
schemes. However, there are strong reasons why CFOs inside-debt incentives might be of 
importance too. First, corporate decisions are often made in teams, which can change the 
 
5 Huge pension fund deficits are a global crisis in waiting, the Conversation (2018) 
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decision-making dynamics (Hsieh, Wang, and Demirkan, 2018; Aggarwal and Samwick, 
2003). Second, similar to CEOs, the holdings of DB claims are also remarkable among CFOs 
that could also instigate CFOs to look after DB schemes to regard their personal financial 
interests. For example, 44% of CFOs in the sample hold DB pensions with an average value of 
pension of £86.85 thousand or 4.24% of their total accumulated wealth. In comparison to CFO, 
there are 46% of CEOs in the sample who hold DB pensions with an average value of pension 
of £177.74 thousand that represent 3.64% of their total accumulated wealth. While these 
numbers indicate that in pound value CFOs DB pensions are about two times lower than CEOs 
DB pensions, DB pensions appear to be equally important for both CEOs and CFOs relative to 
the aggregate wealth suggesting that CFOs may also exert influence over the DB pension 
schemes.  Third, CFOs are responsible for financial management, and CFOs incentives could 
particularly be influential in pension decision making. For example, Florackis and Sainani 
(2018) argue that the role of the CFO has evolved considerably and has expanded beyond the 
traditional controllership and compliance functions, but the role of CFO has received much 
less attention in the literature compared to CEO. Investigating how CFOs matter to corporate 
financial policies, Florackis and Sainani (2018) find that a CFO has an ability to influence 
financial decision-making. Therefore, the second empirical chapter of this thesis examines 
whether CFO inside-debt incentives are associated with the higher funding of DB schemes.  
The third aim of this thesis is to investigate whether managerial inside debt incentives are 
related to the deficit funding approaches. The new scheme-specific funding requirement 
introduced by the Pension Act 2004 prescribes companies to deficit-repair contributions 
(DRCs) if there is a deficit. However, new funding requirements allows companies to adjust 
the frequency and size of DRCs payments to their circumstances as there is no time over which 
the deficit should be eliminated. Such flexibility leaves scope for managerial discretion. 
Building upon the agency theory that holdings of DB pensions create strong incentives to 
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manage the pension risk, the third empirical chapter of the thesis predicts that inside debt 
holdings are associated with a higher probability of making DRCs. Combining the evidence 
from the above studies, it becomes possible to establish whether DRCs are effective at reducing 
the deficit. To understand whether companies which are associated with a higher probability 
of making DRCs are also associated with higher funding levels is important because DRCs do 
not always prove to be effective (lead to higher funding levels/lower deficit in the pension 
scheme). For example, the research conducted by Mercer shows that companies in the 
FTSE350 paid about £20 billion in both normal and deficit reduction contributions during 
March 2011-March 2012, but the deficit for the same period increased by £17 billion (The 
Economist, 2012). Another example is Carillion, one of the largest construction companies in 
the UK, which failed in 2018. The company was making on average £40 million in DRCs each 
year over the 2010-2015 period. Despite these additional contributions, the deficit had grown 
from 250 million to £406 million for the same period. The ineffectiveness of DRCs perhaps 
reflects some CFOs' perceptions about the pension deficit. Back in 2013, Carillion's former 
CFO considered putting cash into the company’s pension deficit a “waste of money”, according 
to the minutes of a meeting between Trustee representatives and the Pensions Regulator 
regarding failure to agree the 2011 valuations6. Carillion's former CFO had no DB pension in 
the company’s pension scheme. 
The fourth and last aim of this thesis is to study whether the companies with DB pension 
arrangements reduce the pension contributions when they have high debt in their capital 
structure. Studies examining the relationship between pension contributions and the corporate 
structure of the company have neglected to consider the role of pension regulation (Davies and 
de Haan, 2012; Bartram, 2018). However, this thesis argues that less restrictive regulation can 
 




incentivise companies to underfund their DB schemes when they are financially constrained. 
In the UK, pension regulation does not set the deadline for eliminating the deficit. Such 
regulatory “freedom” may underlie the incentives to delay making DRCs. It also creates 
incentives to reduce regular contributions as the company can effectively spread the current 
deficit, which will occur as a result of under-contributing, into future periods. Therefore, the 
final chapter of this thesis investigates whether companies with DB schemes in the UK and 
which type of pension contributions they reduce pension contributions when they are 
financially restricted.  
To accomplish all four aims, this thesis uses a hand-collected data for the sample of UK 
companies over the period 2004 to 2015 data - the data, which is not freely available for 
download. The UK provides a unique setting for empirical investigation. The first motivation 
behind examining a UK sample is the limited evidence on the role of executives inside debt 
holdings in the health of DB schemes in the UK. The extant literature focuses almost 
exclusively on US companies. For example, Cheng and Swenson (2018), Y Yu-Thompson 
(2015), Begley, Chamberlain, Yang, and Zhang, (2015) look at the role of CEO inside debt 
holdings in the financial health of DB pension schemes in the US. To examine the role of 
managerial incentives on pension funding in the UK is interesting because of the specific 
regulatory framework for companies with corporate DB pension schemes in the UK. In the 
UK, the pension benefits are protected by the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) up to a 
compensation limit. This means that the PPF will pay pension benefits (subject to the 
compensation cap) if the company bankrupts and there is a deficit in the pension scheme. Such 
protective measures are good for the pension scheme members but could create conflicting 
incentives even among CEOs with DB pensions of different sizes due to the differences in risks 
of the pension claims.  
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Second, there is no, due to no data available for download, research that examines the 
funding policy of deficit of DB schemes. However, there is an explicit need to understand the 
underlying motives of making these DRCs given the importance of those contributions on 
pension funding.  
Third, researchers have primarily focused on the role of CEO inside debt incentives.  
However, existing research suggests that CFOs inside-debt incentives might be more 
influential than those of CEOs (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Florackis and Sainani, 2018). 
Therefore, more research is needed to understand who influence most the pension funding 
decisions. 
Fourth, studies examining the relationship between pension contributions and the corporate 
structure of the company has neglected to consider the role of the pension regulation. This 
possibly explains why the existing research produce contrasting results without there being 
provided reasons why companies are more likely to be inclined to underfund or overfund their 
pension schemes (Davies and de Haan, 2012; Bartram, 2018). However, pension regulation 
must be regarded as an important motivator or, instead, demotivator for companies to use 
pensions as a source of funding. For example, the regulation of occupational pension schemes 
in the UK is specific regarding how companies tackle the deficit – companies may consider 
long periods to eliminate the deficit in the scheme. Such regulatory flexibility allows 
companies to take an excessive risk by maintaining the underfunding over the longer period 
without necessary intervention from the regulatory body. Therefore, focusing on DB pension 
schemes in the UK this thesis, along with to the contribution to the literature on the 
determinants of the contribution policies of DB schemes, sheds a light on the effects of the 
pension regulation which is currently in place. 
Fifth, while existing studies on pension contributions focus on total pension contributions, 
pension contributions consist of regular pension contributions which companies should make 
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to cover the regular cost and additional pension contributions which companies should make 
to reduce the deficit. However, companies are not expected to make lower pension 
contributions when they lack the cash or face borrowing restrictions except for DRCs, which 
can be set up that best suit their financial needs. As there is a fundamental distinction between 
two types of pension contributions, it is important to examine what factors influence each type 
and whether companies manage DRCs, regular contributions or both. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by addressing the gaps discussed above. 
Moreover, a unique feature of the thesis is the use of a dataset which was hand-collected from 
the companies’ annual reports. The use of the hand-collected data makes a distinctive 
contribution to the research on corporate DB pension schemes. In particular, this thesis 
contributes to a better understanding of the factors that influence the funding of DB pension 
schemes. Knowing factors that contribute to the deficit can help to improve the management 
of DB schemes to prevent the scheme from being underfunded and protect the interests of the 
pension scheme members. 
Moreover, research findings presented in the thesis have important policy implications 
because they provide useful insights regarding the effectiveness of the Pension Act of 2004. 
For example, this last study’s findings reveal that companies tend to manage both regular 
pension contributions and DRCs. Managing regular pension contributions can harm the 
pension scheme members as it not only increases the likelihood of default but also lowers the 
amount of pension assets. In particular, making lower regular contributions would increase the 
deficit in DB schemes because the reduction in regular contributions is driven by the 
company’s need for a higher cash and not by the lower cost of DB pensions. Second, DRCs 
may be less effective at reducing the deficit if the company also reduces regular contributions. 
This can explain why the deficit in DB schemes in some companies grows despite having paid 
DRCs (e.g., Carillion, BHS). Therefore, these findings reveal important implications for the 
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management of DB schemes, which might also be of interests to pension regulators who may 
consider improving the existing pension regulation. For example, regulators may consider more 
transparent reporting practices to prevent pension assumptions management and introduce the 
deadline for eliminating the deficit. These measures may help to improve the regulation regarding 
how companies deal with the pension deficit and enchase the security of the members' benefits. 
Moreover, as a primitive measure, the pension regulators may pay more attention to companies 
whose schemes funding worsens, since this may indicate that some of the pension assumptions 
might be violated. The stronger attention should be paid to companies which make DRCs and 
whose schemes funding worsens and/or does not improve since there could be a substitution effect 
through pension assumptions manipulation. These steps may prevent the pension scheme to restore 
the funding levels. 
This thesis is structured in seven chapters as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview 
of the funding of occupational pension schemes in the UK. It briefly discusses the factors that 
contributed to the problem of underfunding in DB schemes. It also briefly discusses the pension 
regulation and how it prescribes companies to tackle the deficit. The final section of this chapter 
describes the data that will be used in this thesis. Chapter 3 reviews relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature. In particular, it reviews agency and capital markets imperfection theories 
and related empirical studies on corporate DB pensions. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
how this thesis contributes to the literature. Chapter 4 presents the empirical study that 
examines the relationship between CEO and CFO inside debt holdings and the funding levels 
of DB schemes. Study in Chapter 5 examines the relationship between CEO and CFO inside 
debt holdings and the funding policy of deficit of DB schemes. Chapter 6 presents the last 
empirical study that examines whether companies with high debt in the capital structure reduce 
pension contributions to DB schemes. The thesis ends up with a brief conclusion by 
summarising findings and discussing implications that emerged from these findings. The final 






Background and Data 
 
2.1. Background on DB pension schemes funding 
At the turn of the century, the private pension sector started to observe a decrease in the 
numbers of employees covered by occupational pension schemes. The increased cost of DB 
pensions is argued to be the main factor that contributed to the decline of DB schemes (Ross 
and Wills, 2002; Aaronson and Coronado; 2005; Banks, Blundell, and Emmerson, 2005). 
Literature highlights several factors that made DB pensions more costly. One of these factors 
is life expectancy. Life expectancy increased globally. For example, in Europe, a sixty-five-
year person can expect to live for another 15 years today, 20 years by 2050 and over 25 years 
by 2100 compared to the person in 1950 (United Nations World Population Prospects, 2017). 
While these positive tendencies are good for society, the increases in life expectancy shifted 
the costs of DB pensions upward because the life expectancy projections are used to calculate 
the pension liabilities. For example, it is estimated that each year of life expectancy raises 
pension liabilities by around 4-5 per cent (Kisser, Kiff, Oppers, and Soto, 2013). In dollar 
value, a one-year shock to longevity could lead to a very material change in the value of pension 
liabilities. For the US, it is estimated that a one-year increase in life expectancy could increase 
the corporate pension liabilities by as much as $110 billion7 (Kisser, Kiff, Oppers, and Soto, 
2013). At a global level, they show that a one-year shock to longevity would raise the pension 
liabilities by $1.1 trillion, from $23.3 trillion to $24.4 trillion.  
 
7 Calculation are made using data for 2007. As of 2007, the aggregate value of corporate pension liabilities 
estimated at $2.2 trillion with a deficit of $81 billion. 
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Another factor is the market discount rate which is used to determine the current value of 
the future pension liabilities. Studies examining the effect of changes in the discount rates on 
pension liabilities show that a 1% decrease in the discount rate would increase the value of the 
pension liability by 15% – 18% (May, Querner, and Schmitz, 2005; Gohdes and Baach, 2004; 
Glum, 2008 as in Billings, O’Brien, and Woods, 2009; Accounting Standard Board, 2007). As 
the interest rates dropped during the financial crisis and remain relatively low since then, 
companies incur a higher cost of DB pensions. In particular, companies need to make higher 
contributions to meet future pension liabilities as well as remove the deficit, which resulted 
from a drop in the market interest rates. For example, for FTSE350 companies, it has been 
estimated that the drop in short-term rates by 100-150 basis points and 40-60 basis points in 
the long-term interest rates between August and December 2008 triggered an increase in the 
value of pension liabilities from US$300 billion to US$400 billion (Impavido and Tower, 
2009).  
Weak investment performance and losses during the financial crisis is another factor that 
increased the costs of DB pensions. It is estimated that if a pension fund achieves a return of 
6% per annum, around two-thirds of the pension benefits will be covered by investment returns, 
and only one third have to be met by direct contributions from the sponsoring company 
(Franzoni, 2007). Given that pension schemes performed well throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
many companies required to make low or even no pension contributions due to higher 
investment returns. However, since about 2000s the cost of DB pensions significantly increased 
due to the weak investment performance. It is calculated that the average rate of return on 
pension assets in the UK estimated at 9.5% during the 1982-2005 period and only 1.9% for the 
2000-2005 period (Tapia, 2008; Antolin, 2008). Moreover, the financial crisis of 2008/09 
sharply undermined asset values. For example, UK private pensions alone have lost about 
US$300 billions of dollars in assets during the financial crisis – the second most significant 
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losses in asset values by private pension funds after the US that lost about US$2.2 trillion of 
dollars (OECD report from 2008)8.   
Increase in life expectancy, low interest rates and weak performance of equity markets all 
contributed to the higher cost of DB pensions, suggesting that companies are exposed to 
significant cash outflows. The latest figures reveal that as of September 2016, the annual cost 
of DB pensions accrued over the year was estimated at 36.6% of employee earnings (Sweeting, 
2016). This is multiple times higher than the cost of alternative pension arrangement such as 
DC that estimated to be only 4.0% of employee earnings (Sweeting, 2016). Moreover, 
companies are also obliged to remove the deficit by making additional pension contributions 
which makes DB pensions even more costly. Graph 2.1 shows that deficit in DB schemes 
sponsored by the UK companies has significantly increased after the financial crisis and remain 
high. For example, at the end of December 2015, around 80% of the corporate pensions 
schemes in the UK were underfunded (PPF, December 2015 Update). The aggregate position 
of all pension schemes was a deficit of £222.4 billion at the end of December 2015, which 
decreased further to £223.9 billion at the end of December 2016. For comparison, by the end 
of December 2003, there were around 32% of pension schemes in deficit with an aggregate 
surplus of 97.2 million. Graph 2.1 shows that the funding positions of DB schemes deteriorated, 
and this highlights the need to study corporate DB pension schemes to understand the factors 
that influence the funding of pension schemes for better scheme management and deficit 
prevention.  
It is worth mentioning that the increase in the deficit is also likely to reflect both global and 
domestic factors. The funding positions of DB pension schemes have fallen since 2008 as a 
result of the global financial crisis. But there are also domestic factors that have been important 
 




too and which likely have contributed to the deficit problem. One of those domestic factors is 
likely to have been the Bank of England’s asset purchase programme (or QE) aimed to boost 
the macroeconomy by lowering long-term interest rates and stimulating spending. Related 
studies estimate that the first £200 billion of QE depressed gilt yields by around 100 basis 
points (Joyce et al., 2011, 2012; Joyce and Tong, 2012). Inman (2015) estimates that in 2012 
the total purchases of government bonds rose to £375 billion from £75 billion in 2009. As a 
result, lower long-term interest rates increased the size of pension deficits for DB schemes that 
were already in deficit. The sharp increase in deficit observed in the 2011-2012 period (Graph 
2.1) more likely reflected the effects on QE programme which also reflects the decline in UK 
bond yields (Graph 2.2). The increase in deficit observed in the 2014-2015 period can also be 
related to the QE programme launched by the European Central Bank in 2015. The impact of 
these programmes was a sharp drop in global bond yields including the UK. Another sharp 
increase in the deficit is observed in the 2016-2017 period. This widened funding gap more 
likely to reflect the EU referendum results after which bond yields dropped to their lowest 
values due to worsening in the economic outlook and expectations of trade barriers between 
the UK and the EU (Graph 2.2.).  
This sub-chapter briefly discussed the major factors that contributed to the cost of DB 
schemes. Higher costs of DB pensions forced companies to switch to DC schemes which are 
less expensive to companies. By switching from DB to DC scheme, the company also transfers 
the investment and longevity risks to the employees (Broadbent, Palumbo, and Woodman, 
2006). However, although DB pensions become less popular, they still remain a prominent 
feature of the UK pension landscape. For example, more than a million UK workers in the 
private sector alone are still actively accumulating pensions under DB schemes, and around 
11.2 millions of people have preserved DB pension entitlements, as shown in Graph 2.2 (ONS 
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report from 20179). This means that companies will be responsible for the funding of DB 
pensions until the end of this century.  
 
Graph 2.1 
Estimated aggregate balance (pension assets minus pension liabilities) of schemes in the PPF 7800 Index 
over the March 2003-December 2017. Notes: Graph prepared by the author based on the data presented in 
the annual updates that are published by the PPF. Source: The graph was prepared by the author based on 



















9 Occupational Pensions Schemes Survey, UK: 2017. Occupational pension provision in the UK, providing 














































United Kingdom Government Bond Yields (10 Year) over the March 2003-December 2017. Source: The 



































































Number of preserved pension entitlements in occupational pension schemes by sector, 1991 to 2017 
(millions). The graph was prepared by the author based on the data collected from Occupational Pensions 




2.2. Pension regulation and accounting standards  
In 1995 under the Pension Act 1995, the UK government introduced the Minimum Funding 
Requirement (MFR). The MFR was introduced to protect pensioners and other scheme 
members’ rights by setting a benchmark for the acceptable level of risk for the scheme’s assets. 
It required DB corporate pension schemes whose assets fall below the minimum set by the 
MFR test to make up the shortfall within the prescribed time to protect pensioners and other 
scheme members’ rights. For example, if the MFR test revealed a deficit in the scheme, the 
company was allowed one year to reach 90% of the MFR level and five years to reach 100%. 
However, MFR was widely criticised for adversely influencing the investment decisions and 
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requirements never proved sufficient to provide promised level of pensions the case of 
bankruptcy (Myners report, 2001). As a result, the Pension Act 1995 was replaced by the 
Pension Act 2004. 
The Pension Act 2004 differed in many ways from the Pension Act 1995. For example, the 
Pension Act 2004 first established a new regulatory body, the Pension Regulator (PR), with a 
power to intervene, if necessary, in the administration of occupational pension scheme. Second, 
it also created a new compensation scheme, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), to provide a 
guaranteed level of pension benefits to members of underfunded corporate pension schemes 
whose employers are unable to pay the contractual pension promises they made. Third, with 
an introduction of the Pensions Act 2004, the MFR funding requirements were replaced by the 
new “scheme-specific” funding requirements. In contrast to MFR, the new “scheme-specific” 
funding requirements do not set the time prescriptions over which the deficit should be 
eliminated. This means that companies have been able to consider a more flexible approach 
with longer funding periods over which the full funding can be achieved.  
In aggregate, these improvements are planned and introduced to provide better protection 
to scheme members. However, this thesis draws attention that existing regulation may also 
contribute to the pension deficits problem. Moreover, current regulation makes the regulators 
valuable to prosecute companies from inappropriate behaviour towards their pension schemes. 
In particular, the Pension Act 2004 provides more time for companies to eliminate the deficit 
as the PR takes into account the financial affordability of sponsoring employer to make 
additional contributions allowing them to adjust DRCs to their financial circumstance. Since 
there are no strict requirements that dictate how and when the deficit should be eliminated, 
trustees and employers have been able to consider a more flexible deficit funding approaches. 
From one hand, such flexibility allows companies to cope with tough economic conditions and 
minimise the risk of being financially pressured by removing underfunding, sometimes high, 
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in a very short time. From another hand, such flexibility allows companies to take excessive 
risk by maintaining the underfunding over the longer period without necessary intervention 
from the regulatory body. Most importantly, such flexibility does not prevent companies from 
making lower regular pension contributions – contributions that companies make to cover the 
regular cost of DB pensions. By making lower regular pension contributions, the company can 
spread the current deficit as a result of under-contributing into future periods through DRCs 
payments. Therefore, lighter regulation may induce companies to take more risk.   
Although companies are not expected to pay lower contributions except for DRCs, which 
can be set up that best suit their financial needs, companies may manage discount rates, 
investment policy and other pension assumptions. For example, by setting a higher discount 
rate or expected returns on pension assets company reduce the cost of pensions that also reduces 
the size of pension contributions needed from the company. Although companies follow 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) to disclose assumptions used to measure DB pension 
liabilities, studies examining the pension assumptions show that accounting standards do not 
prevent companies from manipulating. For example, the Pension Adviser Review finds, that in 
the fourth quarter of 2004, the assumed discount rate across all companies varied between 
4.85% and 5.09% (Williams, 2005). For FTSE 100 companies during the financial crisis when 
bond yields were volatile, Lane Clark and Peacock (2009, p. 36) find that discount rates ranged 
from 5.6%-6.75%. Another study shows that at the end of 2011, the range of discount rates 
used by FTSE 100 companies ranged from 4.7 - 4.9% (Lane Clark and Peacock report, 2012). 
Given that pension liabilities are long-term obligations, even a relatively small variation in the 
discount rate can lead to substantive changes in the present value of the pension liabilities. As 
previously discussed, a 1% increase in discount rate might reduce pension liabilities by 15% - 
25% (May, Querner, and Schmitz, 2005; Gohdes and Baach, 2004; Glum, 2008 as in Billings, 
O’Brien, and Woods, 2009; Accounting Standard Board, 2007, Bozewicz, 2004).  
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There are other assumptions that the company needs to make. For example, the company 
needs to determine the expected rates of return (ERRs) on pension assets. ERRs may be wide-
ranging across different pension schemes because each scheme has different asset allocation 
and, thus, granting substantial discretion over the ERRs. For example, to reduce the company’s 
costs, the company may take more risk by investing a higher share of pension assets into 
equities. Companies also should determine the future price inflation, salary rise and life 
expectancy assumptions. These assumptions also may differ between companies because 
companies operate in different sectors and different geographical regions that make it difficult 
to evaluate the validity of these assumptions. Although for accounting periods beginning on or 
after 1 January 2013 companies require to disclosure ‘significant actuarial assumptions’ to 
prevent the pension assumptions manipulation (IASB, 2011), Billings, O’Brien, Woods, and 
Vencappa, (2017) argue that companies still have discretion in selection of the pension 
assumptions. 
Overall, the choice of pension assumptions has a material impact not only on the reported 
liabilities but also on the size of pension contributions that company should set aside to cover 
the regular cost of pensions and past service deficit. While current pension regulation allows 
companies to take more time to reduce the deficit, companies, due to lighter regulation, may 
also use their discretion over the pension assumptions to reduce regular pension contributions. 
However, the economic consequences of lighter regulation might be significant because the 
companies with DB pensions may also suffer from the danger that one failing institution 
sometimes referred to as “too-big-to-fail” could cause other related organisations to also fail, 
harming the economy as a whole (Zalewska, 2018). For example, in 2007, the peak market 
capitalisation of the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group were £64 billion and 
£33 billion respectively - was small compared to the size of the pension fund deficits, but the 
British government had to inject £850 billion to rescue the UK bank sector from collapsing.  
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These examples show that “too-big-to-fail” companies may take excessive risk-taking 
regarding their DB pension schemes but they won’t have to pick up the pieces if things fall 
apart because these companies are more likely to be saved by the government as their failure 
represents unacceptable systemic risk. In the background paper on the importance of the 
financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also warned that pension funds 
can pose systemic risk to the financial system10. For example, the pension funds which are 
underfunded might move towards riskier investments in order to try to chase increased returns 
and reduce deficits. Moreover, a move toward riskier asset classes may also be provoked by 
negative real rates on bonds. For example, the chairman of the London Pension Fund Authority 
(LPFA), Edmund Truell, said: “We are in a position where we do not have enough assets to 
meet our liabilities. If our rate of return on gilts is 3% before inflation, probably nothing after 
inflation, we are not going to be able to pay the pensions. Therefore, we are safely guaranteeing 
bankruptcy by investing in gilts. I don’t consider gilts to be an appropriate investment for an 
underfunded pension fund”11. However, this could seriously compromise the long-term 
solvency of the pension schemes because risky investment strategy may not solve the deficit 
problems and even compound them. While the pension deficits themselves cannot cause 
systemic risk to financial markets because pension schemes are not interconnected with the 
financial markets in the same way as banks and they are considered as users of the markets, 
the concerns started to appear if the deficit poses the risk to the company. Some schemes may 
have large deficits and the sponsoring company may not have ability to make up the shortage. 
If the failure of the sponsoring company would pose a high systemic market risk, it is more 
likely that the government would be required to intervene. 
 
10 Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations— Background Paper, October 2009. Available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109a.pdf 





The data used in this thesis covers British companies in the FTSE 350 index. The FTSE 350 
index has been chosen for several reasons. First, it incorporates the largest (measured by the 
market capitalisation) British companies that are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
Companies that publicly trade on the stock market are required to disclose the information on 
the corporate pension schemes they sponsor. However, the disclosure of the information on the 
employer-sponsored DB pension schemes has only been mandatory since 1st January 2005 
when the new IASB accounting standard was introduced (Yermo, 2008). Second, according to 
the FTSE group website companies in the FTSE 350 combines largest first 100 companies and 
the next 250 companies that represent around 95 per cent of the overall UK equity market by 
the value that captures a large share of the UK businesses. Further, according to the data 
reported by Mercer’s Pension Risk Survey, at the end of December 2015, the aggregate value 
of pension assets of companies in the FTSE 350 index in DB schemes was estimated to be 
around £634 billion and the combined value of projected pension liabilities to be around £673 
billion. This represents approximately more than 50 per cent of the total assets accumulated in 
all DB pension schemes in the PPF 7800 index, which was estimated to be around £1,250 
billion at the end of December 2015. The sheer size of these assets and obligations highlight 
the significance of DB pensions in the FTSE 350 companies. 
The observation period starts in 2004 and ends in 2015. The sample includes 209 unique 
companies in the FTSE 350 index with DB pension arrangements. This includes 201 companies 
which were constituents of the FTSE 350 in 2015. As the number of companies in the stock 
index change regularly and not all companies were part of the FTSE 350 index in 2015 but 
possibly were constituents in previous years, the sample has been extended by including 
companies that were part of the FTSE 350 in previous calendar years, e.g., between 2004 – 
2014, but were not included for number of reasons: (1) delisted due to bankruptcies or 
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takeovers; (2) had been a member of stock market index other than the FTSE 350; (3) DB 
scheme had been wounded up or sponsoring employer had sold off their pension liabilities.  
Time series of observations for each company are compiled annually. The data gives a 
sample of 2280 observations in total for 209 companies over the 2004-2015 period. This 
represents over 90 per cent of all possible observations for 209 companies in the FTSE 350 
with DB arrangements over the 12-years12. Table 2.1 reports the summary of the frequency of 
annual observations available on companies and shows that data on pension-related data for all 




The summary of frequency of annual observations of companies in the FTSE 350 index. The number of 
observations is the product of frequency of annual observations and the number of companies. Notes: The 
statistics shown in this table was calculated by the author based on the data collected from the companies’ 
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12 157 75.12 1884 82.63 
 
11 9 4.31 99 4.34 
 
10 9 4.31 90 3.95 
 
9 10 4.78 90 3.95 
 
8 3 1.44 24 1.05 
 
7 2 0.96 14 0.61 
 
6 4 1.91 24 1.05 
 
5 2 0.96 10 0.44 
 
4 8 3.83 32 1.40 
 
3 3 1.44 9 0.39 
 
2 2 0.96 4 0.18 
      











12 If data on all 209 companies over 2004-2015 companies was available, the sample would give 2508 observations 




The total number of observations and the variation of observations in the sample by year from 2004 – 
2015. Notes: The statistics shown in this table was calculated by the author based on the data collected 











To accomplish all aims of this thesis, the most data on was hand collected from the annual 
reports13 - the data, which is not freely available for download, but a collection of this information 
requires enormous amount time and patience. Although, hand collecting required information from 
the annual reports was a very challenging task and time-consuming activity, the use of this data 
makes a distinctive contribution to the research on DB pension schemes and provides a background 
for a better understanding of the complex nature of DB pensions and its interaction with the 
company.   
In particular, the first empirical study is concerned with the need to understand the role of 
CEOs and CFOs DB pension holdings for the funding positions of DB pension schemes. Along 
with the information about pension assets and liabilities, which were used to calculate the funding 
position of DB schemes (assets minus liabilities), the information about CEO and CFO DB 
pension holdings was collected from the remuneration section in companies’ annual reports. 
 













2004 166 166 7.28 7.28 
 
2005 172 172 7.54 14.82 
 
2006 183 183 8.03 22.85 
 
2007 191 191 8.38 31.23 
 
2008 188 188 8.25 39.47 
 
2009 190 190 8.33 47.81 
 
2010 191 191 8.38 56.18 
 
2011 193 193 8.46 64.65 
 
2012 201 201 8.82 73.46 
 
2013 201 201 8.82 82.28 
 
2014 203 203 8.90 91.18 
 
2015 201 201 8.82 100.00 
      
Years of observation 12 
    
Number of unique companies 
  
209 
    






Using information from annual reports on directors’ remuneration, it made possible to 
determine whether the CEO (and CFO) is a member of DB pension scheme or not and obtain 
details on the size of DB pension arrangements if relevant. There are two variables which 
represent the size of DB pension holdings. Firms disclose the “Total Accrued” DB pension at 
the end of the year which represents the value which would be paid annually on retirement and 
“Transfer Value” of total accrued pension which represents the value which the scheme 
member could get if he exercises the right to transfer money out of the scheme. Both variables 
“Total Accrued” and “Transfer Value” are divided by the CEO (or CFO) accumulated wealth 
in the firm. Data on accumulated wealth are obtained from BoardEx.  
 The second empirical study requires data about DRCs made to the schemes. The 
information about DRCs is not readily available and thus was also hand-collected from 
companies’ annual reports. DRCs are different from normal contributions that the companies 
usually make necessary to match the present value of future benefits earned in the current year. 
The funding strategy of the deficit of sponsoring companies was identified through payments 
of DRCs purposely made to close or at least reduce the gap between the estimated value of 
scheme assets and projected pension obligations. DRCs defined as an amount paid in excess to 
normal pension contributions that the company usually make necessary to match the value of 
the increase in pensions to be accepted for levy purposes (PPF Deficit Reduction Guidance).  
The normal pension contributions and DRCs, if any made, are reported under single figure14. 
However, those companies that paid additional contributions to the pension schemes provide 
supplementary notes explaining the funding recovery plan and the amount of payments made 
in the year (or in the previous years). Studying the supplementary notes on pension 
 
14 During the collection of the data it was observed that majority of companies report the combined value of 
pension contributions., the value of normal pension contributions plus the value of deficit reduction pension 
contributions, under the single figure. However, in most recent years it becomes more prevalent for companies to 
separate the aggregate value of pension contributions into two, normal and deficit contributions and show in the 
pension section to the annual report the value of regular pension contributions and cash paid in excess to reduce 
the deficit separately. 
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contributions made it possible to identify whether and how much the company paid in 
additional pension contributions towards deficit reduction. Although, companies do not always 
use “DRCs” to describe additional contributions towards deficit reduction, they, however, 
clearly state the amount of additional contributions they make to “recover the funding levels” 
or “reduce the pension deficit” and hence these contributions are classified as DRCs.  
The definition of these and other control variables are discussed in greater detail in the 
related studies. 
 
2.3.1. Pension funding of FTSE 350 companies 
 
Table 2.3 reports the aggregate value of pension assets, liabilities and the deficit (the 
difference between pension assets and liabilities) of DB schemes sponsored by the companies 
in the FTSE 350 index over the 2004-2015 period. Graph 2.3. and 2.4 graphically depicts the 
aggregate value of pension assets and liabilities and the corresponding deficit, respectively.  
As from Table 2.3, at the end of 2004, there were 166 companies in the FTSE 350 index 
with DB pension arrangements. The aggregate value of pension assets of 166 companies 
amounted to £240.3 billion in 2004, and the value of pension liabilities was estimated at £290.6 
billion with an aggregate deficit of £50.3 billion At the end of 2015, there were 201 companies 
in the FTSE 350 index with DB pension arrangements with the aggregate value of pension 
assets and liabilities of £588.9 billion and £622.7 billion respectively. This represents an 
increase of pension assets by more than 140% of the value of pension assets and increases in 
pension liabilities by more than 110% of the value of pension liabilities in 2004. Although 
pension assets had grown at a faster rate than the pension obligations, the growth of pension 
assets was insufficient as the pension liabilities had consistently exceeded the value of pension 
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assets. At the end of 2015, the aggregate deficit was estimated at £34 billion. This also means 
that the deficit remains persistent as underfunding is observed in all years since 2004.  
While the highest funding was observed in 2007 when the deficit estimated at £12.4 billion, 
in the subsequent year the funding declined to £-33.2 billion. In 2009, the deficit increased 
further and reached nearly £67 billion. The level of deficit in 2009 was the highest during the 
2004-2015 period, which was driven by the fall in equity prices and low discount rates as a 
result of the financial crisis that began in 2008. For the 2010-2015 period, the level of 
underfunding varied between (-£58.3) – (-£33.8) billions. Although it is now 10 years from the 
crisis of 2008/09, the deficit remains high that, according to the latest figures, estimated at 
£39.8 billion (The Actuary, 2019). 
It is also worth noting that the funding positions of DB pension schemes in the FTSE 350 
index do not deteriorate as much as for DB pension schemes in the PPF 7800 index during 
2014-2015 period as was previously shown in Figure 2.1. Such difference may reflect the fact 
that there are companies which take actions to remove the deficit as well as companies which 
take more risk in respect to their DB schemes. This may therefore suggest that funding 
positions of DB schemes more likely to be influenced by factors beyond those directly 













The aggregate value of pension assets and liabilities and corresponding funding over the 2004-2015 period, 
£ billion. Notes: The statistics shown in this table was calculated by the author based on the data collected 
from the companies’ annual reports and DataStream. 
   
Year Pension assets Pension liabilities Funding  
2004 240.28 290.56 -50.28  
2005 289.40 344.14 -54.74  
2006 353.12 393.27 -40.15  
2007 388.55 400.92 -12.37  
2008 352.16 385.32 -33.16  
2009 370.44 437.32 -66.88  
2010 419.81 478.09 -58.28  
2011 466.76 506.59 -39.83  
2012 507.43 562.03 -54.60  
2013 520.97 567.14 -46.18  
2014 570.29 617.46 -47.17  
2015 588.87 622.66 -33.80  
     




Pension assets and liabilities over 2004-2015 period, £ billion. Notes: The graph was prepared by the 


























Aggregate deficit/surplus of pension schemes over 2004-2015 period, £ billion. Notes: The graph was 





Graph 2.5 further reports the number of schemes running a deficit. As shown in Graph 2.5, 
the majority of schemes were underfunded. The highest number of schemes running a deficit 
was in 2004-05, where about 95% of schemes in the FTSE 350 companies were in deficit, and 
only 5% of schemes were reported in surplus. The lowest number of schemes running a deficit 
was in 2015, where about three-third (68%) of companies were reported in deficit. However, 
it is worth noting that while the number of schemes running a surplus has been gradually 
increasing, the underfunding remains relatively high. The latest figures on funding levels of 
FTSE 350 companies reveals that the number of schemes running surplus increased further to 
about 50%, but the level of aggregate deficit in 2018 amounted to £39 billion that is higher 
than in 2015 when the number of underfunded schemes estimated at 68%. This suggests that 



















% of schemes running deficit over 2004-2015 period. Notes: The graph was prepared by the author based 






























Literature review  
 
This chapter provides a brief review of related studies on corporate pension schemes. It 
starts with a revision of the literature that explains why pension schemes should be viewed as 
a part of the company. It then reviews the existent literature that focuses on the determinants 
of the funding of DB schemes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how this thesis will 
contribute to the literature. 
 
 
3.1. Consolidation of DB schemes with the company 
DB pension schemes and sponsoring companies are separate legal entities as the pension 
assets are kept apart from the company. However, many researchers have come to the view 
that pension assets and pension obligations are considered as assets and obligations of the 
company themselves. For example, the early paper of Sharpe (1976) view pension obligations 
and assets as an integral part of the company’s balance sheet because the company is obliged 
to pay pensions to its employees and set aside assets to meet these obligations. Such integration 
also creates a pension call option that the company may exercise when there is a surplus or put 
option when there is a deficit in the pension scheme. Black (1980) argues that most of the risk 
in DB pension schemes is borne by the sponsoring companies and their shareholders that makes 
pension obligations to be corporate. Bulow (1981) show that pension liabilities act in the same 
manner as the corporate bonds: the current reduction in salary is the present value of the bond, 
and the future promise is the face amount of the bond (Bodie and Shoven,1983). Ippolito (1986) 
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also views pensions as economic liabilities of the company mainly because workers make 
savings in the form of pension (employee) contributions with their companies in anticipation 
of receiving a pension upon retirement. Stefanescu (2006) also argues that the pension 
legislation that governs the interaction between the company and the pension scheme supports 
the balance sheets integration because sponsoring companies are liable for all pension liabilities 
which are senior to the claims of all lenders. But seniority of claims on unfunded pension 
liabilities is questionable when sponsoring company fails as the courts have sometimes 
deviated from this view (Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2009). Although these studies suggest that 
pension liabilities should be viewed as the company’s debt, Ralfe, Speed, and Palin (2004) 
argue about the complexity of this debt compared to conventional debt. In particular, they argue 
that pension debt is complex due to that: (1) payments are volatile as they depend on mortality 
rates, withdrawal rates, and other demographic features, (2) pension benefits in the UK are 
indexed, e.g., increase in line with rate of inflations, (3) pension promises are not traded. Ralfe, 
Speed, and Palin (2004), however, point out that these specific features of pension debt do not 
alter the underlying economics that pensions are debt for the sponsoring company. 
To explain the relationship between the company and its pension schemes, Bodie, Light, 
Morck, and Taggart (1987) propose two diametrically opposite views: the traditional and 
corporate financial perspectives.  The traditional perspective assumes that pension funds are 
separate from the company. This suggests that funding policy and assets allocation of a pension 
scheme should be made in the best interest of pension scheme beneficiaries without regard to 
either corporate financial policy or the interests of the sponsoring company and its 
shareholders. As such, funding strategy should be influenced by “expected future stream of 
employee pension liabilities,” regardless of corporate financial strategy. In contrast, the 
“corporate financial perspective” represented by the stream of theoretical work of Black 
(1980), Sharpe (1976), Tepper (1981), and Treynor (1977), stresses the potential effects of a 
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company’s financial condition on its pension funding and asset allocation decisions” (Bodie, 
Light, Morck, and Taggart, 1987). This view has several merits including tax benefits (as 
demonstrated by Black (1980) and Tepper (1981)), the pension call/put options that company 
has and that is related to the insurance protection offered by the PBGC (studied by Sharpe 
(1976) and Treynor (1977)), and the financial slack analysed by Myers and Majluf (1983). 
Empirical findings of Bodie, Light, Morck, and Taggart (1987) and Bartram (2018) 
investigating whether DB plans are managed independently or integrated into the financial 
management of their sponsoring company support the corporate finance perspective. In 
particular, companies appear to manage their pension schemes as part of their overall financial 
strategy, since various pension scheme dimensions are found to be related to the company-
specific characteristic.  
The view that pensions are debt-like has also been supported by several empirical studies 
showing that the market also views DB pensions as a part of the company rather than separate 
entities. For instance, Feldstein and Morck (1983) study how unfunded pension liabilities and 
net pension assets affect the market value of sponsoring companies. They show that company 
market value reflects both pension surplus and pension deficit and that the financial market 
uses common standard interest rate (which is very close to the average rate used by all 
companies in the sample) rather than rates reported by the companies. This suggests that the 
financial market appears to “see-through” the manipulation of pension liabilities using interest 
rates. Feldstein and Seligman (1981) investigating the effect of a pension scheme’s deficit on 
the share price find that pension deficit is incorporated into the share price suggesting that 
shareholders perceive the unfunded pension liabilities as corporate debt. Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman (1992) argue that each component of pension cost contains information regarding 
the company’s permanent earnings potential. Examining this proposition empirically, they find 
that pension cost coefficients differ from one another and that the disclosure of separate pension 
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cost components is used by market participants when they assess the company’s permanent 
earning potential. Alderson and Chen (1987) also show an abnormal rise in share price for 
companies that announced to recover a pension surplus. With a focus on most recent evidence, 
Franzoni and Marin (2006) find that most underfunded companies earn lower subsequent 
returns than companies with healthier pension schemes. Jin, Merton and Bodie (2004) 
investigating whether the systematic equity risk reflects the risk of their pension schemes, find 
empirical support for his hypothesis that is consistent with the informational efficiency of the 
capital markets despite obscure pensions accounting disclosures. Gallagher, Mckillop and 
Pogue (2011) also find that pension risk is reflected into company’s equity suggesting that 
company’s pension assets and liabilities are perceived as “the assets and liabilities of the firm 
itself”. Also, Mckillop and Pogue (2009) find that pension risk is incorporated in the credit 
rating: the greater the pension risk, the greater the probability of obtaining a lower debt rating. 
In a subsequent study, however, Gallagher and Mckillop (2010) find that unfunded pension 
liabilities are priced but not as aggressive as traditional leverage and that the pension-credit 
risk relation is more evident in the US and Germany, but not in the UK. These studies provide 
strong evidence of why the role of the company should be considered in understanding the 
determinants of the funding of DB schemes. 
 
3.2. Review of related studies  
A major strand of literature on funding DB schemes investigates whether and why 
companies may underfund or overfund their pension schemes. Building on the work of Sharpe 
(1976) that demonstrates that sponsoring company has a put option on the pension assets in 
respect of any potential deficit, Francis and Reiter (1987) argue that riskier companies are more 
likely to underfund their schemes because the put option becomes more valuable. Francis and 
Reiter (1987) also argue that companies with restrictive debt covenants are more likely to use 
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their schemes as a source of financing by making lower contributions. Why companies may 
underfund their pension schemes has further been debated in the paper of Cooper and Ross 
(2002) that argues that capital markets imperfections may induce a company to make lower 
pension contributions to the scheme. In particular, they argue that if the company encounters 
imperfections in the capital markets when raising external funds to finance investments, the 
company may consider borrowing from the scheme members and payback when the company 
is more financially sound. In contrast, Tepper (1981) and Black (1980) show that sponsoring 
company has reasons to remove the risk from the pension scheme and make a large contribution 
as possible to take full advantage of tax benefits. Tepper and Affleck (1974) argue that the 
company may even consider borrowing funds to finance its pension scheme because it creates 
a debt tax shield without increasing the risk of the company. 
Empirical studies have, however, come to the different views on whether high-debt 
companies, which are riskier and more likely face borrowing restrictions, underfund their 
pension schemes. In one of these empirical studies, Davis and De Haan (2012) analysing Dutch 
DB pension funds between the 1996-2005 period find that companies with high debt make 
higher pension contributions than those with lower debt in their capital structure. While the 
positive relationship between debt and pension contributions supports tax effects hypothesis 
that taxpaying companies would run overfunded DB pension schemes to take full advantage of 
tax benefits, these results contradict with the predictions of Cooper and Ross (2002) and 
Francis and Reiter (1987). Moreover, the findings of Davies and de Haan (2012) also contradict 
with those of Bartram (2018). In particular, using a sample of US companies with DB pension 
schemes over the 1992-2014 period, Bartram (2018) finds that both pension contributions and 
funding levels are lower for companies that have a higher debt in their capital structure. These 
findings are in line with Cooper and Ross (2002) and Francis and Reiter (1987) predictions. 
These findings are also in line with prior study of Bodie, Light, Morck, and Taggart (1986) that 
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also finds that riskier companies tend to exhibit lower funding levels. This interpretation is also 
consistent with an earlier study of Bereskin (2009) on US companies that shows that pension 
contributions decline with increased bankruptcy probability and that increased bankruptcy 
probability impact plan funding levels as well as the choice of actuarial assumptions. 
Furthermore, the negative relationship between pension contributions is also consistent with 
the study of Cheng and Michalski (2010) that also finds that US companies contribute less 
when the leverage is high and when their credit rating is near the investment/non-investment 
grade cut-off. These findings suggest that pension contributions decisions reflect the trade-off 
between the benefit – reducing the pension liability, and the cost-reducing cash flows from 
operations. The evidence on the relationship between debt and funding of DB schemes on the 
companies in the UK is, however, limited. The only known research in this area is the cross-
sectional study of Cocco and Volpin (2007) that finds no direct evidence between debt and 
pension scheme financing decisions, perhaps due to the presence of endogenous variable 
(Cocco and Volpin, 2007). However, estimating the instrumental variables regressions that 
effectively deals with the endogenous variable, it has been found that more financially 
constrained companies with a higher proportion of insider- trustees make lower pension 
contributions.  
Another strand of literature investigates determinants of pension actuarial assumptions. As 
previously discussed, pension assumptions affect the costs of DB pensions as well as the 
funding position of DB schemes. The research on pension assumptions finds that discount 
rates, expected rates of return and other assumptions are also explained by the financial 
condition of the companies sponsoring these schemes. For example, in an attempt to enhance 
the understanding of how pension assumptions choices are made and how companies behave 
in response to accounting regulation, Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1995) examine the 
determinants of the choices of discount rate and the rate of salary progressions. They stated 
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that in an efficient market, unfunded pension liabilities are similar to debt and other liabilities 
of a company for equity valuation and also for determining the systematic risk. The presence 
of a large deficit could be regarded as undesirable by corporate managers. Higher unfunded 
pension liability coupled with higher leverage can lead to an increase in the likelihood of 
technical default. Therefore, companies with large unfunded pension liabilities and leverage 
are likely to choose higher discount rates to lower pension liabilities. Similarly, companies 
with large unfunded pension liabilities are also likely to assume lower salary progression rates. 
Empirical results reveal indeed that the choice of the discount rate is influenced by leverage 
and the funding level of the scheme. These findings suggest that companies choose actuarial 
assumptions that are favourable to them. Asthana (1999) also investigates the effects of US 
companies’ financial and pension profiles on their funding strategies and actuarial choices. 
They find that as companies become overfunded, they make conservative actuarial choices to 
avoid visibility costs. However, as companies become underfunded, they make more liberal 
actuarial choices. That is the larger the profitability, cash flow from operations, and tax 
liability, and the smaller the debt of a company, the higher the likelihood that the company's 
managers will make conservative actuarial choices to maximize contributions. Conversely, the 
smaller the profitability, cash flow from operations, and tax liability, and the larger the debt of 
a company, the higher the likelihood that the company's managers will make liberal actuarial 
choices to minimize contributions. Other studies also show that US companies tend to set 
higher discount rates and apply more aggressive return assumptions when companies’ financial 
situation is more difficult, e.g., when they have insufficient cash holdings and generate lower 
profit (Bartram, 2018).  Pension assumptions management helps financially distressed 
companies to smooth reported earnings, shift the pension costs and reduce contributions (Lew, 
2008). It also has been found that companies manipulate discount rates to help inflate the 
scheme funding (Godwin, 1999). 
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The results of studies on UK companies investigating pension assumptions also provide 
evidence of the companies’ discretion over the choice of pension assumptions. For example, 
Sweeting (2011) examine FTSE 100 non-financial companies over 1989– 2005. He finds no 
relationship between the funding of DB schemes and the choice of the discount rate but 
concludes that large companies use high discount rates. Li and Klumpes (2013) analyse the 
discount rate used by FTSE 350 companies over 1998–2002. They find that high discount rates 
are associated with highly leveraged companies and weakly funded pension plans. These 
results are in line with previous studies of Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue, (1995) and Asthana 
(1999). Byrne, Clacher, Hillier, and Hodgson (2007) examining assumptions used by FTSE 
350 companies over 2001–2004 find that companies with well-funded plans tended to use high 
discount rates. However, Billings, O’Brien and Woods (2017) find no evidence that companies 
with high debt in their capital structure manage pension assumptions but find evidence of 
selective ‘management’ of the pension assumptions in companies weak funding positions.  
Companies may also manage earnings by increasing the proportion of pension assets in 
equities (Gold, 2003). By investing in assets with high expected returns, the company can 
significantly reduce its pension contributions which financially weak companies may 
particularly benefit from (McCarthy and Neuberger, 2005). While the institutional structure of 
DB pensions creates moral hazard incentives for companies to underfund pension schemes by 
investing a higher proportion of pension assets into equities, Rauh (2007) find that riskier 
companies choose less risky pension allocations. This suggests that risk-management 
incentives dominate risk-shifting incentives. However, Addoum, van Binsbergen, and Brandt 
(2010) find that company increases the proportion of pension assets into equities when they 
are required to make mandatory contributions to reduce the deficit. This finding suggests that 
companies increase their risk-taking to avoid mandatory contributions, and such behaviour 
resembles gambling for resurrection. Also, Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) provide 
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evidence that companies manipulate earnings forecasts by assuming relatively high long-term 
rates of return on pension assets, and that higher assumed rates of return, in turn, drive pension 
asset allocation towards more equity.  
Another stream of research looks beyond the financial and profitability measures of the 
company. For example, Anantharaman and Lee (2014) empirically analyse how two important 
measures of the compensation incentives of CEO and CFO, namely wealth risk sensitivity 
(vega) and wealth price sensitivity (delta), affect the risk-shifting versus risk-management 
behaviour of executives in pension schemes. Anantharaman and Lee (2014) find that 
compensation structure of senior management is of importance for funding of DB schemes as 
it drives the corporate pension policy: risk shifting by underfunding pension plans is weaker 
when they have a larger stake in plans that is at risk if the plan fails. Begley, Chamberlain, 
Yang, and Zhang, (2015) investigate the relationship between the funding of DB pensions and 
CEOs’ incentives captured by their equity wealth, pension obligations, and other deferred 
obligations. They find that DB pensions are better funded in companies whose CEO accrued 
higher DB pensions. Further, they find that the CEO’s equity wealth among financially-
constrained companies is negatively associated with underfunding. This implies that when the 
company is near to bankruptcy, CEOs prefer to keep cash in hand as a security for debt claims. 
Other studies also find that higher funding of DB schemes is associated with CEOs inside debt 
incentives (Y Yu-Thompson, 2015; Cheng and Swenson, 2018). These studies suggest that 
managerial inside-debt incentives appear to be important for the health of DB schemes. Other 
studies also show that managers manage pension assumptions to extract higher pay. For 
example, Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) find that managers are more aggressive with 
assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported 
earnings and when their managers exercise stock options. Comprix and Muller (2006) find that 
companies change the interest rate assumptions to boost earnings to increase executive 
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compensation. Whether managers have incentives to manage pension assumptions have been 
previously debated in the study of Watts and Zimmermann (1990). It argued that since 
management remuneration schemes linked to the financial performance of the company, it 
creates incentives to manage the relevant accounting numbers. As a result, managers may have 
an incentive to exercise bias in the selection of the actuarial assumptions if they believe that 
higher pension liabilities (or funding deficits) will be negatively received by the capital markets 
and subsequently affect them personally, via reduced remuneration (Billings, O’Brien, and 
Woods 2017).  
 
 
3.3. Contribution of this thesis 
 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the literature on corporate DB pension schemes. 
The amounts of literature highlight that DB pensions have been well researched. However, 
several gaps have been identified. First, the existing literature on the role of managerial 
incentives on pension funding tends to focus on US companies. To examine the role of 
managerial incentives on pension funding in the UK is interesting because the pension 
regulation in the UK differs from the pension regulation in the US. In the UK, the pension 
benefits of members of DB pension schemes are protected by the Pension Protection Fund 
(PPF) up to a compensation limit. This means that the PPF will pay pension benefits (subject 
to the compensation cap) if the company bankrupts and there are insufficient funds. This may 
suggest that managerial incentives might differ even for the managers with inside debt.  
Second, there is no, due to no data available for download, research that examines the 
funding policy of deficit of DB schemes. However, there is an explicit need to understand the 
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underlying motives of making these DRCs given the importance of those contributions on 
pension funding.  
Third, researchers have primarily focused on the role of CEO inside debt incentives. 
However, prior research suggests that CFOs inside-debt incentives might be more influential 
than those of CEOs (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014). Therefore, more research is needed to 
understand who contribute most to the funding of DB schemes. 
Fourth, studies examining the relationship between pension contributions and the corporate 
structure of the company has neglected to consider the role of the pension regulation. This 
possibly explains why the existing research produce contrasting results without there being 
provided reasons why companies are more likely to be inclined to underfund or overfund their 
pension schemes (Davies and de Haan, 2012; Bartram, 2018). However, the pension regulation 
must be regarded as an important motivator or, instead, demotivator for companies to use 
pensions as a source of funding.  
Fifth, while existing studies on pension contributions focus on total pension contributions, 
pension contributions consist of regular pension contributions which companies should make 
to cover the regular cost and additional pension contributions which companies should make 
to reduce the deficit. However, companies are not expected to make lower pension 
contributions when they lack the cash or face borrowing restrictions except for DRCs, which 
can be set up that best suit their financial needs. As there is a fundamental distinction between 
two types of pension contributions, it is important to examine what factors influence each type 
and whether companies manage DRCs, regular contributions or both. 










Managers’ inside-debt incentives and the funding 




Understanding the determinants of funding levels of DB pension schemes has been a major 
focus in research on corporate pension schemes. To date, research on the determinants of the 
funding levels has tended to focus on the role of companies that sponsor DB pension schemes 
(Bartram, 2018; Davies and de Haan, 2012; Bereskin, 2009; Cooper and Ross, 2002; Bodie, 
Light, and Morck, 1987; Francis and Reiter, 1987; Cheng and Michalski, 2010; Lew, 2008; 
Braswell, Chang, and Hsieh, 2017). In aggregate, the findings suggest that company-level 
factors such as financing constraints and profitability among others influence the funding levels 
of DB schemes, pension assumptions or pension contributions. These studies show that 
companies integrate their DB schemes in their overall financial management and that the 
funding decisions of schemes are part of the company’s whole portfolio of corporate decisions. 
As the CEO influences the major corporate decisions (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005), 
the CEO may be a further important determinant of the funding level. While the CEO is 
appointed to act in the best interests of the company, the separation of ownership and control 
gives rise to agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). To address 
the agency costs, boards seek to remunerate CEO with incentive plans to ensure that CEO 
decisions best reflect shareholder goals (Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2003; Murphy, 1999; Davila 
and Penalva, 2006). Whereas incentive plans encourage the shifting of risk to debtholders, 
boards also seek to include inside debt to reduce risk-inducing effects (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). Consistent with this goal, a strand of empirical research shows 
that inside debt leads to avoidance of risk in company (Deng, He, Kong, and Zhang, 2019; 
Bennett, Guntay, and Unal, 2015; Srivastav, Armitage, Hagendorff, and King, 2018; Freund, 
Latif, and V. Phan, 2018; Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova, 2013; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, 
and Stuart, 2012; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). Other studies also show that companies in 
which CEOs are paid with inside debt have a lower cost of capital suggesting that bondholders are 
aware of risk-avoiding incentives created by inside debt (Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova, 2013). 
This study builds on the agency theory to examine whether CEO inside debt incentives 
generated by DB pensions are associated with higher funding levels of DB schemes. DB 
pension is viewed as inside debt because the pension of DB type consists of the company’s 
promise of cash in the future. CEO more likely will get the promised level of DB pension when 
there are sufficient funds in the pension schemes – when the pension assets equal to or exceed 
the value of pension promises. However, when there is a deficit, e.g., shortage of pension 
assets, the CEO risks losing a share of the pension accruals. For instance, if the company 
bankrupts, the CEO would stand in line with other debtholders and is bound to accept what is 
offered rather than what is promised. Therefore, inside debt becomes unsecured when there is 
a deficit, and the CEO can be seen as an unsecured creditor of the company. 
However, as the CEO may influence all major decisions, the CEO could also initiate 
decisions to prevent the scheme from being underfunded or restore the funding levels if there 
is a deficit. By maintaining healthy DB scheme, the CEO pension becomes more secured. In 
contrast, CEOs with alternative pension arrangements such as DC and cash, which are not debt-
like like DB pensions, may show more risk-taking behaviour because financing of DB scheme 
is costly for the company that may directly influence CEO (through lower remuneration for 
example). Evidence from past research shows that CEOs manipulate pension assumptions and 
adjust pension investment strategy when they have the interests to do so (Bergstresser, Desai, 
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and Rauh, 2006; Comprix and Muller, 2006; Watts and Zimmermann, 1990) – actions that 
directly influence the funding levels of DB schemes. Other studies also show that CEOs benefit 
from lower pension contributions by getting higher compensation, especially when CEO 
compensation is linked/more sensitive to cash flows from operations (Cheng and Swenson, 
2018). 
While CEOs inside-debt incentives are believed to be important, this study further examines 
the inside-debt incentives of CFOs and their impact on the funding levels of DB schemes. 
There are several reasons why it is also important to focus on CFOs. First, corporate decisions 
are often made in teams, which can change the decision-making dynamics (Hsieh, Wang, and 
Demirkan, 2018; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003) and thus both CEO and CFO, as leaders with 
the most valued positions in the company, should be viewed as “one team with two faces” 
(Tulimiere and Banai, 2010). Second, similar to CEOs, the holdings of DB claims are also 
remarkable among CFOs that could also instigate CFOs to look after DB schemes to regard 
their personal financial interests. For example, 44% of CFOs in the sample hold DB pensions 
with an average value of pension of £86.85 thousand or 4.24% of their total accumulated 
wealth. In comparison to CFO, there are 46% of CEOs in the sample who hold DB pensions 
with an average value of pension of £177.74 thousand that represent 3.64% of their total 
accumulated wealth. Third, CFOs are responsible for the financial management and CFOs 
incentives in particular, due to financial expertise and responsibilities, could be more influential 
in the decision setting. Prior studies provide evidence that suggests that the incentives of CFOs 
are more influential than incentives of CEOs in explaining earnings management (Jiang, 
Petroni, and Wang, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010) and the pension funding 
(Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) inferring that CEOs may rely on CFOs when executing their 
decisions. However, on the hand, the literature also argues that CEO may exert influence on 
various decisions through dismissal of CFO who does not perform in accordance with the 
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preferences of CEO (Mian, 2001; Fee and Hadlock, 2004). In a study examining the reasons 
behind the CFO involvement in accounting manipulation, Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2011) 
find that CFOs manipulate financials due to pressure from CEOs to manage earnings and not 
because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. Following 
these conflicting arguments, this study investigates whose inside debt incentives are associated 
with the funding levels of DB schemes. Focusing on both CEOs and CFOs will enrich the 
understanding of how managerial incentives influence the funding levels of DB schemes and 
in whose domain the funding policy falls. 
Following the empirical studies discussed above and prior theoretical work, this study 
hypothesizes that funding levels of DB schemes are positively related to managers (CEOs and 
CFOs) DB pensions. As argued above, the presence of DB pensions may induce CEOs and 
CFOs to take less risk with respect to DB schemes by keeping the scheme better funded. Using 
a sample of UK companies with DB pension arrangements and remuneration data of their 
CEOs, this study finds strong support for this hypothesis. In particular, this study finds that 
CEOs DB pensions positively associated with the funding levels of DB schemes. These 
findings imply that DB pension schemes are better funded when CEOs participate in DB 
schemes, e.g., when they have DB pensions, as consistent with the stated hypothesis. However, 
the regression analysis fails to find a relationship between CFOs DB pensions and the funding 
levels of DB schemes implying that CFOs inside debt incentives are less influential than those 
of CEOs. Taken together, these findings suggest that CEOs incentives play a more important 
role than CFOs incentives. Although CFOs are in charge of financials, it appears that CEOs 
exert significant influence over CFOs decisions to induce CFOs to make decisions to regard 
the interests of CEOs which are not always in interests of CFOs themselves.  
This study further documents that CEOs DB pensions are associated with higher funding 
for older CEOs (CEOs who approach closer to retirement). These findings imply that CEOs 
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seek to secure their DB pensions as they get near to retirement. Overall, these results highlight 
the importance of CEO inside debt incentives for DB schemes.  
This study does not test whether the funding position of DB schemes is increasing in the 
age of a CFO with DB pension because CFOs are on average 4 years younger than CEOs and 
there is no insufficient number of observations for the sub-sample of CFOs approaching closer 
to retirement.  
This research makes several contributions to the literature. First, this study contributes to 
the literature on the determinants of funding levels of DB schemes by examining whether 
funding levels are related to CEO inside debt incentives plans (Begley, Chamberlain, Yang, 
and Zhang, 2014; Y Yu-Thompson, 2015). As CEO plays an important role in corporate 
financing decisions, CEO incentives are vital at understanding the complex relationship 
between the company and the pension scheme. While previous research has tended to focus on 
the role of companies (Davis and de Haan, 2012; Bartram, 2018 and others), this study shows 
that CEOs inside debt incentives also influence the funding levels of DB schemes. These 
findings reveal important implications for DB schemes, and regulators and policymakers can 
use these results to respond to the problem of CEO disincentives when the CEO has no DB 
pensions to encourage proper scheme management.  
Second, this is the first study that examines the relationship between CEOs inside debt 
incentives and funding levels of DB schemes in the United Kingdom. The regulation of 
occupational pension schemes in the United Kingdom is specific regarding how companies 
tackle the deficit – companies may consider long periods to eliminate the deficit in the scheme, 
as previously discussed in Chapter 2. First, such regulatory flexibility assures that regulation 
does not influence the managers attitude towards DB scheme with no inside debt incentives. 
For instance, if the pension regulation is stricter in a sense that it would require companies to 
remove the underfunding within a short period of time (e.g., 3 years), the managers with no 
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inside debt incentives are also more likely to take actions to remove the deficit due to the 
regulatory requirements. Therefore, when the deficit funding requirements are strict, all 
managers, irrespective of their incentives, may take actions to bring and keep the scheme fully 
funded to avoid regulatory intervention or penalties. Second, the results of this study reflect 
the effects of the existing pension regulation. Although this research focuses on UK companies, 
the results of this study can also apply to companies with DB pension arrangements in other 
countries with pension regulation similar to the UK, such as the US. As evidence of 
applicability, these study findings are consistent with prior studies on US companies examining 
the role of CEO inside debt incentives for funding of DB schemes (Begley and Chamberlain, 
2014; Y Yu-Thompson, 2015). 
Third, this study contributes to the literature on CEOs incentives highlighting the usefulness 
of inside-debt in reducing the risk-taking behaviour, as consistent with prior literature (Deng, 
He, Kong, and Zhang, 2019; Bennett, Guntay, and Unal, 2015; Srivastav, Armitage, 
Hagendorff, and King, 2018; Freund, Latif, and V. Phan, 2018; Kabir, Li, and Veld- 
Merkoulova, 2017; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 2012; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007 
and others). As the popularity of DB pensions decreases, boards and other stakeholders should 
seek an alternative form of compensation to avoid excessive risk-taking by the CEO and protect 
the interests of remaining DB members.  
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature on the opportunistic behaviour of CEOs by 
documenting that CEOs tend to be more short-term oriented as they approach retirement. This 
is consistent with prior research that shows that shorter career horizon causes CEOs to act 
myopically (Barker and Mueller, 2002, Zona, 2016; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Cho and Kim, 
2017 and others). However, the DB element of CEO compensation induces CEOs to reduce 
the deficit in DB schemes to preserve their DB accruals in the company. This conclusion is 
consistent with prior study findings by documenting that DB pension causes CEOs with short 
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career horizon to reduce R&D to secure their DB pensions (Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova, 
2017). 
Fifth, this study provides new evidence on the interactive relationship between DB pensions 
and companies with single-schemes suggesting that CEOs with DB pensions are particularly 
concerned about the funding of the scheme in which they participate. This has implications for 
other DB schemes if there is any. This study also demonstrates that the board, policymakers, 
regulators and investors should recognize the contrasting incentives of CEOs with alternative 
pension arrangements and the potential implications for the pension scheme members and the 
company in the future. To recognize these contrasting incentives is important, particularly 
when DB pensions gradually disappear, and companies offer their CEOs to participate in DC 
schemes or receive cash in lieu of pension contributions. 
Lastly, this study also contributes to the literature on the determinants of funding levels of 
DB schemes by examining whether funding levels are also related to CFO inside debt 
incentives. The results reveal that CFOs inside debt incentives are less important than those of 
CEOs. These findings may help board, policymakers and regulators understand the roles of 
CEOs and CFOs play in the company setting and in the funding policy of DB schemes. This 
study also contributes to the growing literature on the influential role of CEOs (Feng, Ge, Luo, 
and Shevlin, 2011). Moreover, these findings have implications for current corporate 
governance reform and highlight the need to improve on the current corporate governance 
system. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 develops hypotheses. 






4.2. Hypothesis development 
 
CEO is the most senior manager who is in charge of the company and thus wields significant 
influence over the corporate decisions (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005). Because CEO’s 
decisions are sensitive to his/her incentives (Fama and Jensen, 1983), this study predicts that 
funding of DB schemes is related to CEO’s inside-debt incentives.  
DB pensions may incentivise managers to take less risks because of the inside debt nature 
of these claims (Edmans and Liu, 2012). In a DB scheme, the CEO expects to receive a pension 
typically linked to final or average salary, and the company is responsible to deliver the 
promised level of pension when CEO retires. CEO usually makes annual contributions defined 
as a certain percentage of his salary in return to the future stream of retirement income. Such 
“pay me now – I will pay you later” relationship makes CEO creditor of the company because 
if the company bankrupts CEO would stand in line with other debtholders. In this case, the 
CEO is bound to accept whether payments are available for them. Thus, the CEO with DB 
pensions could be more incentivised to look after DB scheme and keep the scheme better 
funded. By having a financially healthy scheme, CEO reduces the overall risk of the pension 
scheme, improves the outlook of the company as well as places the company in a better 
situation to honour all the pension claims in full simultaneously protecting himself from the 
risk of losing his pension.  
However, CEO with DC or cash arrangements may exhibit contrasting behaviour from the 
CEO with DB pensions. For CEO with DC or cash pensions, the company makes annual 
contributions to the CEO’s personal pension fund or pays cash in place of pension contributions 
directly to the CEO. After making these contributions, the company has no further 
responsibility and CEO holds no pension claims. Having no pension claims may encourage the 
CEO to take more pension risks by making lower pension contributions to the scheme. By 
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managing the contribution policy of schemes, the CEO can reserve more funds available for 
investments and dividends payouts as well as for higher remuneration. While both DB and DC 
schemes along with cash arrangements intend to provide the CEO with a retirement income, 
only DB pensions expose the CEO to the possibility of a loss of personal wealth. Thus, DB 
pensions more likely to incentivise the CEO to be prudent concerning DB schemes while DC 
or cash pensions more likely to encourage the CEO to take more risk. 
However, the extent to which CEOs with DB pensions may care about the scheme may also 
depend on the sensitivity of CEOs to pension losses. In the United Kingdom, the PPF protects 
the interests of the scheme members. If the company bankrupts, the PPF guarantees to pay 
pensions but only up to a certain amount (compensation cap). Such protective measures are 
good for the pension scheme members but could create conflicting incentives in the CEOs with 
DB pensions of different sizes due to the differences in risks of the pension claims. For 
example, CEO with DB pension accrued up to compensation cap losses only 10% of the 
compensation cap while CEO with DB pension accrued above the compensation cap losses 
10% plus pension accrued above the cap15. This means that CEOs with the largest pensions 
could face the largest losses. Thus, CEO with DB pension above the compensation cap can be 
more sensitive to pension risk than CEO with DB pension below the compensation cap.  
Building upon agency theory, this study hypothesises that, as CEO DB pension leads to risk 
avoidance in the pension schemes, funding levels of DB schemes positively associate with 
CEO DB pension. However, taking the regulatory feature of UK pension schemes, this study 
predicts that funding levels of DB schemes positively associate only with CEO DB pension 
accrued above the compensation cap as lower funding levels expose the CEO to the possibility 
 
15 For example, if CEO accrued DB pension of £40,020 a year, his pension would be reduced to a minimum of 
£36,018 a year (compensation cap limit from 2019 is £40,020 and DB members are entitled to receive only 90% 
of the compensation cap). For CEO with DB pension of £100,000 a year, the loss in pension would be £63,982 a 
year compared to £4,002 for CEO with DB pension of £40,020.  
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of losing a higher portion of the accrued pension when the pension exceeds the compensation 
cap. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Funding of DB schemes is positively related to CEO DB pensions accrued 
above the compensation cap. 
 
CFO also may wield significant influence over the corporate decisions due to his/her 
financial expertise and responsibilities. For example, Florackis and Sainani (2018) argue that 
the role of the CFO has evolved considerably and has expanded beyond the traditional 
controllership and compliance functions, but the role of CFO has received much less attention 
in the literature compared to CEO. Investigating how CFOs matter to corporate financial 
policies, Florackis and Sainani (2018) find that a CFO has an ability to influence financial 
decision-making. Other studies provide evidence that suggests that the incentives of CFOs are 
more influential than incentives of CEOs (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2010; Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2010; Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) inferring that CEOs may rely on CFOs 
when executing their decisions.  Because CFO’s decisions may also be sensitive to his/her 
incentives, this study predicts that funding of DB schemes is also related to CFO’s inside-debt 
incentives.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Funding of DB schemes is positively related to CFO DB pensions accrued 
above the compensation cap. 
 
While DB pension may incentivise managers to take actions to bring and keep the pension 
scheme fully funded, it is conceivable that age may further influence this relationship.  
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Previous studies have well documented the change in manager behaviour as he gets closer 
to retirement. For example, it has been found that CEO nearing retirement tend to spend less 
on research (Barker and Mueller, 2002, Zona, 2016; Dechow and Sloan, 1991), make fewer 
innovations (Cho and Kim, 2017) and reduce the capital expenditure (Conyon, 2006; Cheng, 
2004). CEOs with shorted career horizon also associate with higher earnings management (Ali 
and Zhang, 2015; Kalyta, 2009b; Davidson Xie, Xu and Ning, 2007) and lower firm valuation 
and higher levels of information risk (Antia, Pantzalis, and Park, 2010). Universally, these 
studies suggest that managers approaching retirement are less incentivised to invest in projects 
whose payback comes after their retirement and instead behave in a way that increases the 
benefits in the short-run. 
The age may also influence the link between DB pension and funding position of DB 
schemes as Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that as manager approaches closer to 
retirement, the importance of pension also increases. As pension become more important, 
having a DB arrangement can make the manager more cautious about the deficit in the DB 
scheme as underfunding increases the risks of losing the pension. As a result, older manager 
with DB pensions more likely to make decisions that would positively influence the funding 
levels of DB schemes to maximize the prospect of receiving their pensions in full. Prior study 
indirectly supports these conjectures by documenting that DB component of executive 
compensation leads older CEOs to decrease the R&D (Kabir, Li, and Veld- Merkoulova, 2017) 
possibly suggesting that CEO with DB pension tend to reduce the deficit at the expense of 
R&D. Therefore, the third hypothesis predicts that the funding position of DB schemes is 
increasing in the age of a CEO with DB pension above the compensation cap as CEO becomes 




Hypothesis 3 (CEO age hypothesis): the funding position of DB schemes is increasing in 
the age of a CEO with DB pension above the compensation cap as CEO becomes more cautious 
about the security of DB pension as he gets closer to retirement. 
 
The age hypothesis has been dropped for CFOs because CFOs are on average 4 years 
younger than CEOs, and there is insufficient number of observations for the sample of CFOs 
approaching closer to retirement.  
 
 
4.3. Research design 
 
4.3.1. Sample 
This study focuses on the companies in the FTSE 350 index (Chapter 2 explains why the 
FTSE 350 index has been chosen as the primary data source). The initial sample contains 
information on funding levels of DB schemes on 211 companies and remuneration on 414 
unique CEOs and 453 unique CFOs over the 2004-2015 period. However, there is some 
missing information on other CEO-, CFO-, the company- and pension scheme-specific 
variables that reduces the initial sample. Moreover, as the compensation cap was first 
introduced in the 2005/06 year, this study uses a sample covering the 2006-2015 period in the 
main analyses and full sample covering the 2004-2015 period for robustness check. Since the 
analysis also includes company-specific characteristics, the analysis is conducted using non-
financial companies. The reason for excluding financial companies from the sample is due to 
the excessive leverage that is normal for the financial institutions but does not have the same 
meaning for non-financial companies, where high leverage more likely indicates distress (Fama 
and French, 1992). Exclusion of financial companies further reduces the sample by 25 
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companies. However, the results remain robust to the inclusion of financial companies in the 
sample (this will be discussed later in this chapter). 
Depending on the choice of independent variables, the 2006-2015 sample consists of cross-
sectional time-series data of at least 998 company-year observations for at least 126 non-
financial companies. The full sample consists of cross-sectional time-series data of at least 





The dependent variable (FR%) is the ratio of pension assets to the pension liabilities 
represented in percentage. The FR% below 100% indicates that the pension scheme is 
underfunded, while FR% of 100% or above indicates that the pension scheme is sufficiently 
funded and able to pay the pensions in full. Lower FR% translates to a higher deficit in the 
scheme that raises the scheme risk as the company may be unable to pay the pension liabilities 
in full. This study draws on data on the current market value of pension assets and future 
liabilities from DataStream and companies’ annual reports to compute the FR%. The latter data 
source has been used to fill the gaps in missing data obtained from DataStream. The 
information on the current market value of pension assets and future liabilities has been widely 
used in prior studies on DB pensions to measure the financial health of the pension schemes 
(Begley, Chamberlain, 2014; Yang and Zhang, 2015; Rauh, Stefanescu and Zeldes, 2013; 
Ponds, Severinson and Yermo, 2011; Kroon, Wouters and Carvalho, 2017; Inkmann, Blake 





Managers’ inside-debt incentives 
Managers’ inside-debt is the accrued value of DB pension. There are two measures of CEO 
and CFO DB pensions: the annual value of DB pension (Annual-pension) and transfer or total 
(Total-pension) value of DB pension. Annual-pension is the value of DB pension that the CEO 
or CFO would expect to receive each year after he retires. Total-pension is the value of all 
future pensions accrued to date and is the value that the CEO or CFO could get if he exercises 
the right to transfer money out of the scheme. This study uses both Annual-pension and Total-
pension to check the sensitivity of results to different measures of DB pensions. Also, there are 
two ways how to measure the size of DB pension: in pound value of DB pension or as a ratio 
of DB pension relative to the CEO or CFO total wealth. This study focuses on the latter as this 
measure better reflects the importance of DB pension for CEO or CFO.  
To account for CEOs or CFOs who accrued pensions above the compensation cap, this study 
introduces an indicator variable above-CAP-member. Variable above-CAP-member takes the 
value of 1 if CEO or CFO DB pension exceeds the compensation cap and 0 otherwise.  
The data on CEO and CFO pension remuneration has been collected from financial notes to 
the companies’ annual reports. Information on CEO and CFO total wealth has been obtained 
from Boardex that defines total wealth as the market value of stock plus the intrinsic value of 
options.  
 
Single and multiple DB schemes  
Companies may have more than one DB pension scheme. For multiple pension schemes, 
the FR% represents the average FR% of all schemes as companies report the pension-related 
information at the aggregate level. Existence of multiple schemes adds complexity in 
examining the role of CEO and CFO inside-debt incentives on the funding of DB schemes as 
CEO or CFO may care more about the scheme in which he participates and less about other 
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schemes. Conversely, the pension scheme in which the CEO or CFO participates may show 
higher funding levels compared to other pension schemes in which the CEO and CFO has no 
DB pension. As the average FR% can be less sensitive to managers DB pensions, this study 
introduces an indicator variable Single-scheme that equals 1 if the company has only one DB 
scheme and 0 otherwise.  
However, including Single-scheme is also important in its own. Single-scheme is typically 
large as all eligible employees participate in one scheme. Large schemes have better 
governance, less operational costs and more effective investment strategies (DWP White 
Paper, 2018). In contrast, the company that sponsor multiple schemes tend to have smaller 
individual schemes as employee participates in one of several schemes based on the specific 
participation requirements (e.g., by operational or geographical characteristics, etc.). While 
large schemes benefit from economies of scale, small schemes experience lack of access to the 
skills and expertise necessary to achieve a comparable level of returns and face higher 
administration and investment costs (Stewart and Yermo, 2008; Bikker and De Dreu, 2009; 
Dyck and Pomorski, 2011). Therefore, this study predicts that company with Single-scheme 
shows higher FR% than a company with multiple schemes.  
The information on whether or not a company has only one DB pension scheme has been 
collected from the company’s annual report.  
 
Other variables 
This study includes several other variables to capture the effects of other CEO and CFO 






CEO and CFO characteristics  
Other CEO and CFO characteristics include tenure, age, accounting background and 
education. Managers’ tenure is a widely used measure of managerial power that represents the 
CEO’s or CFO’s length of service in the company (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). How tenure influences the funding is explained as follows. First, long-
tenured managers develop the company-specific human capital (Harris and Helfat, 1997) that 
is more difficult for the board to monitor (Lado and Wilson, 1994). As a result, manager have 
greater discretion in resources allocation and decision making. Second, long-tenured managers 
more likely to have DB pensions as DB pensions were a common form of retirement 
arrangements until recently. Having DB pensions more likely to make the CEO and CFO to be 
more cautious about the funding of the DB scheme and make necessary decisions to ensure the 
recipience of the promised level of pensions. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that CEOs 
tend to manage earnings more in the early years due to career concerns (Ali and Zhang, 2015). 
As such, new CEOs may increase profitability by reducing pension contributions to favourably 
influence the market perception of their ability. Thus, taking together it is expected that tenure 
positively associates with FR%. The study separately controls for the CEO/CFO tenure in role 
(Role-tenure), tenure in the company (Company-tenure) and time on board (Board-tenure).  
Due to hidden multicollinearity issues, this study also separately controls for the CEO age 
(Age) in regressions examining hypothesis 1. For the CEO age hypothesis (hypothesis 3), CEO 
Age is one of the key variables of interest. This study uses the log of Role-, Company-, Board- 
tenure and the log of Age. 
This study also controls for the effect of whether or not the CEO has an accounting education 
(Accounting-background). CEO with accounting background has more accounting/finance 
knowledge, and it is argued that frauds occurring during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX Act) period may have been avoided if CEOs had accounting background (Hu, 2006). 
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Having an accounting background may encourage more accurate financial reporting due to 
accounting knowledge and less financial manipulation to avoid implications implemented by 
the SOX Act. Existing literature suggests that companies managed by the CEOs with 
financial/accounting experience provide more accurate earnings information and higher quality 
financial statements (Jiang, Zhu, and Huang, 2013; Matsunaga and Yeung, 2008). Therefore, 
it is expected that CEO Accounting-education, which takes the value of 1 when CEO has 
accounting education or previously served as CFO and 0 otherwise, positively associates with 
FR% by maintaining more accurate pension accounting and the level of pension contributions.  
 
Company characteristics 
This study also captures the effects of the company size, borrowing capability and 
profitability on the funding of DB schemes. Larger companies are likely to have more resources 
and higher leverage capability (Wilden, Gudergan, Nielsen, and Lings, 2013). Some studies 
also provide evidence that larger companies are more profitable (Lee, 2009). As a result, the 
size could be an important determinant of the company’s ability to make pension contributions. 
Therefore, it is expected that DB schemes are more financially sound in larger companies. This 
study controls for the size of the company (Company-size) measured by the pound value of 
total assets. A natural logarithm is taken to address the issues with normality. Prior studies find 
that the size of the company positively relates to the size of pension contributions (Davies and 
de Haan, 2012) and funding levels of pension schemes (Bartram, 2018). Financial constraints 
also may influence the ability of the company to fund the pension scheme as financially 
constrained companies are likely to have less easy access to capital markets (Acharya, 
Almeida, and Campello, 2007; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang, 2011). As a result, financially 
constrained companies may have stronger incentives to reduce pension contributions to have 
the resource available for the company’s needs (Cooper and Ross, 2002). In line with this 
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theoretical work, empirical studies find that financially constrained companies associate with 
lower pension contributions and funding levels (Bartram, 2018) and with more aggressive 
pension assumptions (Bartram, 2018; Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006; Lew, 2008) that 
simultaneously reduce cash contributions and funding levels. Consequently, pension schemes 
in financially constrained companies are likely less funded. Following previous studies 
(Bartram, 2018), financial constraint is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to the market 
capitalisation plus total liabilities (Leverage). The profitability is another determinant of the 
ability of the company to fund their pension scheme because more profitable companies have 
more financial resources to make higher pension contributions to keep the pension scheme 
better funded. Therefore, it is expected that company profitability, as measured by the return 
on the company’s assets (ROA), positively associate with FR%. A study by Davies and Haan 
(2012) finds that more profitable companies tend to contribute more to pension schemes. 
Another important determinant of the funding is dividend payouts since it is argued that 
companies may be more inclined to pay out cash to equity holders and either underinvest (due 
to a debt-like overhang of pension liabilities) or invest in risky projects (due to risk-shifting) 
(Webb, 2007). However, a deficit in DB schemes has become an issue for many companies 
and the regulators, protecting the interests of the scheme members, may consider intervening 
into the management of the scheme if the company does not take necessary actions to improve 
the funding. As a result, the company may consider paying higher pension contributions to 
reduce the deficit when it has more free funds to avoid the involvement of the regulator into 
the management of the scheme. Reducing deficit also helps to lower the cost of capital, improve 
the credit rating and increase the earnings that can be beneficial for the shareholders themselves 
in the long-run. Therefore, it is expected that companies paying higher Dividends positively 
associate with the %FR. A study of Bunn, Mizen and Smietanka (2018) finds that additional 
pension contributions towards deficit reduction negatively associate with dividends implying 
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that shareholders make up the fund’s shortage. This study also controls for cash which is 
defined as the ratio of cash or equivalent and short-term investment to total assets (Cash).  
 
Pension scheme characteristics 
This research also controls for the pension scheme’ specific characteristics. Specifically, it 
controls for the number of years of DB scheme closure to future accruals (Closure-to-FA). 
Closing DB scheme to future accruals might appear attractive to reduce risks prevalent in DB 
schemes as well as the costs of running the scheme. Moreover, the future of the closed DB 
scheme becomes more evident as it becomes possible to project the scheme’s upcoming benefit 
payments with much greater certainty. However, companies closing DB schemes suffer the 
loss of finances because they lose pension contributions from employees that could make the 
problem of underfunding more severe. First, after the closure, the company more likely 
consider switching to bonds which offer lower returns. That means that to keep the scheme 
fully funded, the company has to increase the pension contributions as the company still need 
to honour the commitments made to current and past employees. It is calculated that since the 
closure of the pension scheme to new members, contribution rates have almost doubled 
(Herzenberg and Snuggs, 2013). Lower asset performance is also exacerbated by the loss of 
returns on pension contributions that new members would have been making had the scheme 
not been closed. Second, since companies no longer able to share the cost of DB pensions with 
their employees (e.g., by increasing employee contributions, increasing retirement age, 
reducing the benefits or switching from final salary to career average), companies may take 
more risk by pursuing risky investments to reduce the pension contributions and transfer the 
risk from the company to pension scheme members. In aggregate, the potential implications 
offset the benefits of scheme closure to future accruals. Therefore, it is also might be expected 
that Closure-to-FA negatively relates to FR%. Also, companies with more mature scheme 
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could take more risks as there is a higher proportion of immediate obligations. Therefore, more 
mature schemes, as measured by the ratio of pension benefits paid out of the scheme/s to the 
total value of pension liabilities (Maturity), more likely to show lower funding levels. In line 
with this prediction, a study by Davies and de Haan (2012) finds that companies with more 
mature schemes pay lower pension contributions. The last variable of this study controls for 
the scheme equity holdings (Equity%) defined as the percentage of pension assets invested in 
equities. Companies can take more pension risk by increasing equity holdings. For example, a 
higher share of pension assets in equities decreases the amount of pension contribution needed 
from the company (Gold, 2003). Consistent with this argument, empirical studies find the 
negative relationship between equity holdings and pension contributions (Davies and de Haan, 
2012) and positive relationship between equity holdings and expected rates of return 
(Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006) that allow companies to make and justify lower pension 
contributions. Therefore, consistent with the previous studies, it is expected that Equity% 
negatively associated with FR%. 
The data on CEO and CFO specific-characteristics such as Role-tenure, Company-tenure, 
Board-tenure, Age and Accounting-background is obtained from BoardEx database. The 
information on Accounting-background (education) has been also obtained by screening the 
CEO profile online (e.g., using Linkedin or other internet resources) when it was impossible to 
determine the CEO accounting background from BoardEx. The company-specific data such as 
Company-size, Leverage, ROA, Dividends and Cash are obtained from DataStream database. 
Information on pension scheme characteristics such as Single-scheme, Closure-to-FA and 
Maturity is hand collected from companies’ annual reports. Data on Equity% is downloaded 




Table 4.1 reports the names of the all variables used in this study, their definitions and the 
data sources. 
Table 4.1 
Variables definitions and data sources. 
 
Variable Definition Data source 
 
CEO characteristics   
CEO-Annual-pension CEO annual DB pension to CEO total wealth, % companies’ annual reports/ 
BoardEx 
CEO-Total-pension CEO total DB pension to CEO total wealth, % companies’ annual reports/ 
BoardEx 
CEO-aboveCAP-member indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO 
pension exceeds the compensation cap and 0 
otherwise 
companies’ annual reports 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) log number of fiscal years of CEO in the company as 
CEO 
BoardEx 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure) log number of fiscal years of CEO on the board BoardEx 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) log number of fiscal years of CEO in the company BoardEx 
ln (CEO-Age) log CEO age BoardEx 
Accounting-background indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO has 
accounting background or previously served as CFO 
and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
CFO characteristics   
CFO-Annual-pension CFO annual DB pension to CFO total wealth, % companies’ annual reports/ 
BoardEx 
CFO-Total-pension CFO total DB pension to CFO total wealth, % companies’ annual reports/ 
BoardEx 
CFO-aboveCAP-member indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if CFO 
pension exceeds the compensation cap and 0 
otherwise 
companies’ annual reports 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure) log number of years of CFO in the company as CFO BoardEx 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure) log number of years of CFO on the board BoardEx 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure) log number of years of CFO in the company BoardEx 
ln (CFO-Age) log CFO age BoardEx 
Company characteristics   
Ln (Company-size) log of the company’s total assets DataStream 
Leverage total liabilities to market capitalisation plus total 
liabilities, % 
DataStream 
ROA company’s annual earnings to total assets, % DataStream 
Dividends dividends to market capitalisation, % DataStream 
Cash company’s cash and cash equivalents to total assets, 
% 
DataStream 
Pension scheme characteristics   
Single-scheme indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if company 
has only one DB scheme and 0 otherwise 
companies’ annual reports 
Closure-to-FA number of years since the scheme closure to future 
accruals  
companies’ annual reports 













Table 4.2 reports a pair-wise correlation. Most variables have correlation coefficients below 
0.40. However, there are several variables which tend to substantially correlate. For example, 
a high correlation is observed between CEO Annual-pension and CEO Total-pension with a 
correlation coefficient of above 0.94. Such a high correlation is expected as these variables all 
measure the CEO inside-debt incentives. The high correlation is also observed between CFO 
Annual-pension and CFO Total-pension with a correlation coefficient of above 0.91.  Given 
that these highly correlated variables are used in the regressions alternatively, the strong 
association between these variables is not an issue. As expected, a high correlation is also 
observed between Role-tenure, Company-tenure and Board-tenure variables. These variables 
also to be used in the regressions alternatively.  
Moreover, for each model specification the variance inflation factor (VIF) has been 
calculated. Overall, the results from the VIF estimates indicate that the degree of the variance 
of the estimated coefficients is not affected by the collinearity.  
The pair-wise correlation shows that %FR is significantly and negatively correlated with 
Total-pension. The negative relationship means that DB schemes are less funded when the 
CEO has inside debt in the company, which contradicts with the stated hypothesis. However, 
it is important to distinguish whether or not CEO accrued pension above the compensation cap 
because CEO risk to pension losses raises after the pension exceeds the compensation threshold 
set by the PPF. As previously discussed, it is also important to account whether or not the 
company has only one DB scheme because the %FR may be less sensitive to CEO inside debt 
in multiple schemes.  These factors are accounted at the empirical stage of the analysis. The 
pair-wise correlation, however, fails to find any correlation between CFO DB pension and 
%FR.    
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Table 4.2 
Pair-wise correlation. Correlations significant at the 5% level or better are denoted with *. Correlations exceeding 0.4 threshold are highlighted in bold. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1 %FR 1            
2 CEO-Annual-pension -0.0237 1           
3 CEO-Total-pension -0.1262* 0.9455* 1          
4 ln (CEO-Role-tenure) 0.0098 0.042 0.0640* 1         
5 ln (CEO-Company-tenure) -0.0474* 0.0491* 0.2861* 0.6360* 1        
6 ln (CEO-Board-tenure) -0.0533* 0.0435 0.1733* 0.7925* 0.8695* 1       
7 ln (CEO-Age) -0.0107 0.0022 0.0763* 0.3394* 0.2384* 0.3127* 1      
8 Accounting-background 0.0053 -0.0159 -0.0515* -0.0365 0.0074 0.0652* -0.0283 1     
9 CFO-Annual-pension 0.0331 0.9140* 0.3341* 0.0470* 0.0526* 0.0476* 0.0022 -0.0169 1    
10 CFO-Total-pension -0.0419 0.2895* 0.3255* -0.0249 0.0517* 0.0055 -0.0444* -0.0590* 0.9179* 1   
11 ln (CFO-Role-tenure) -0.0011 0.0645* 0.0224 0.2951* 0.2953* 0.3014* 0.1005* -0.0746* 0.0707* 0.1734* 1  
12 ln (CFO-Company-tenure) -0.0084 0.0446 0.0671* 0.2798* 0.3396* 0.3192* 0.0666* -0.0043 0.0532* 0.3484* 0.8130*  
13 ln (CFO-Board-tenure) -0.0135 0.0618* 0.0352 0.2887* 0.3033* 0.3080* 0.1081* -0.0785* 0.0685* 0.2016* 0.9726*  
14 ln (CFO-Age) 0.012 0.0587* -0.0507* 0.0876* 0.0627* 0.0611* 0.2269* -0.1422* 0.0634* 0.1489* 0.4525*  
15 Single-scheme 0.1925* -0.0234 -0.1041* 0.0530* 0.0641* 0.0697* -0.0839* -0.0358 -0.0238 -0.0274 -0.0184  
16 %Equity -0.3524* -0.0188 0.1811* -0.0053 0.0726* 0.0714* -0.0973* -0.0856* -0.0142 0.0889* 0.0480*  
17 Closure-to-FA 0.1220* -0.0151 -0.1473* 0.0874* 0.0354 0.0586* 0.0264 0.0083 -0.0187 -0.1521* 0.0852*  
18 Maturity 0.0485* -0.0516* -0.0531* -0.0098 -0.0793* -0.0408 0.0594* 0.0758* -0.0176 0.0042 -0.0228  
19 ln (Company-size) 0.0819* 0.0407 -0.0551* -0.0853* -0.0790* -0.0826* 0.0937* 0.043 0.0451* -0.0484* -0.0335  
21 Leverage -0.0533* -0.0478* 0.1015* -0.1311* -0.1161* -0.0932* -0.0136 0.0941* -0.0489* 0.0474* -0.1927*  
22 ROA -0.0276 0.0071 -0.0174 0.1248* 0.1490* 0.1147* -0.0255 -0.0595* 0.0073 0.0017 0.1407*  
23 Dividends-to-MC -0.0106 -0.0084 0.0063 0.0481* 0.0597* 0.0538* 0.0064 -0.0303 -0.0079 -0.0051 -0.0495*  
24 Cash-to-TA 0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0028 0.0354 0.0951* 0.0667* 0.0184 -0.0490* -0.0005 0.021 -0.031                
  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 
12 ln (CFO-Company-tenure) 1            
13 ln (CFO-Board-tenure) 0.8325* 1           
14 ln (CFO-Age) 0.3417* 0.4821* 1          
15 Single-scheme 0.0228 -0.003 -0.1426* 1         
16 %Equity 0.0450* 0.0599* -0.1973* 0.0268 1        
17 Closure-to-FA 0.0254 0.0736* 0.0842* 0.2161* -0.1579* 1       
18 Maturity -0.0134 -0.0158 0.1215* -0.0755* -0.2705* 0.0127 1      
19 ln (Company-size) 0.0048 -0.0486* 0.1650* -0.2102* -0.2325* -0.1632* 0.1575* 1     
21 Leverage -0.1736* -0.1862* -0.0417 -0.1552* -0.0345 -0.1203* 0.1191* 0.3097* 1    
22 ROA 0.1509* 0.1339* 0.0145 0.0919* 0.1262* 0.0438* -0.0780* -0.2115* -0.5788* 1   
23 Dividends-to-MC -0.0639* -0.0518* -0.0345 -0.0578* -0.0409 -0.0355 -0.0083 -0.0059 0.2273* -0.0657* 1  




4.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics such as minimum (Min), mean (Mean), median 
(Median) and maximum (Max) values and standard deviation (SD) of the variables used in the 
study. For CEO and CFO pensions, the statistics are reported for the sample of all CEOs/CFOs 
and the sample of CEOs/CFOs with DB pensions only. The sample excludes Royal Mail Group 
as the company transferred the pension liabilities of around £40 billion to the new public sector 
(House of Commons report from 2013: Royal Mail Pension Plan). This event had a significant 
impact on the scheme funding level: the scheme turned to be in surplus after the transfer from 
having a deficit of around £10 billion before the transfer. 
According to the statistics, the mean of %FR is 87.19% and the median is 87.85%. The 
minimum and maximum of %FR is 14.3% and 136.66% respectively, with a SD of 13.82%. 
These statistics show that the average pension scheme is underfunded by around 13% and that 
funding levels of DB schemes vary across companies. With regards to CEO annual DB 
pensions (here the main focus on CEOs-DB members only), pensions on average constitute 
around 3.64% of the total CEO wealth with a median of 2.22% and minimum and maximum 
values of less than 0.1% and 35.7% respectively. In pound value, the average (median) size of 
annual pension valued at £177.75 (£110.21) thousands with a minimum of less than a thousand 
and a maximum of nearly one million pounds. The significance of pensions relative to the CEO 
wealth is higher when DB pensions represent the total size of DB accruals. For example, the 
total size of DB pension on average constitute around 62.12% of the total CEO wealth, with a 
median of 34.08% and a maximum of 699.03%. In pound value, the average (median) size of 
total pension estimated at more than £3085.02 (£1774.50) thousand with a minimum of less 
than £6 thousand and maximum of over £22242 million. These numbers indicate that DB 
pension can be substantially large and may represent a significant portion of CEO total wealth.  
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The statistics reported on CFO DB pensions also highlights that DB are also widespread in 
CFO compensation. For example, CFOs pensions on average constitute around 4.24% of the 
total CFO wealth with a median of 2.30% and minimum and maximum values of less than 
0.1% and 42.86% respectively. In pound value, the average (median) size of CFO annual 
pension valued at £86.85 (£50.99) thousands with a minimum of a thousand and a maximum 
of £540.66 thousand. The total size of DB pension on average constitute around 61.61% of the 
total CFO wealth, with a median of 32.34% and a maximum of 600.80%. In pound value, the 
average (median) size of CFO total pension estimated at more than £1407.31 (£669.50) 
thousand with a minimum of £5 thousand and maximum of over £13222 thousand. These 
numbers indicate that in pound value CFOs DB pensions are about two times lower than CEOs 
DB pensions, but there is no significant difference in the importance of CEOs and CFOs DB 
pensions relative to the total wealth. Therefore, despite that CFOs pension compensation is 
smaller than those of CEOs, DB pensions appear to be equally important for both CEOs and 
CFOs suggesting that CFOs incentives may also play an influential role in the funding of DB 
schemes.  
For CEO-level characteristics-the average Role-tenure is 5.72 years (log of 1.63 years) and 
average Company- and Board- tenure is 11.57 and 8.49 years (or log of 2.22 and 1.99 years) 
respectively. Average Age of CEO is 52.4 years (log of 3.97 years). For CFO-level 
characteristics-the average Role-tenure is 5.28 years (log of 1.58 years) and average Company- 
and Board- tenure is 7.74 and 5.57 years (or log of 1.85 and 1.61 years) respectively. Average 
Age of CFO is 48.83 years (log of 3.90 years). Comparing CFO statistics with statistics on 
CEOs, it emerges that CEOs present longer on the board and in the company compared to 
CFOs. As the long-tenured executives are also more likely to delegate fewer financial decisions 
to others (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2015), these statistics suggest that CEOs incentives might 
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be more influential. Moreover, as CEOs are on average about 4 years older than CFOs, the 
incentives of CFOs could differ from those of CEOs as CEOs are closer to retirement. 
With respect to company-specific variables, the average company has £41549.03 million in 
total assets (log-value of £7.71 million), Leverage of 41.46% with a median of 40.24%, ROA 
of 8.57% with a median of 7.72%, Dividends of 4.41% with a median of 2.83% and Cash of 
10.52% with a median of 6.26%. To minimise the influence of outliers in the company-specific 
variables, variables such as Leverage, ROA, Cash and Dividends are winsorized at 2% and 98% 
levels.  
The statistics on pension-scheme characteristics reveal that on average pension scheme has 
48.58% of pension assets invested in equities with a median of 49% and minimum and 
maximum of none and 100% respectively. The length of Closure-to-FA is less than a year that 
suggests that DB schemes actively accrued pensions for existing and new members during the 
observation period and companies only recently started to close their schemes. The average 
(median) maturity ratio of DB scheme is 3.75% (3.56%) with a maximum ratio of 36.97% that 
suggests that DB schemes have fewer immediate liabilities as the company has more active or 
deferred members than pensioners.  
For indicator variables, CEO-DB member and CEO-aboveCAP-member (DB members only) 
with the value of 1 constitute around 46% and 86% of the sample respectively. These numbers 
suggest that nearly half (46%) of all CEOs participated in DB pension schemes and that the 
majority of these CEOs had pensions in values accrued over the compensation threshold. CFO-
DB member and CFO-aboveCAP-member (DB members only) with the value of 1 constitute 
around 44% and 77% of the sample respectively. These numbers suggest that 44% of all CFOs 
participated in DB pension schemes and that 77% of these CFOs had accrued pensions over 
the compensation threshold.  The statistics also suggest that only 17% of CEOs had accounting-
background and there are 27% of companies with only one DB pension scheme. 
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Table 4.4 further reports the breakdown of different types of pension arrangements in the 
CEO’s (Panel A) and CFO’s (Panel B) compensation package for the 2004 – 2015 period. As 
shown in Panel A of Table 4.4, in 2004 over 67 per cent of CEOs in the FTSE 350 companies 
were members of DB schemes. This is made of 52.3 per cent of CEOs who were served under 
DB pension plan only and more than 15 per cent of CEOs who were members of DC pension 
arrangement and/or had received cash in lieu of pension in addition to accrued benefits under 
DB arrangement. In 2004, nearly 22 per cent of CEOs were merely served under DC plan and 
only 6.5 per cent had received cash in alternative to pension contributions. As shown in Panel 
B of Table 4.4, the number of CFOs with DB arrangement is estimated to be higher and reached 
nearly 75 per cent in 2004. This comprises of more than 51.9 per cent of CFOs with DB only 
pension arrangement and more than 22 per cent of CFOs with both DB and DC arrangements, 
and DB and cash supplements. In 2004 less than 18 per cent of CFOs were members of DC 
plan and only 4 per cent of CFOs had received cash in lieu of pension contributions only. This 
trend has, however, changed significantly and has been matched by a steady increase in the 
number of executives with DC and cash in lieu of pension arrangements, and corresponding 
decrease in the number of executives with DB membership. For example, in 2015 number of 
CEOs with cash in lieu of pension had rapidly increased to 44.5 per cent from just less than 10 
per cent in 2004. The increase in the number of CEOs with DC pension has been more modest 
and reached nearly 29 per cent in 2015 from 21 per cent in 2004. The popularity of the final 
salary pension arrangement has steadily declined and in 2015 less than 7 per cent of CEOs 
accrued pension merely under DB scheme. In aggregate, the proportion of CEOs with DB 
pension is estimated at less than 25 per cent in 2015 compared to more than 67 per cent in 
2004. The decrease of DB pension among CFOs has been more rapid and dropped to 17 per 
cent in 2015 from 75 per cent in 2004. Less than 7 per cent of CFOs accrued pension under 
DB scheme only. In 2015, 43 per cent of CFOs had received cash in lieu of pension 
contributions, 28 per cent were served under DC plan and 8.3 per cent of CFOs had received 





 Min Mean Median Max SD N of observations 
       
%FR (%) 14.34 87.19 87.85 136.66 13.82 1960 
       
CEO inside debt              
CEO-Annual-pension to wealth, % 0.00 1.76 0.00 35.70 3.49 1712 
CEO-Annual-pension, £ 0.00 81.78 0.00 978.00 153.74 1830 
DB members only - Annual-pension to wealth, % 0.00 3.64 2.22 35.70 4.28 827 
DB members only - Annual-pension, £ thousands 0.76 177.75 110.21 978.00 185.27 842 
CEO-Total-pension to wealth, % 0.00 26.04 0.00 699.03 59.09 1701 
CEO-Total-pension, £ thousands 0.00 1304.64 0.00 22242.00 2797.94 1712 
DB members only - Total-pension to wealth, % 0.05 62.12 34.08 699.03 78.05 713 
DB members only - Total-pension, £ thousands 6.52 3085.02 1774.50 22242.00 3609.18 724 
       
CFO inside debt              
CFO-Annual-pension to wealth, % 0.00 1.84 0.00 42.86 4.10 1805 
CFO-Annual-pension, £ 0.00 37.97 0.00 540.66 73.29 1816 
DB members only - Annual-pension to wealth, % 0.04 4.24 2.30 42.86 5.35 783 
DB members only - Annual-pension, £ thousands 1.00 86.85 50.99 540.66 89.69 794 
CFO-Total-pension to wealth, % 0.00 25.44 0.00 600.80 61.93 1741 
CFO-Total-pension, £ thousands 0.00 586.38 0.00 13222.00 1357.91 1752 
DB members only - Total-pension to wealth, % 0.28 61.61 32.34 600.80 84.04 719 
DB members only - Total-pension, £ thousands 5.00 1407.31 669.50 13222.00 1808.89 730        
Other CEO characteristics              
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) 0.00 1.63 1.65 3.70 0.74 1861 
CEO-Role-tenure 0.00 5.72 4.20 39.40 5.63 1861 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) 0.00 2.22 2.29 3.77 0.85 1861 
CEO-Company-tenure 0.00 11.57 8.90 42.40 9.28 1861 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure) 0.00 1.99 2.05 3.70 0.76 1854 
CEO-Board-tenure 0.00 8.49 6.80 39.40 6.82 1854 
ln (CEO-Age) 3.58 3.97 3.97 4.33 0.11 1844 
CEO-Age 35.00 52.40 52.00 75.00 6.02 1844 
       
Other CFO characteristics              
ln (CFO-Role-tenure) 0.00 1.58 1.60 3.58 0.73 1836 
CFO-Role-tenure 0.00 5.28 3.95 34.70 4.84 1836 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure) 0.00 1.85 1.87 3.64 0.83 1836 
CFO-Company-tenure 0.00 7.74 5.50 37.10 7.08 1836 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure) 0.00 1.61 1.65 3.58 0.74 1836 
CFO-Board-tenure 0.00 5.57 4.20 34.70 5.08 1836 
ln (CFO-Age) 3.53 3.90 3.91 4.20 0.11 1828 
CFO-Age 33.00 48.83 49.00 66.00 5.62 1828 
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 Min Mean Median Max SD N of observations 
       
Company characteristics              
Ln (Company-size), £ mil 4.33 7.71 7.54 12.34 1.42 1758 
Company-size, £ mil 37.15 41549.03 2047.00 2394570.00 195424.10 2033 
Leverage, % 1.81 41.46 40.24 99.34 18.43 1729 
ROA, % -84.04 8.57 7.72 100.83 9.05 1732 
Dividends, % 0.00 4.41 2.83 210.61 13.46 1722 
Cash, % 0.00 10.52 6.26 632.05 31.74 1528 
       
Pension scheme characteristics              
Equity, % 0.00 48.58 49.00 100.00 19.76 1854 
Closure-to-FA, years 0.00 0.73 0.00 15.00 1.98 1920 
Maturity, % 0.00 3.75 3.56 36.97 2.14 1841 
       
Indicator variables              
CEO-DB members  0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.50 1842 
CEO-aboveCAP-member (DB-members only) 0.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.35 842 
CFO-DB members  0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.50 1818 
CFO-aboveCAP-member (DB-members only) 0.00 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.42 794 
Accounting-background 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.38 1865 



















Types of pension provisions of CEOs and CFOs over the period between 2004 – 2015, % 
 
 
Panel B: Types of pension provisions of CEOs over the period between 2004 – 2015, % 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2004-2015 
 
DB only 81 76 59 58 49 44 43 29 25 14 15 12 
 
505 
 52.26 46.63 34.50 32.58 28.16 25.00 24.02 16.11 13.23 7.49 7.85 6.28 23.66 
DB/DC 8 10 8 3 8 9 9 9 6 6 6 5 87 
 5.16 6.13 4.68 1.69 4.60 5.11 5.03 5.00 3.17 3.21 3.14 2.62 4.08 
DB/Cash 12 13 30 33 32 32 29 34 35 32 28 27 337 
 7.74 7.98 17.54 18.54 18.39 18.18 16.20 18.89 18.52 17.11 14.66 14.14 15.79 
DB/DC/Cash 4 4 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 4 2 1 23 
 2.58 2.45 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.57 1.12 0.56 1.59 2.14 1.05 0.52 1.08 
DC only 26 32 30 36 40 37 39 35 39 43 45 47 449 
 16.77 19.63 17.54 20.22 22.99 21.02 21.79 19.44 20.63 22.99 23.56 24.61 21.04 
DC/Cash 8 8 11 5 4 3 5 12 12 6 7 8 89 
 5.16 4.91 6.43 2.81 2.30 1.70 2.79 6.67 6.35 3.21 3.66 4.19 4.17 
Cash only 10 15 22 31 36 42 45 53 60 72 80 85 551 
 6.45 9.20 12.87 17.42 20.69 23.86 25.14 29.44 31.75 38.50 41.88 44.50 25.82 
None 6 5 11 11 5 8 7 7 9 10 8 6 93 
 3.87 3.07 6.43 6.18 2.87 4.55 3.91 3.89 4.76 5.35 4.19 3.14 4.36 
 



















Panel B: Types of pension provisions of CFOs over the period between 2004 – 2015, % 
 



























  51.88 48.47 37.79 35.56 31.61 29.28 22.28 11.48 7.94 7.77 7.14 6.22 23.85 
DB/DC 15 12 9 7 6 5 7 6 6 4 2 3 82 
  9.38 7.36 5.23 3.89 3.45 2.76 3.80 3.28 3.17 2.07 1.02 1.55 3.78 
DB/Cash 22 23 32 28 25 21 21 28 36 27 20 18 301 
  13.75 14.11 18.60 15.56 14.37 11.60 11.41 15.30 19.05 13.99 10.20 9.33 13.88 
DB/DC/Cash 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 2 1 13 
  0.00 1.23 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.55 0.53 1.55 1.02 0.52 0.60 
DC only 26 31 32 39 44 55 62 59 50 55 53 54 560 
  16.25 19.02 18.60 21.67 25.29 30.39 33.70 32.24 26.46 28.50 27.04 27.98 25.83 
DC/Cash 3 2 7 5 3 4 7 13 20 16 23 16 119 
  1.88 1.23 4.07 2.78 1.72 2.21 3.80 7.10 10.58 8.29 11.73 8.29 5.49 
Cash only 6 10 18 31 36 39 40 52 54 66 76 83 511 
  3.75 6.13 10.47 17.22 20.69 21.55 21.74 28.42 28.57 34.20 38.78 43.01 23.57 
None 5 4 7 6 5 4 5 3 7 7 6 6 65 




























The statistics presented above describes the variables used in this study. However, it is 
difficult to understand whether or not CEOs/CFOs DB pensions are associated with the funding 
of DB schemes. To better understand whether CEOs/CFOs DB pensions are associated with 
higher %FR, companies are sorted into three groups: companies with (1) alternative-
arrangements, (2) always-DB-pensions and (3) companies-Switchers. Alternative-
arrangements group includes companies whose CEOs/CFOs never had DB pensions during 
the 2004-2015 period and had alternative pension arrangements such as DC or cash pensions. 
Always-DB-pensions group includes companies whose CEOs/CFOs were always members of 
DB schemes, and the companies-Switchers group includes companies whose CEOs/CFOs 
participated in DB schemes, but new CEOs/CFOs were offered alternative pension 
arrangements. The latter group also includes CEOs/CFOs who decided to withdraw their 
pensions from the schemes leaving managers with no inside debt. Companies in always-DB-
pensions and companies-Switchers are further re-sorted into two groups: companies with (1) 
aboveCAP-pensions and (2) belowCAP-pensions. aboveCAP-pensions group includes 
companies whose CEOs/CFOs DB pensions exceed the compensation threshold while 
belowCAP-pensions group includes companies whose CEOs/CFOs DB pensions are below the 
compensation cap16.   
Graph 4.1 graphically displays %FR for companies with alternative-arrangements, always-
DB-pensions and companies-Switchers which were created based on CEOs. Graph 4.2 further 
displays %FR for companies with alternative-arrangements, aboveCAP-pensions and 
belowCAP-pensions which were also created based on CEOs. Using the mean of %FR, Graph 
4.1 reveals no significant differences in %FR between companies with alternative-
arrangements, always-DB-pensions and companies-Switchers. However, Graph 4.2 depicts 
 
16 Both aboveCAP-pension and belowCAP-pension may also include CEOs with non-DB arrangements. 
aboveCAP-pension also includes companies whose CEOs DB pensions were below the compensation cap 
before exceeding the compensation cap. 
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that %FR of DB schemes is higher in companies whose CEOs accrued pension above the 
compensation cap than in companies whose CEOs accrued pension below cap and companies 
with alternative pension arrangements. These graphs illustrate that CEO DB pensions may be 
related to the %FR, but only when CEO DB pensions exceed the compensation threshold, as 
consistent with the hypothesis. This conjecture is further tested using regression analysis.  
 
Graph 4.1 
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Graph 4.3 graphically displays %FR for companies with alternative-arrangements, always-
DB-pensions and companies-Switchers for CFOs. Graph 4.4 further displays %FR for 
companies with alternative-arrangements, aboveCAP-pensions and belowCAP-pensions for 
CFOs. Using the mean of %FR, both Graph 4.3 and 4.4 reveal no significant differences in 
%FR between companies with alternative- arrangements, aboveCAP-pensions and belowCAP-
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Graph 5.1 
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4.4.2. Empirical results 
 
 
At the empirical stage of the analysis, this study considers employing Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimation method. One potential estimation issue is the panel structure of the sample. 
When there is a combination of cross-section and time-series data, it is plausible to test whether 
there are cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and residual autocorrelation within a given cross-
sectional unit. The results from the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation reveal that the error terms are heteroscedastic. Heteroskedastic errors make 
OLS estimators inefficient and induce bias in the corresponding standard errors. A significant 
test statistic for the presence of autocorrelation also indicates about the presence of serial 
correlation in the error terms. Apart from autocorrelation, the correlation between the cross-
sections of the panel is another form of correlation that might also be present in the data. There 
are procedures to test for cross-sectional dependence (Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006, Pesaran, 
2006). However, the test for cross-sectional dependence cannot be performed as the panel is 
unbalanced and there are too many cross-sections. Nevertheless, cross-sectional correlation is 
considered common for panels when there are much more cross-sections than time periods. 
While the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and cross-section correlation 
does not destroy the consistency of the OLS estimator, OLS is no longer efficient as the 
standard errors will be biased. To correct for the lack of efficiency, a Feasible Generalised 
Least Square (FGLS) estimation method is used that allows for the presence of autocorrelation 
within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels that will 
result in an efficient estimation. 
Moreover, it is argued that FGLS is preferred when a time-variation in the data is lower than 
a cross-sectional variation – as in the case here. For example, Davies and de Haan, 2012 argue 
that Within-estimation does not produce a good fit when the time variation in the data is much 
lower than the cross-sectional variation because within estimation loses too much 
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information17. Therefore, FGLS estimation approach is appropriate for this study. The 
appropriateness of random effects was also verified by using the Hausman specification test. 
As a robustness check, this study also used simple linear regression Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation method with industry and year effects. To deal with the heteroskedasticity 
problem in OLS, standard errors are clustered at the company-level. The results from OLS are 
consistent with the estimates obtained from FGLS (the results from OLS are not tabulated). 
 
DB pensions and the funding of DB schemes 
Results from FGLS regressions are reported in Tables 4.5 - 4.8: Table 4.5 reports results 
from regressions controlling for Role-tenure, Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 report results from 
regressions controlling for Company-tenure, Board-tenure and CEO Age respectively. Results 
reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 yield estimates which are consistent with those reported in 
Table 4.5 and thus are shown in Appendix for the sake of saving space. Each regression 
includes (unreported) year and industry dummies to control for any unobserved time- and 
industry- related effects. To check for multicollinearity among independent variables, VIF has 
been calculated for each model specification. Estimates from VIF suggest that multicollinearity 
is not an issue as the VIF does not exceed the critical value of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 
1980).  
Results from the regression analyses using FGLS estimation and controlling for Role-tenure 
are reported in Table 4.5. The %FR is first regressed on the CEO Annual-pension X aboveCAP-
member and other independent variables (Model (1)). Then the %FR is regressed on the CFO 
Annual-pension X aboveCAP-member and other independent variables (Model (2)). Results 
reported in Model (3) includes both CEO- and CFO- Annual-pension to ensure that results 
 
17 Davies and de Haan (2013) also uses FGLS to explain the contribution policy of DB schemes. They 
explain that FGLS is more preferable when time-variation in the data is lower than the cross-sectional 
variation. The sample includes 240 pension funds over the 1996-2005 period. 
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remain robust to inclusion of other control variables. In a similar sequence, regressions are re-
run using CEO Total-pension and CFO Total-pension along with other variables with estimates 
shown in Model s (4) – (6) of Table 4.5. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that %FR positively associate with CEO DB pension. The results from 
the FGLS estimators provide strong support in favour of this hypothesis. In Model (1) of Table 
4.5, the coefficient for two-way interactions CEO-Annual-pension*CEO-aboveCAP (CEOs 
who accrued pensions above the compensation cap) is positive and statistically significant 
(βCEO-Annual-pension*CEO-aboveCAP = 1.119, p < 0.001). The positive relationship 
suggests that DB schemes in companies whose CEOs accrued pensions above the 
compensation cap are observed to be better-funded compared to DB schemes in companies 
whose CEOs have alternative pension arrangements. It is estimated that a 1% increase in CEO-
Annual-pension above the compensation cap is associated with 1.119 percent increase in %FR. 
The coefficient for CEO-Annual-pension*CEO-aboveCAP remains positive and highly 
statistically significant when controlling for CFO-Annual-pension (Model (3)): it is estimated 
that a 1% increase in CEO-Annual-pension above the compensation cap (when controlling for 
CFO Annual-pension) is associated with 1.430 percent increase in %FR. 
However, estimates for two-way interaction CFO Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member 
reported in Model (2) fails to find any evidence in support of the hypothesis 2 that predicts that 
CFOs DB pensions are also associated with higher funding levels. The coefficient is 
statistically insignificant (βCFO-Annual-pension*CFO-aboveCAP = -0.227, p < 0.235) and 
remains so when controlling for CEO-Annual-pension (Model (3)). In contrast to the 
prediction, this finding suggests that CFO inside-debt incentives generated by DB pensions do 
not associate with the higher funding levels. While CFO Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member 
shows no association with the funding level of pension schemes, CEO Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member is found to be positively associated with the funding levels of DB 
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schemes. This highlights the importance and dominance of CEOs inside-debt incentives and 
insignificance of CFOs inside-debt incentives for the funding levels of DB schemes. 
Estimates for two-way interactions reported in Models (4) and (6) further provide evidence 
in favour of hypothesis 1. The coefficient remains consistent (in terms of sign and significance) 
when CEO-aboveCAP-member interacts with CEO-Total-pension. It is estimated that a 1% 
increase in CEO-Total-pension above the compensation cap is associated with 0.061 percent 
increase in %FR (Model 4). The coefficient also remains statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level when controlling for CFO-Total-pension: it is estimated that a 1% increase in 
CEO-Total-pension above the compensation cap is associated with 0.093% percent increase in 
%FR (Model 6). With respect to CFOs, two-way interaction CFO-Total-pension*CFO-
aboveCAP is not statistically significant, as shown in Models (4) and (6).  
Overall, the obtained results highlight the importance of CEOs inside-debt incentives for 
the funding levels of DB schemes, as consistent with hypothesis 1. Consistent with the agency 
theory, inside debt incentives generated by DB pensions make CEOs to be cautious about the 
funding of DB schemes and possibly take actions to reduce the riskiness of schemes, which 
can help to preserve their pension entitlements. However, analysis fails to find any evidence of 
the association between CFO-inside debt incentives and the funding levels of DB schemes. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that CEO incentives play a more influential role than 
CFO incentives. 
 When regressing %FR on CEO DB pensions (Annual- or Total- pension) without 
distinguishing between CEOs with DB pensions below/above the compensation cap, the 
estimated coefficients are negative but not statistically significant (results are not tabulated). 
This suggests that incentives also differ among CEOs with DB pensions. When the value of 
accrued DB pension exceeds the compensation threshold, CEO become more sensitive to the 
pension funding because he becomes to be more concerned about the security of his pension 
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entitlement. In contrast, CEOs with pensions below the compensation cap appear to be less 
incentivised to keep healthy scheme due to lower personal losses compared to CEOs with 
pensions above the compensation cap. These findings raise the confidence that it is necessary 
to take the riskiness of inside debt and distinguish between those who might/might not face a 
material loss of personal wealth as CEOs with DB pensions appear to have conflicting interests. 
The negative coefficient on CEO AboveCAP member may suggest about the prevalence of the 
inheritance effects. In particular, the higher funding levels in firms with non-DB CEOs may 
incorporate effects of CEOs with DB pension arrangements. For example, CEOs with 
alternative pension arrangements who succeeded CEOs with DB pension arrangements may 
inherent DB schemes with already higher funding levels due to previous CEOs actions put in 
place. This perhaps explains the negative sign of the estimated coefficient.  
As the funding can be less sensitive to CEO and CFO inside-debt incentives in companies 
with multiple schemes, the %FR is then regressed on the three-way interaction CEO-Annual-
pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme (Model (7)). Model (8) reports results from 
regressions including three-way interaction between CFO-Annual-pension, CFO-aboveCAP-
member and Single-scheme. Model (9) reports results from regressions including three-way 
interaction between CEO-Annual-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and 
three-way interaction between CFO-Annual-pension, CFO-aboveCAP-member and Single-
scheme. In a similar sequence, regressions are also re-run using CEO Total-pension and CFO 
Total-pension along with other variables with estimates shown in Models (10) – (12) of Table 
4.5. 
Models (7) - (12) of Table 4.5 presents estimates from the FGLS for three-way interaction 
variable Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Estimates for three-way 
interaction provide additional evidence in support of hypothesis 1. The coefficient for the three-
way interaction term CEO-Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme is positive and 
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significant at the conventional levels. This finding indicates that funding of DB schemes is 
higher in companies with single-schemes and whose CEOs accrued DB pensions above the 
compensation cap. While CEOs with DB pensions above the cap are associated with higher 
funding suggesting that CEOs interests are aligned with those of other scheme members, it 
appears that CEOs care more about the scheme in which they participate. It has been estimated 
that for CEOs with accrued pension above the compensation threshold and where there is only 
one DB scheme, a 1% increase in CEO-Annual-pension is associated with 3.098% increase in 
the %FR (Model (7)). The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. The 
three-way interaction coefficient also remains positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
confidence level when controlling for CFO-Total-pension: a 1% increase in CEO-Annual-
pension is associated with 2.238% increase in the %FR (Model (9)). 
With respect to CFOs, the results also remain insignificant when CFO Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member further interacts with Single-scheme. The coefficients are 
statistically insignificant, as shown in Models (8) and (9). The insignificant relationship 
between CFO DB pension and the %FR re-confirms the previous findings of the unimportance 
of CFO inside debt incentives for the funding of DB schemes. 
Re-estimation of regressions with Total-pension yield consistent results (in terms of sign 
and significance). For CEOs with accrued pension above the compensation threshold and 
where there is only one DB scheme, a 1% increase in CEO Total-pension is associated with 
0.583% increase in the %FR (Model (10)). The results remain robust to the inclusion of three-
way interaction CFO-Annual-pension~*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. It is estimated 
that for CEOs with accrued pension above the compensation threshold and where there is only 
one DB scheme, a 1% increase in CEO Total-pension is associated with 0.549% increase in 
the %FR (Model (12)). Both coefficients CEO-Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-
scheme are statistically significant at the 1% confidence levels. The coefficients for CFO DB 
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pension remain insignificant in all model specifications. Including CFO two- or three- way 
interactions do not affect the results obtained for CEOs. 
Estimates from regressions reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 controlling for CEO 
Company-, Board- tenure and Age respectively are similar in direction and significance to those 
discussed above. In aggregate, results provide plausible evidence in favour of the stated 
hypothesis regarding CEO but not with respect to CFO. 
With respect to other executive-specific characteristics, it has been found that CEO-Role-
tenure is positively associated with the %FR: the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the conventional levels in almost all model specifications except for the results 
shown in Model (6). The positive relationship suggests that DB pension schemes are better 
funded in companies with long-tenured CEOs. It is estimated that additional year of service is 
associated with 0.473%-0.576% (log) increase in %FR. There is some evidence that CEO-Age 
might also be important for the funding levels of DB pension schemes. The estimated 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. The possible explanation for this is that as 
tenure gets longer, CEO also becomes older that causes CEO to care about pensions leading to 
higher funding levels in DB schemes. Other variables such CEO-Board- and Company- tenure 
and Accounting-background are not statistically significant. With respect to CFO-specific 
characteristics, it is found that CFO-Age negatively associates with the %FR. This implies that 
older CFOs have a short-term orientation leading to lower funding levels in DB schemes, in 
contrast to CEOs. Other CFO-specific variables are not significant.  
With respect to company- and pension scheme- specific characteristics, there are number of 
variables that are found to be associated with funding levels of DB schemes. For example, 
consistent with prediction, there is evidence that Single-scheme is better funded. Depending on 
the model specification, it has been estimated that companies with Single-schemes are 3.766%-
4.999% better funded than companies with multiple schemes, which is economically 
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significant. All coefficients Single-scheme are statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
levels.  
There is evidence that Leverage negatively associates with %FR suggesting that pension 
schemes have lower funding levels in financially constrained companies. This finding is 
consistent with the prediction that companies tend to reduce pension contributions when they 
are likely, due to the already high presence of debt, to face borrowing constrains the capital 
markets leading to a higher deficit. It is estimated that a 1% increase in Leverage is associated 
with 0.035%-0.051% decrease in the %FR. The estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% confidence levels across all model specifications except for the 
Model in Model (12). 
Also, there is evidence that Dividends positively associate with %FR suggesting that DB 
schemes are better funded in companies which pay higher dividends. This finding, however, 
implies that shareholders in a company with a pension deficit should anticipate that future 
dividends are likely to be reduced, which may also have implications for future stock prices of 
companies with underfunded DB schemes. The estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% confidence levels with a magnitude ranging between 0.122%-and 
0.189% depending on the model specifications. It is also found that Cash positively associates 
with higher %FR.  The estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5% 
confidence levels with a magnitude ranging between 0.070%-and 0.101% depending on the 
model specifications.  
Closure-to-FA negatively associates with the %FR highlighting that DB schemes are worse 
off after the closure. This is consistent with the argument that the lack of additional sources of 
financing and the inability to share the cost of pensions with employees can encourage 
companies to take more pension risk. While it is predicted that Maturity negatively associates 
with %FR, the estimates suggest that Maturity positively associates with the %FR. The positive 
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relationship implies that more mature schemes are better funded, which contradicts with the 
finding of Davies and de Haan (2012) who argue that more mature scheme tends to make lower 
pension contributions. The size of pension contributions more likely to be determined by the 
pension deficit. Given that majority of pension schemes in the UK are underfunded, this 
possibly explains why Maturity positively associates with the %FR as companies are expected 
to make higher contributions in order to meet all pension liabilities.  
Another variable that is found to be important is %Equity. The negative relationship between 
%Equity and %FR implies that companies invest a higher share of pension assets in equities 
that leads to a higher deficit. As discussed previously, investing a larger portion of assets into 
equities companies set higher expected rates of return allowing them to make lower pension 
contributions. As a result, lower pension contributions are insufficient to cover the full cost of 
pensions that leads to a higher deficit and an increase in the overall risk of the pension scheme. 
It has been estimated that a 1% increase in %Equity associate with 0.103%-0.117% decrease 
in %FR. Other variables appear to be less important. 
Estimates from regressions reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 (these results are shown in 
Appendix) controlling for CEO Company-tenure, Board-tenure and Age respectively are 



















Table 4.5  
FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Role-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable - %FR              
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension             
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
       
CEO-DB-pension -1.031***  -1.316*** -0.057**  -0.092*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.031)  (0.000) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.798***  -4.363*** -3.289***  -3.836*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension *CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.119***  1.430*** 0.061**  0.093*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.022)  (0.000) 
Single-scheme 4.289*** 4.345*** 3.766*** 4.384*** 4.999*** 3.839*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) 0.552**  0.547** 0.538**  0.412 
 (0.024)  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.103) 
Accounting-background -0.112  -0.081 0.405  0.227 
 (0.869)  (0.912) (0.513)  (0.741) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.14 0.09  0.025 0.012 
  (0.446) (0.653)  (0.142) (0.417) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.646 0.680  1.020 2.000 
  (0.304) (0.292)  (0.151) (0.004) 
CFO-DB-pension *CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.227 -0.188  -0.033* -0.021 
  (0.235) (0.362)  (0.063) (0.158) 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure)  -0.285 -0.212  -0.226 -0.423 
  (0.304) (0.453)  (0.431) (0.152) 
%Equity -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.514*** -0.288* -0.483*** -0.535*** -0.375** -0.519*** 
 (0.002) (0.058) (0.002) (0.001) (0.016) (0.000) 
Maturity 0.598*** 0.593*** 0.556*** 0.687*** 0.624*** 0.676*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.154 -0.253 0.135 -0.429 -0.353 -0.569* 
 (0.604) (0.427) (0.651) (0.132) (0.283) (0.052) 
Leverage -0.044** -0.043** -0.052*** -0.044** -0.045** -0.039** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.003) (0.013) (0.020) (0.032) 
ROA -0.025 -0.056* -0.046 -0.038 -0.049 -0.058* 
 (0.415) (0.070) (0.148) (0.204) (0.130) (0.062) 
Dividends 0.151** 0.149** 0.166*** 0.122** 0.161** 0.159*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.038) (0.012) (0.010) 
Cash 0.075** 0.071** 0.082** 0.089*** 0.070** 0.101*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) (0.035) (0.002) 
_cons 90.51*** 97.40*** 91.63*** 97.00*** 98.848*** 99.831*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,090 1,156 1,048 1,065 1,098 1,005 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 955.03 1045.7 977.11 1000.87 935.4 994.52 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 















Dependent variable - %FR              
Explanatory pension variable – Annual- or Total- pension              
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
       
CEO-DB-pension -0.565*  -1.095*** -0.037  -0.083*** 
 (0.096)  (0.001) (0.135)  (0.000) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -4.037***  -4.240*** -3.313***  -3.578*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.653*  1.177*** 0.041*  0.082*** 
 (0.058)  (0.000) (0.099)  (0.000) 
Single-scheme 3.705*** 4.625*** 3.346*** 4.600*** 5.105*** 3.965*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -3.171**  -2.312* -0.587***  -0.547*** 
 (0.018)  (0.081) (0.001)  (0.009) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.087  2.279 -0.154  0.621 
 (0.156)  (0.133) (0.925)  (0.729) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 3.098**  2.238* 0.583***  0.549*** 
 (0.021)  (0.092) (0.001)  (0.009) 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) 0.539**  0.473* 0.576**  0.501* 
 (0.031)  (0.065) (0.019)  (0.054) 
Accounting-background -0.17  -0.348 0.283  -0.076 
 (0.807)  (0.643) (0.647)  (0.912) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.429 -0.257  0.057** 0.016 
  (0.208) (0.457)  (0.018) (0.437) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.301 -0.041  0.559 1.123 
  (0.663) (0.955)  (0.466) (0.135) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.349 0.307  -0.052** -0.011 
  (0.315) (0.385)  (0.036) (0.577) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  -0.373 0.337  -0.057* -0.014 
  (0.358) (0.408)  (0.097) (0.657) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.705 1.23  0.673 1.201 
  (0.633) (0.436)  (0.668) (0.450) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.023 -0.705*  0.030 -0.01 
  (0.957) (0.099)  (0.389) (0.754) 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure)  -0.258 -0.142  -0.243 -0.396 
  (0.367) (0.6310  (0.410) (0.196) 
%Equity -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.112*** -0.107*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.433*** -0.286* -0.402*** -0.544*** -0.354** -0.477*** 
 (0.010) (0.056) (0.010) (0.001) (0.022) (0.002) 
Maturity 0.522*** 0.553*** 0.489*** 0.682*** 0.545*** 0.611*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.151 -0.188 0.157 -0.545* -0.297 -0.513* 
 (0.612) (0.553) (0.597) (0.054) (0.370) (0.084) 
Leverage -0.045** -0.045** -0.051*** -0.042** -0.045** -0.035* 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.017) (0.019) (0.056) 
ROA -0.023 -0.059* -0.046 -0.035 -0.056* -0.052* 
 (0.455) (0.058) (0.142) (0.243) (0.085) (0.100) 
Dividends 0.151** 0.181*** 0.186*** 0.124** 0.189*** 0.177*** 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.035) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cash 0.074** 0.083*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.081** 0.100*** 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.002) 
_cons 91.097*** 96.777*** 91.926*** 98.107 97.484 98.031 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,090 1,156 1,048 1,065 1,098 1,005 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 943.09 1046.21 975.05 1028.04 914.39 958.92 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








DB pensions, age and the funding of DB schemes (H3) 
 
Table 4.10 reports results examining hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 predicts that %FR will be 
higher when CEO approaches retirement and has a DB pension implying a positive 
relationship. To investigate this, this study follows the previous study methodology (Kabir, Li, 
and Veld-Merkoulova, 2017). Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2017) argue that in the UK the 
default age for retirement was 65 years before 2011, but CEOs can choose to retire earlier for 
many different reasons. Conyon and Florou (2006) state that identifying retiring CEOs is a 
complicated task because companies usually do not announce the true reason behind their 
departures. Cassell et al., (2013), using a sample of US firms, find that the average age of CEO 
at retirement is 61 years and approximately 65% of CEOs retire when they are at least 60 years 
old. As the actual retirement date of CEOs is not known, Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2017) use a mechanical approach by using the cut-off age that corresponds to the 75th 
percentile of CEO age in the sample. The 75th percentile of CEO age in the sample used in this 
study is 57.2 years which is similar to Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2017) study. Therefore, 
this study adopts 58 years as the cut-off rate to identify those CEOs who are close to retirement. 
Results for CEOs with short (CEOs who are 58 years or older) career horizon and others 
(CEOs younger than 58 years) are reported in Table 4.10. It is observed that coefficient 
estimates of CEO-Annual-pension* aboveCAP-member in Models (1) - (4) are all positive and 
statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is much larger for the 
sample of CEOs with a shorter career horizon. For example, while, for the sample of CEOs 
younger than 58 years, a 1% increase in Annual-pension above the compensation cap is 
associated with 0.993 in the %FR (Model 1), for the sample of CEOs with short career horizon 
a 1% increase in Annual-pension above the compensation cap is associated with 10.114% in 
the %FR (Model 1). The estimated coefficients for CEO-Total-pension is also larger for the 
CEOs with short career horizon that equals to 0.425% compared to 0.050% for the CEOs 
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younger than 58 years (Model 3). These findings suggest that DB schemes are better funded in 
companies whose CEOs participate in DB schemes and who are closer to retirement. 
Controlling for CFO-Annual-pension (Model 2) or CFO-Annual-pension (Model 4) do not 
change the conclusion as the estimated coefficients remain positive and statistically significant 
and the magnitude of the coefficient for the sample of CEOs with short-term career horizon is 
larger than for the rest of CEOs. In aggregate, these findings indicate that CEOs associate with 
higher funding when CEOs are closer to retirement and have DB pensions as they appear to be 
particularly concerned with the security of their pensions. These findings provide evidence in 
favour of hypothesis 3.  
 
With respect to other variables, it is observed that Maturity positively associates with the 
%FR in the sub-sample of CEOs with long career horizon. The disappearance of the association 
between Maturity and the %FR for the sub-sample of CEOs who are 58 years or older possibly 
suggest that older CEOs become less incentivised to keep making higher pension contributions 
as they reduce the resources for other needs and these cash outgoing do not bring direct benefits 
to CEOs.  
It is also observed that Leverage negatively associates with %FR in the both sub-samples. 
However, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is larger for the sub-sample of companies 
whose CEOs approached closer to retirement.  This could suggest that companies take more 
pension risk by underfunding the pension scheme when their CEOs are approaching closer 
towards the end of their working life. As CEO approaches closer to retirement, the incentive 
to underfund the DB scheme may increase because CEOs may behave in a way that increases 
the benefits in the short-run.  
It also has been found that ROA negatively associates with the %FR in the sample of CEOs 
with short career horizon. This finding also implies that CEOs approaching closer to retirement 
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may seek to use earned returns to meet their personal interests. As a result, they spend less on 
pensions leaving more money for their personal needs.  
Moreover, there is evidence that Dividends positively associate with %FR for the sample of 
CEOs younger than 58 years. This finding suggests that younger CEOs may use Dividends to 
reduce the deficit to minimise the consequences of underfunding (e.g. financial constraints and 
increased risk of bankruptcy) that could leave CEO with no job and even undermine the CEO 
reputation. As older CEOs may care less about future job security, %FR may become less 
sensitive to Dividends that explains the disappearance of a positive relationship between %FR 
and Dividends in pre-retirement years.  
There is also evidence that Ln (Company-size) negatively associates with %FR in the sample 
of CEOs with short career horizon. Larger companies tend to have larger DB schemes that 
could also have a larger deficit that potentially explains the negative relationship. As the 
estimated coefficient is only significant in the sample of CEOs older than 58 years, this might 
suggest that CEOs take more pension risk when they are closer to retirement. This is because 
large companies are likely to have higher pension costs that could significantly constrain the 
resources for other company’s need. This finding suggests that CEO becomes more risk-
seeking near retirement that may reduce the need to underfund the scheme. There are no 


















FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) (H3) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions in which dependent variable is Funding Ratio defined as the 
ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities for the sub-sample of CEOs older/younger than 58 years. 
Models 1 to 2 in Panel A report results from regressions examining Annual-pension and Models 3 to 4 in Panel B 
report results from regressions examining Total-pension. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are 




Dependent variable - %FR          
Explanatory pension variable - Annual-pension          
 Model 1 Model 2 
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No Yes No 
      
CEO-Annual-pension -10.103*** -0.678** -9.021*** -0.292 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.329) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.285*** -4.495*** -1.533 -4.100*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.162) (0.000) 
CEO-Annual-pension * CEO-aboveCAP-member 10.114*** 0.993*** 8.477*** 0.605** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.054) 
ln (CEO-Age) 2.599 5.423* 20.543** 8.901*** 
 (0.779) (0.054) (0.040) (0.002) 
Accounting-background 1.449 -0.414 1.328 -1.229* 
 (0.566) (0.517) (0.584) (0.073) 
CFO-Annual-pension    -1.166 0.323 
    (0.141) (0.151) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member    -0.020 1.975*** 
    (0.989) (0.008) 
CFO-Annual-pension * CFO-aboveCAP-member    1.442* -0.354 
    (0.061) (0.160) 
ln (CFO-Age)    -14.893*** -8. 771*** 
    (0.004) (0.000) 
Single-scheme 1.940* 4.003*** 1.871 3.638*** 
 (0.059) (0.000) (0.192) (0.000) 
%Equity -0.139*** -0.100*** -0.132*** -0.105*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.508*** -0.414** -0.348 -0.360** 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.125) (0.040) 
Maturity 0.405 0.499*** -0.027 0.512*** 
 (0.234) (0.004) (0.943) (0.003) 
ln (Company-size) -1.692*** 0.302 -1.532** 0.479 
 (0.000) (0.281) (0.022) (0.102) 
Leverage -0.265*** -0.066*** -0.226*** -0.060*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ROA -0.578*** -0.026 -0.504*** -0.030 
 (0.000) (0.425) (0.000) (0.364) 
Dividends 0.096 0.164** -0.089 0.170** 
 (0.291) (0.020) (0.378) (0.018) 
Cash 0.122* 0.009 0.132 0.002 
 (0.090) (0.785) (0.114) (0.949) 
_cons 112.935*** 66.513*** 107.601*** 84.748*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
         
Number of obs 184 877 169 850 
Number of companies 52 118 47 116 
Wald chi2 1789.08 928.02 74490.89 923.35 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 















Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual-pension    
 Model 3 Model 4 
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No Yes No 
      
CEO-Total-pension -0.428*** -0.028 -0.452*** 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.295) (0.000) (0.886) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -2.150 -4.706*** -2.259 -4.469*** 
 (0.167) (0.000) (0.142) (0.000) 
CEO-Total-pension *CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.425*** 0.050* 0.422*** 0.018 
 (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.408) 
ln (CEO-Age) -12.610 6.176** 7.285 7.953*** 
 (0.112) (0.024) (0.517) (0.004) 
Accounting-background -2.491 -0.060 -3.091** -1.237* 
 (0.200) (0.925) (0.040) (0.084) 
CFO-Total-pension   -0.130 0.019 
    (0.154) (0.268) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member   0.493 3.901*** 
    (0.801) (0.000) 
CFO-Total-pension *CFO-aboveCAP-member 0.164* -0.030 
    (0.051) (0.107) 
ln (CFO-Age)    -24.528*** -10.723*** 
    (0.001) (0.000) 
Single-scheme 3.068* 4.437*** 0.553 4.119*** 
 (0.065) (0.000) (0.754) (0.000) 
%Equity -0.121*** -0.104*** -0.092*** -0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.785*** -0.394** -0.588** -0.360** 
 (0.000) (0.035) (0.022) (0.036) 
Maturity -0.408 0.730*** -0.541** 0.811*** 
 (0.149) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) -2.750*** 0.034 -2.989*** 0.156 
 (0.000) (0.909) (0.001) (0.600) 
Leverage -0.226*** -0.057*** -0.251*** -0.038** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.041) 
ROA -0.450*** -0.026 -0.553*** -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.372) (0.000) (0.543) 
Dividends 0.211* 0.146** 0.063 0.130* 
 (0.077) (0.018) (0.704) (0.060) 
Cash 0.158** 0.021 0.071 0.017 
 (0.044) (0.534) (0.444) (0.615) 
_cons 177.922*** 66.049*** 209.312*** 98.269*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Number of obs 182 853 159 816 
Number of companies 48 119 44 118 
Wald chi2 25739.32 857.95 40621.29 988.18 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 



















To check the sensitivity of the results, this study uses an extended sample. The extended 
sample includes companies over the 2004-2015 period and covers the period when the PPF 
started to offer protection of DB pensions up to compensation cap (2006-2015) and the period 
with no protection of DB schemes (2004-2005). The variable aboveCAP-member takes the 
value 0 for CEOs or CFOs with pension below the compensation cap and CEOs or CFOs with 
DB pensions in 2004 and 2005 for any size and 1 for CEOs or CFOs with pension above the 
compensation cap. The results obtained from regressions using the extended sample are similar 
in direction and significance of the coefficients to those obtained using the 2006-2015 sample 
(Table 4.11). The results are also robust when controlling for the board characteristics, e.g., 
number of board members, board independence, and whether or not CEO is also served as a 
Chairman in the company (results are not tabulated). The results also remain consistent when 
using all companies in the sample (e.g., including financial companies) (results are not 
tabulated) . 
For hypothesis 3, a further check is done by removing from the sample CEOs who already 
retired because CEOs DB pensions become fully protected after they retire. As a result, this 
could reduce the incentive to look after the DB schemes. Removal of CEOs who have already 
retired reduces the sample18, but this modification does not change the previous findings 
(results are not tabulated). An additional check is performed by introducing an interaction term 
between Age and Annual-pension and Age and Total-pension. This eliminates the need to 
identify the cut-off age. The results also reveal a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
suggesting that older CEO with DB pension associated with higher funding of DB schemes, as 
 
18 The sample reduces from 188 to 156 observations when Annual-pension is included in the model and from 
169 to 138 observations when Total-pension is included in the model. 
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consistent with the hypothesis and previous findings (results are also not tabulated). These 






This study integrates insights from the agency theory to examine the relationship between 
CEO inside debt incentives and the funding levels of the pension schemes. Using a sample of 
UK companies with DB pension arrangements, it has been found that, in line with the 
prediction, CEO DB pension is positively associated with funding levels of DB schemes. The 
positive relationship suggests that DB pension schemes are better funded when CEOs 
participate in DB schemes, e.g., when they accrue DB pensions. Further analysis reveals that 
the CEOs with shorter time horizon and DB pensions associate with higher pension funding 
levels. This suggests that the presence of DB pensions in compensation packages of CEOs 
induce them to act in a way to preserve their DB accruals. Moreover, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on interaction term, CEO DB pension and Single-scheme 
(companies which have only one DB scheme) suggest that CEOs are particularly concerned 
about the funding of the schemes in which they participate. This, however, has implications for 
other DB schemes. In particular, CEOs with DB pensions may overfund the scheme in which 
they participate and take no actions with respect to other schemes or even underfund them. 
This study also investigates the association between CFO inside debt incentives and the 
funding levels of DB pension schemes. Specifically, this study tries to understand whether CFO 
inside debt incentives, similar to CEOs, contribute to the better funding levels of pension 
schemes. The results suggest that CFOs DB pensions are not associated with the funding levels 
of DB schemes, suggesting that the role of CFO inside debt incentives are less influential 
compared to CEOs. 
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Taken together, these findings suggest that CEOs incentives play a more important role. 
Although CFOs are in charge of financials, CEOs might exert significant influence over CFOs 
decisions to induce CFOs to make decisions to regard the interests of CEOs which are not 
always in interests of CFOs themselves. Overall, this study extends and contributes to the 
literature on the determinants of funding levels of corporate DB pension schemes by providing 
empirical evidence that CEOs with inside-debt incentives, but not CFOs, are important for the 
financial health of DB pension schemes. These results may help company board, policymakers 
and regulators understand the roles of CEOs and CFOs play in the company.   
This study, however, have some limitations. These limitations and direction for future 




















Managers’ inside-debt incentives and funding policy 
of deficit of Defined-Benefit pension schemes 
 
 
The Pension Act of 2004 was enacted to help improve the management of DB pension 
schemes following the number of issues highlighted in the Myners Report (2001). As a result, 
the statutory funding requirement, MFR, imposed by the previous Pension Act 1995 was 
replaced by a new scheme-specific "statutory funding objective". New scheme-specific 
funding requirement prescribes companies to make additional pension contributions (deficit-
repair contributions (DRCs)) if there is a deficit. However, under new funding requirement 
companies have more flexibility since there are no time prescriptions over which the deficit 
should be eliminated. This means that companies are allowed to adjust DRCs to their and 
pension scheme circumstances. In other words, new funding requirements is up to companies 
to decide appropriate funding targets and deficit recovery periods. However, such flexibility 
leaves scope for managerial discretion, and this study examines whether CEOs and CFOs 
inside debt incentives generated by DB pensions are associated with a higher probability of 
making DRCs. 
Managerial incentives have been found to influence the funding levels of DB pension 
schemes (Begley, Chamberlain, 2014; Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Chapter 4 study). 
However, no research examines whether or not managerial incentives associated with DRCs 
because there is no data available for download. To understand the underlying motives of 
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making DRCs is of relevance given the importance of those contributions on pension funding 
and the security and sustainability of DB pension schemes. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether these additional payments are indeed effective at reducing 
the deficit. For example, the research conducted by Mercer shows that companies in the 
FTSE350 paid about £20 billion in both normal and deficit reduction contributions during 
March 2011-March 2012, but the deficit for the same period increased by £17 billion (The 
Economist, 2012). Moreover, the recent failures of large companies with DB schemes whose 
deficit had been growing continuously despite paying DRCs, also raise a question about the 
effectiveness of these additional contributions on the pension funding. For example, British 
Home Store (BHS) failed in 2016, leaving a pension scheme in deficit by more than £500 
million. One of the largest construction company sponsoring over 28,000 members across 13 
pension schemes, Carillion, failed at the beginning of 2018. Despite that company had a 
recovery plan and paid DRCs on annual basis (BHS also had made additional contributions 
towards deficit reduction), the actual deficit was persistent and had grown at worst from around 
£25 million in 2007 to £240 million in 2010 to £498 in 2014 and £587 in 2017. At the time of 
the collapse, the actual deficit is estimated to sit at around £900 million, according to the PPF 
estimates (Reuters, 2018). While the main objective of this study is to examine whether 
CEO/CFO inside debt incentives associated with the higher probability of making DRCs, it 
also supplements the previous research regarding determinants of DB schemes funding levels 
(Chapter 4 study). In particular, this study allows establishing whether DRCs were effective at 
reducing the deficit. 
Building upon the prior research arguments and the agency theory that holdings of DB 
pensions create strong incentives to manage the pension risk, this study hypothesizes that 
CEO/CFO DB pensions are associated with a higher probability of making DRCs. Examining 
this conjecture, this study finds that CEO participation in DB scheme is associated with a higher 
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probability of making DRCs, suggesting that companies are more likely to make DRCs to 
restore the funding level when their CEOs have DB pensions. These findings imply that CEOs 
become more cautious about the security of their DB pensions when the pension scheme is 
underfunded. To reduce the deficit in the pension scheme, companies might to seek to make 
DRCs that also reduces the riskiness of the CEOs DB pensions. However, the analysis fails to 
find any relationship between CFO participation in DB scheme and DRCs, suggesting that 
CEO incentives are more influential. This study further documents that retiring CEOs with DB 
pensions are also associated with a higher probability of making DRCs suggesting that CEOs 
with DB holdings become more concerned about the security of their pensions as whey get 
closer to retirement.  
This study also makes several important contributions. First, this study contributes to the 
literature regarding the determinants of the funding policy of DB pension schemes - DRCs. 
The results suggest that managerial inside-debt incentives are also important for funding policy 
of deficit of DB pension schemes highlighting that the company is more likely to make DRCs 
to reduce the deficit when the CEO has a DB pension. Again, these results can be used by 
regulators to improve the regulation of corporate pension schemes to ensure that companies 
whose CEOs do not participate in DB schemes also make DRCs to reduce the deficit in DB 
schemes. Second, this study shows that CEOs with DB pensions which are associated with a 
higher probability of making DRCs are also positively associated with the pension funding. 
This suggests that DRCs are effective at reducing the deficit at least in companies whose CEOs 
have DB pensions. Third, this study also contributes to the existing literature on usefulness of 
inside-debt at reducing the risk-taking by CEOs (Deng, He, Kong, and Zhang, 2019; Bennett, 
Guntay, and Unal, 2015; Srivastav, Armitage, Hagendorff, and King, 2018; Freund, Latif, and 
V. Phan, 2018; Kabir, Li, and Veld- Merkoulova, 2013; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart, 
2012; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). Fourth, this study contributes to the existing literature 
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on the role of CEOs and CFOs. In particular, this study documents that despite that CFO is a 
head of the finance department, the CEO is the key executive who is involved in the decision 
making with regard to the funding policy of DB schemes. This might suggest that CFO has a 
more functional role in the company who supports the CEO rather than an executive who makes 
the decisions. Fifth, this study provides evidence on the interactive relationship between career 
horizon, DB pensions and DRCs by documenting that DB pensions change the CEO behaviour 
as they get closer to retirement. Overall, these findings can be used by regulators to improve 
the management of DB schemes. Boards also should be aware of the possible future 
implications of CEOs disincentives to reduce the deficit. Apart from this, boards might rely on 
these study findings in designing the optimal compensation contracts taking into account that 
CEOs inside incentives prevail over the CFOs inside debt incentives and that behaviour of 
CEOs with short career horizon tend to change as they approach closer to retirement. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses hypotheses. 













5.2. Hypotheses  
 
When there is a deficit in the pension scheme, DB pensions become more risky as the 
company may not be able to pay the full amount it promised. The company may make DRCs 
to reduce the deficit and, therefore, the riskiness of DB pensions. If the pensions are relatively 
important compared to other types of compensation, the CEOs/CFOs are more likely to reduce 
the riskiness of their pensions by making DRCs, as consistent with the agency theory. While 
the decision to pay DRCs can help to secure the CEOs/CFOs DB pensions, additional pension 
contributions are costly to management and executives with no inside-debt may not fully 
benefit from making DRCs. This is because additional pension contributions reduce the cash 
resources, which otherwise might be used for capital investment (Rauh, 2006). Moreover, 
additional pension contributions reduce the current period income leading to lower reported 
earnings that may affect the executive short-term pay such as bonuses. There is also an 
anecdotal evidence regarding some CFOs' perceptions about regular contributions and DCRs. 
Back in 2013, Carillion's former CFO considered putting cash into the company’s pension 
deficit a “waste of money”, according to the minutes of a meeting between Trustee 
representatives and the Pensions Regulator regarding failure to agree the 2011 valuations19. 
Carillion's former CFO had no DB pension in the company’s pension scheme.  
Following the discussion above, this study proposes that while managers with no DB 
pensions may be more reluctant to make DRCs, companies are more likely to make DRCs 
when their executives have DB pensions. This proposition is indirectly supported by previous 
studies showing that DB pension schemes are better funded in companies whose executives 
participate in DB schemes (Begley, Chamberlain, 2014; Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Chapter 
 
19 The attendance note is available at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Carillion/Carrillion.pdf. 
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4 study). However, taking into account that the PPF guarantees to pay pensions up to a certain 
amount (compensation cap), as has been previously discussed in Chapter 4, it is expected that 
companies are more likely to make DRCs when their executives have accrued DB pensions 
above the compensation cap. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  CEOs with DB pensions above the compensation cap are associated with a 
higher probability of making DRCs compared to CEOs with non-DB pension arrangements 
 
Hypothesis 2:  CFOs with DB pensions above the compensation cap are associated with a 
higher probability of making DRCs compared to CFOs with non-DB pension arrangements 
 
Similar to the previous chapter, this study also tests whether the probability of making DRCs 
is increasing in the age of a CEO with DB pension above the compensation cap. As previously 
discussed in Chapter 4, pensions become more important as executive approaches retirement 
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). As underfunding makes pension accruals less secure, a 
retiring executive with DB pension arrangements more likely to make DRCs to reduce the 
deficit in order to secure DB pensions. Study in Chapter 4 indirectly supports this conjecture 
by documenting that the effect of DB pensions on the funding of DB schemes is stronger for 
retiring CEOs. Moreover, the study of Kabir, Li, and Veld- Merkoulova (2017) shows that DB 
component of executive compensation leads older CEOs to decrease the R&D possibly 
suggesting that CEO with DB pension tend to reduce the deficit at the expense of R&D. 
Therefore, it is expected that closer to retirement CEO with DB pension above the 
compensation threshold is associated with a higher probability of making DRCs as CEO 
becomes more cautious about the security of DB pension as he gets closer to retirement. 
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Hypothesis 3 (CEO-age hypothesis): the probability of making DRCs is increasing in the 
age of a CEO with DB pension as CEO becomes more cautious about the security of DB 
pension as he gets closer to retirement.  
 
Similar to previous Chapter, the age hypothesis has been dropped for CFOs because there 
is insufficient number of observations for the sample of CFOs approaching closer to retirement.  
 
 





This study focusses on funding policy of deficit of DB pension schemes, additional 
contributions towards deficit reduction, rather than on funding positions themself. Pension 
contributions can be divided into two categories: (i) normal contributions which are paid to 
match the present value of future benefits (increase in pension) that employees earned over the 
year (number of assumptions have to be made, e.g., future increase in salary, discount rates 
etc.) and (ii) DRCs which the sponsoring company is expected to pay in order to close or, at 
least reduce, the gap between estimated value of scheme assets and projected pension 
obligations. Given that these contributions differ significantly in their stated objectives, only 
DRCs payments are considered as a measure of funding the deficit in DB schemes. DRCs 
defined as an amount paid in excess to normal contributions that the company makes to match 
the value of the increase in pensions. The dependent variable is a binary variable (DRCs) that 
takes the value of 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise.  
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Data on DRCs has not been previously used as it not publicly available for download. 
However, the information on DRCs is reported by the majority of companies and annual reports 
were scrutinised to obtain records on actual DRCs. Although, companies do not always use 
“DRCs” to describe additional contributions towards deficit reduction, they, however, clearly 
state the amount of additional contributions they make to “recover the funding levels” or 
“reduce the pension deficit” and hence these contributions are classified as DRCs. The data on 
DRCs have been collected for majority of companies in the FTSE 350 index with DB pension 
schemes: only 3 companies were excluded from the sample given that these companies state 
that additional contributions were made towards deficit but do not report the value of these 
contributions. 
 
CEO/CFO inside-debt incentives  
As hypothesized, DB pensions may incentive CEOs and CFOs to make DRCs to reduce the 
risk associated with DB pensions. This study uses several measures of DB pensions. First, this 
study introduces binary variable aboveCAP-member that equals to 1 if CEO/CFO is a member 
of the DB pension scheme with pension above the compensation cap and 0 otherwise. Having 
an independent binary pension variable will determine the change in the probability associated 
with having a DB pension above the compensation cap compared to the rest. Second, similar 
to Chapter 4, it uses Annual-pension (the ratio of annual pension to total wealth) and Total-
pension (the ratio of total accrued pension to total wealth) to determine the association between 
a 1% change in pension variables and the probability of making DRCs. 
Table 5.1 reports the number of companies in the FTSE 350 that have made DRCs to reduce 
the deficit. It shows that 166 companies that represent around 80 per cent of the total number 
of companies in the sample have made at least one payment over the 12 years observation 
period. Around 6 per cent or 12 companies of the total number of FTSE 350 companies in the 
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sample have made DRCs each year over the period 2004 – 2015 and 23 companies or 11 per 
cent of companies have made DRCs only once. There are 77 companies which have made 7 or 
more payments over the period 2004 – 2015 and 89 companies which have made 6 or less. 
Other 41 companies that represent the remaining 20 per cent of the total sample have made no 
DRCs at all over the 12 years observation period. Table 5.2 reports the number of companies 
with underfunded schemes and the number of companies which decided to pay DRCs. It shows 
that the number of FTSE 350 companies with underfunded DB schemes (FR<100%) decreased 
from 94% in 2004 to 69% in 2015 while the number of companies which decided to pay DRCs 
has increased from 19 per cent in 2004 to 50 per cent in 2015 reaching a peak of 57 per cent in 
2011. The analysis of DRCs also indicates that since 2010 nearly every second company in the 
FTSE 350 have paid DRCs towards deficit reduction. These numbers suggest that while the 
number of companies which deal with deficit increased significantly, there are companies 
which do not pay DRCs despite having a deficit in the pension schemes. 
Table 5.1 
The number of FTSE 350 companies which have/have not made DRCs over the period 2004 – 2015. The 
frequency of deficit repair contributions represents the number of annual payments made by companies 




Frequency of  
DRCs payments 










 11 16 7.66 
 10 17 8.13 
 9 13 6.22 
 8 13 6.22 
 7 11 5.26 
 6 9 4.31 
 5 14 6.70 
 4 14 6.70 
 3 13 6.22 
 2 13 6.22 
 1 23 11.00 
 0 41 19.62 
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Table 5.2 


















% of companies 
which made 
DRCs 
2004 166 156 93.98 31 18.67 
2005 172 163 94.77 62 36.05 
2006 183 157 85.79 90 49.18 
2007 191 141 73.82 87 45.55 
2008 188 144 76.60 79 42.02 
2009 190 173 91.05 88 46.32 
2010 191 171 89.53 97 50.79 
2011 193 154 79.79 110 56.99 
2012 201 166 82.59 107 53.23 
2013 201 151 75.12 103 51.24 
2014 203 153 75.37 101 49.75 
2015 201 138 68.66 101 50.25 
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Other variables 
 Other variables are similar to the variables used in the previous Chapter 4. These include tenure 
in role, tenure in company, time on board, age and accounting background. In the previous chapter, 
it was argued that long-tenured managers develop the company-specific human capital (Harris and 
Helfat, 1997) that is more difficult for the board to monitor (Lado and Wilson, 1994). As a result, 
manager have greater discretion in resources allocation and decision making. Moreover, the age 
originates with the risk preferences and the manager might be less inclined to increase the risk 
of the company as he approaches closer to retirement (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). Third, 
long-tenured managers more likely to have DB pensions as DB pensions were a common form of 
retirement arrangements until recently. Having DB pensions more likely to make the CEO and 
CFO to be more cautious about the funding of the DB scheme and make necessary decisions to 
ensure the recipience of the promised level of pensions. Therefore, it is expected that the CEO/CFO 
tenure is associated with a higher probability of making DRCs in order to reduce the risk associated 
with pension deficit in the scheme. The results from previous chapter show that CEO tenure in role 
is positively associated with the higher funding levels of DB pension schemes indirectly supporting 
the prediction made above. This study also separately controls for CEO/CFO tenure in the company 
(Company-tenure) and time on board (Board-tenure) and Age.  
Similar to the study in Chapter 4, this study also controls for the effect of whether or not the 
CEO has finance/accounting education (Accounting-background). CEOs with accounting 
education more likely to have a higher level of financial expertise to understand the implications 
of having a deficit in DB scheme. For example, pension deficit may lower company earnings 
(Franzoni and Marin, 2006), lower credit rating (Mckillop and Pogue, 2009) or increase the cost 
of capital (Cambell, Dhaliwal and Schwartz, 2012. Therefore, having an accounting background 
may encourage CEOs to make DRCs to reduce pension risk in order to avoid or at least lessen the 
negative consequences in the future. Therefore, it is expected that CEO Accounting-background, 
which takes the value of 1 when the CEO has accounting education or previously served as CFO 
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and 0 otherwise, associates with a higher probability of making DRCs. The results presented in the 
previous chapter, however, fails to find any statistically significant relationship between CEO 
Accounting-background and the funding levels of DB pension schemes. 
Other variables include company size Ln (Company-size), Leverage, ROA, Dividends and Cash. 
How these variables relate to the funding levels of DB pension schemes was discussed in the 
previous chapter. The direction of these coefficients is also not expected to change when 
considering DRCs. Therefore, it is predicted that Ln (Company-size), ROA, Dividends and Cash 
are associated with higher probability of making DRCs while Leverage is associated with lower 
probability of making DRCs.  
Similar to previous study, pension scheme characteristics also include Closure-to-FA, Maturity, 
%Equity and Single-scheme. In closed schemes, there could be a shift of power more towards the 
scheme trustees whose function will be to continue to look after the interests of all scheme members 
to justify the reasons of closure the scheme. As a result, after the closure of the scheme to future 
accruals companies may consider starting to make DRCs in order to reduce the pension deficit. 
Moreover, the future of the closed DB scheme becomes more evident as it becomes possible to 
project the scheme’s upcoming benefit payments with much greater certainty. This may incentives 
companies to make DRCs. Therefore, it is expected that Closure-to-FA associated with a higher 
probability of making DRCs. The positive relationship is also expected between DRCs and the 
Single-scheme as companies with Single-scheme, which tend to have better governance due to large 
size of Single-schemes, may have established a better relationship with the pension scheme trustees 
to address the deficit challenges as they arise.  
In an attempt to avoid making DRCs, company may intentionally increase the equity 
investments because a higher share of pension assets in equities increases the expected returns 
simultaneously decreasing the amount of pension contribution needed from the company (Gold, 
2003). As a result, the company may determine that DRCs are not needed due to the high returns 
on pension assets that will help to reduce the deficit in the scheme. Therefore, it is expected that 
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%Equity is associated with a lower probability of DRCs. This study also controls for the funding 
levels of DB schemes (%FR). Given that DRCs are made to reduce the deficit, it is expected that 
%FR positively associate with DRCs. %FR is defined as the ratio of pension assets to pension 
liabilities (%). The variables names, their definitions and the data sources of the variables used in 
this study have been previously reported in Chapter 4.  
Table 5.3 reports the pair-wise correlation. The high correlations are observed between 
CEO- and CFO- aboveCAP-member, Annual-pension, Total-pension and between CEO- and 
CFO- tenure Role-tenure, Company-tenure and Board-tenure. As these variables are used in 
the regressions alternatively, the strong association between these variables is not an issue. The 
results from the VIF estimates indicate that the degree of the variance of the estimated 
coefficients is not affected by the collinearity.  
The pair-wise correlation shows that CEO-aboveCAP is positively associated with DRCs 
suggesting that being a member of DB pension scheme with an accrued pension above the 
compensation cap might be an important determinant of the funding policy of DB schemes. 
This implies that companies are more likely to make DRCs when CEO has accrued pension 
above the compensation cap, which is consistent with the hypothesis. However, the correlation 
coefficient is negative but not statistically significant between CEO-Annual-pension and CEO-
Total-pension and DRCs. The possible explanation for this is that CEO-Annual-pension and 
CEO-Total-pension incorporate pensions which have different levels of risk that create 
different incentives even between the CEOs with DB pensions themselves. This highlights that 
it is important to take into account the riskiness of DB pensions. For CFOs, there is no 
significant correlation between CFO-aboveCAP-member and DRCs indicating that CFOs 




Pair-wise correlation. Correlations significant at the 5% level or better are denoted with *. Correlations exceeding 0.4 threshold are highlighted in bold. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
DRCs 1             
CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.0503* 1            
CEO-Annual-pension -0.0253 0.5729* 1           
CEO-Total-pension -0.0108 0.5837* 0.9453* 1          
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) -0.0497* 0.1477* 0.0197 0.0757* 1         
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) -0.0721* 0.4780* 0.2990* 0.2992* 0.6305* 1        
ln (CEO-Board-tenure) -0.0961* 0.3318* 0.1551* 0.1814* 0.7845* 0.8750* 1       
ln (CEO-Age) -0.0373 -0.0545* 0.0316 0.1081* 0.3401* 0.2513* 0.3259* 1      
Accounting-background 0.0437 0.0068 -0.0578* -0.0613* -0.0258 0.0016 0.0563* -0.007 1     
CFO-aboveCAP-member -0.0417 0.3289* 0.2161* 0.2257* 0.0227 0.1305* 0.1006* -0.0048 -0.0031 1    
CFO-Annual-pension -0.1026* 0.2230* 0.3271* 0.3153* -0.0397 0.0579* 0.0048 -0.0455 -0.0704* 0.6079* 1   
CFO-Total-pension -0.0731* 0.1970* 0.2806* 0.3071* -0.021 0.0514* 0.0027 -0.0217 -0.0725* 0.6112* 0.9159* 1  
ln (CFO-Role-tenure) -0.0561* 0.1200* 0.0269 0.0333 0.3043* 0.2971* 0.3148* 0.1096* -0.0546* 0.3932* 0.1608* 0.1895* 1 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure) -0.0807* 0.1575* 0.0822* 0.0780* 0.2887* 0.3383* 0.3256* 0.0775* -0.0134 0.5476* 0.3624* 0.3738* 0.8177* 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure) -0.0688* 0.1142* 0.0417 0.0438 0.2987* 0.3065* 0.3218* 0.1207* -0.0633* 0.3948* 0.1827* 0.2170* 0.9686* 
ln (CFO-Age) 0.0127 -0.0058 -0.044 -0.024 0.0880* 0.0623* 0.0733* 0.2077* -0.1407* 0.1734* 0.0855* 0.1901* 0.4425* 
Single-scheme -0.0025 -0.1380* -0.1136* -0.1187* 0.0348 0.0363 0.0433 -0.0934* -0.0215 -0.1093* -0.0355 -0.0229 -0.0246 
%Equity -0.1270* 0.1331* 0.1527* 0.1464* 0.018 0.0726* 0.0733* -0.0349 -0.0973* 0.0872* 0.0937* 0.0341 0.0616* 
Closure-to-FA 0.1743* -0.1939* -0.1165* -0.1191* 0.0881* 0.0518* 0.0826* -0.0002 0.0293 -0.2121* -0.1419* -0.1348* 0.0359 
Maturity -0.0234 -0.0857* -0.0516* -0.0532* -0.0098 -0.0793* -0.0408 0.0595* 0.0760* -0.0265 -0.0176 0.0042 -0.0228 
Ln (Company-size) -0.0489* -0.0057 -0.0587* -0.0382 -0.1075* -0.1046* -0.1036* 0.0701* 0.0474 0.1022* -0.0759* -0.0338 -0.0441 
Leverage -0.0963* -0.0664* 0.0557* 0.0631* -0.0753* -0.1459* -0.0913* -0.0186 0.0763* -0.0385 0.0053 0.0285 -0.1499* 
ROA 0.0496* 0.1080* -0.0312 -0.0206 0.1302* 0.1675* 0.1268* -0.0224 -0.0578* 0.0623* 0.0044 -0.0042 0.1409* 
Dividends -0.0327 0.0389 0.0412 0.0268 0.0146 0.0485* 0.0182 -0.0066 -0.0342 -0.0243 0.0082 0.0075 -0.0375 
Cash -0.0716* 0.0795* 0.0189 0.0097 0.0218 0.0971* 0.0539* 0.0161 -0.0509 -0.0143 0.0655* 0.0374 -0.0113 
%FR 0.1167* -0.0847* -0.1250* -0.1189* -0.0112 -0.0658* -0.0683* -0.0475* -0.0033 0.0134 -0.0477* -0.0179 0.0064 
              
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure) 1             
ln (CFO-Board-tenure) 0.8409* 1            
ln (CFO-Age) 0.3458* 0.4794* 1           
Single-scheme 0.0254 -0.0064 -0.1272* 1          
%Equity 0.0480* 0.0700* -0.1483* 0.0085 1         
Closure-to-FA -0.0215 0.0285 0.0307 0.2159* -0.0832* 1        
Maturity -0.0135 -0.0159 0.1215* -0.0755* -0.2706* 0.0127 1       
Ln (Company-size) -0.0081 -0.0574* 0.1485* -0.2107* -0.2142* -0.1973* 0.1575* 1      
Leverage -0.1502* -0.1453* -0.016 0.0146 -0.0555* -0.0538* 0.1096* 0.2334* 1     
ROA 0.1427* 0.1315* 0.0204 0.0514* 0.1083* 0.0306 -0.0781* -0.1981* -0.5629* 1    
Dividends -0.0549* -0.0398 -0.0297 -0.0566* -0.0407 -0.0309 -0.0083 0.0127 0.3375* -0.0700* 1   
Cash 0.0114 -0.0224 -0.0321 -0.0603* -0.0106 -0.0147 -0.0369 -0.0609* 0.1738* 0.0187 0.7834* 1  
%FR -0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0028 0.1884* -0.3071* 0.0850* 0.0485* 0.0641* 0.0129 -0.0482* -0.0121 -0.0065 1 
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5.4. Results  
 
5.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.4 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The first column 
of Table 5.4 presents descriptive statistics for companies which made no DRCs (DRCs = 0) and 
companies which made at least one payment towards deficit reduction respectively (DRCs ≥ 1). 
The statistics reveal that the mean value of CEO Annual-pension relative to the total CEO wealth 
is £1.83% for the sample of companies which made at least one DRCs and 0.97% for companies 
which did not make any DRCs. In pound value, the average CEO Annual-pension is £85.44 
thousand for the sample of companies which made at least one DRCs and £44.85 thousand for 
companies which did not make any DRCs. These numbers indicate that CEOs in companies which 
made DRCs accumulated larger pensions both in pound value and relative to the total CEO wealth 
compared to CEOs in companies which made no DRCs all. CEOs in companies which made at 
least one DRCs also accrued larger Total-pension relative to the total CEO wealth (7.78% vs 
27.80%) and larger Total-pension in pound value (£225.68 vs 1,408.26 thousand) compared to the 
companies which made no DRCs at all. The differences in means in these variables are statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence levels. 
Comparing CEO tenure in role, company and on board between companies which made/made 
no DRCs payments, it appears that CEOs in companies which made no DRCs have longer Role-
tenure (8.39 years (log 1.86 years) versus 5.45 years (log 1.61 years)), Company-tenure (15.36 
years  (log 2.43 years) versus 11.20 years (log 2.20 years)) and Board-tenure (12.13 years (log 
2.22) versus 8.14 years (log 1.97 years)) and compared to companies which made at least one 
DRCs. The average age of CEO is distributed more uniformly between sample companies which 
made at least one DRCs and between companies which did not make any DRCs payments (52.33 
years (log 3.97 years) versus 53.13 years (log 3.98 years)).  
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The statistics for CFOs reveal that the mean value of CFO Annual-pension relative to the total 
CFO wealth is 1.93% for the sample of companies which made at least one DRCs and 0.78% for 
companies which did not make any DRCs. In pound value, the mean value of CFO Annual-pension 
is 40.20 thousand for the sample of companies which made at least one DRCs and 11.05 thousand 
for companies which did not make any DRCs. CFO-Total-pension, both relative to the total CFO 
wealth and in pound value is also higher in companies which made at least one DRCs payment 
(26.67% or £622.75 thousand versus 11.21% or £160.95 thousand). These statistics also suggest 
that the mean size of CFO Annual-pension is larger for CFOs in companies which made at least 
one DRCs payment compared to the companies which made no DRCs at all. The differences in 
these variables are also statistically significant at the 1% confidence levels. However, while the 
mean size of CFO Annual-pension is larger for CFOs in companies which made at least one DRCs 
payment (which is similar to CEOs), the average size of CFO Annual and Total-pension is less than 
2 times smaller.  
CFOs in companies which made no DRCs compared to the companies which made at least one 
DRCs payment are also had longer Role- (6.48 years (log 1.69 years) versus 5.18 years (log 1.57 
years), Board (9.38 years (log 1.97 years) versus 7.60 years (log 1.84 years) and Company- tenure 
(7.13 years (log 1.75 years) versus 5.44 years (log 1.60 years). The difference between these 
variables across the two groups is smaller compared to the difference observed for CEOs. The 
average CFO Age does not differ significantly between the two groups of companies (49.91 years 
(log 3.91 years) versus 48.78 years (log 3.90 years)). However, it is observed that CFOs were, on 
average, 3 years younger compared to the CEOs. 
Companies which did not make any DRCs payments compared to companies which made at 
least one DRCs, on average, were larger (log £7.95 million versus log £7.68 million), had higher 
Leverage (44.82% versus 41.13%), lower ROA (6.88% versus 8.74%), higher Dividends (12.27% 
versus 3.64%) and Cash (28.36% versus 8.59%).  
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Companies which did not make any DRCs payments also had lower %Equity (39.36% versus 
49.49%) and lower %FR (78.31% versus 88.18%) compared to companies which made at least one 
DRCs. The average Closure-to-FA for companies which made no DRCs was 0.45 years compared 
to 0.76 years for companies which made at least one DRCs. The pension schemes in companies 
which made no DRCs were also more mature schemes (4.69% versus 3.65%). 
For indicator variables, CEO-aboveCAP-member with the value of 1 constitutes around 47% in 
the companies which made at least one DRCs and 29% in the companies which made no DRCs at 
all. CFO-aboveCAPmember with the value of 1 constitutes around 39% in the companies which 
made at least one DRCs and 25% in the companies which made no DRCs at all. These statistics 
suggest that companies which made DRCs have a higher number of CEOs and CFOs who 
participate in DB schemes with the value of DB pensions exceeding the compensation threshold. 
Companies which made DRCs had a lower number of CEOs with Accounting-background.  A 
number of single-pension schemes are higher in companies which made no DRCs (34%) compared 
to companies which made at least one DRCs payment (27%). 
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Table 5.4  
Descriptive statistics.  “DRCs = 0” reports statistics for the sample of companies which did not make any DRCs payments and “DRC ≥ 1” reports statistics for the 
sample of companies which made at least one DRCs payment and during 2004-2015 period.  
 
 DRCs=0  DRC ≥ 1  T-test 
 Mean Median SD  Mean Median SD  Diff in means Sig. 
           
DRCs 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.58 1.00 0.49    
 
CEO characteristics           
CEO-Annual-pension (to wealth), %  0.97 0.00 2.54  1.83 0.02 3.55  -0.87*** 0.002 
CEO-Annual-pension, £ 44.85 0.00 112.55  85.44 0.00 156.79  -40.59*** 0.001 
CEO-Total-pension (to wealth), %  7.78 0.00 30.06  27.80 0.00 60.89  -20.02*** 0.000 
CEO-Total-pension, £ 225.68 0.00 690.41  1408.26 0.00 2900.45  -1182.58*** 0.000 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure), years 1.86 1.92 0.91  1.61 1.63 0.72  0.25*** 0.000 
CEO-Role-tenure, years 8.39 5.80 8.11  5.45 4.10 5.25  2.94*** 0.000 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure), years 2.43 2.75 0.99  2.20 2.28 0.83  0.23*** 0.001 
CEO-Company-tenure, years 15.36 14.60 11.35  11.20 8.80 8.97  4.16*** 0.000 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure), years 2.22 2.43 0.94  1.97 2.04 0.74  0.26*** 0.000 
CEO-Board-tenure, years 12.13 10.35 9.42  8.14 6.70 6.42  3.99*** 0.000 
ln (CEO-Age), years 3.98 3.97 0.14  3.97 3.97 0.11  0.01 0.105 
CEO-Age, years 53.13 52.00 7.39  52.33 52.00 5.86  0.81** 0.050 
 
CFO characteristics           
CFO-Annual-pension (to wealth), %  0.78 0.00 2.37  1.93 0.00 4.20  -1.15*** 0.001 
CFO-Annual-pension, £ 11.05 0.00 28.86  40.20 0.00 75.39  -29.15*** 0.000 
CFO-Total-pension (to wealth), %  11.21 0.00 33.88  26.67 0.00 63.63  -15.46*** 0.002 
CFO-Total-pension, £ 160.95 0.00 443.61  622.75 0.00 1402.91  -461.80*** 0.000 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure), years 1.69 1.70 0.84  1.57 1.59 0.72  0.13** 0.024 
CFO-Role-tenure, years 6.48 4.50 5.57  5.18 3.90 4.77  1.30*** 0.001 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure), years 1.97 2.13 0.94  1.84 1.86 0.81  0.13** 0.033 
CFO-Company-tenure, years 9.38 7.40 7.64  7.60 5.40 7.02  1.78*** 0.002 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure), years 1.75 1.74 0.88  1.60 1.65 0.73  0.15** 0.012 
CFO-Board-tenure, years 7.13 4.70 6.16  5.44 4.20 4.96  1.68*** 0.000 
ln (CFO-Age), years 3.91 3.91 0.13  3.90 3.91 0.11  0.01 0.148 
CFO-Age, years 49.41 49.00 6.49  48.78 49.00 5.55  0.63 0.103 
 
Company-specific characteristics           
Ln (Company-size), £ mil  7.95 7.74 1.31  7.68 7.52 1.42  0.27** 0.011 
Leverage, % 44.82 44.06 20.58  41.13 39.98 18.19  3.68*** 0.009 
ROA, %  6.88 6.22 10.31  8.74 7.81 8.90  -1.85*** 0.007 
Dividends, % 12.27 2.39 40.52  3.64 2.86 5.65  8.63*** 0.000 
Cash, % 28.36 5.56 96.97  8.59 6.27 8.27  19.77*** 0.000 
 
Pension-scheme characteristics           
%Equity, % 39.36 38.92 21.17  49.49 50.00 19.36  -10.13*** 0.000 
Closure-to-FA, years 0.45 0.00 1.52  0.76 0.00 2.02  -0.31** 0.024 
Maturity, % 4.69 3.48 4.38  3.65 3.57 1.73  1.04*** 0.000 
%FR 78.31 79.20 19.04  88.18 88.48 12.74  -9.86*** 0.000 
 
Indicator variables           
CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.29 0.00 0.46  0.47 0.00 0.50  -0.18*** 0.000 
Accounting-background 0.28 0.00 0.45  0.16 0.00 0.37  0.12*** 0.000 
CFO-aboveCAP-member 0.25 0.00 0.44  0.39 0.00 0.49  -0.13*** 0.001 
Single-scheme 0.34 0.00 0.48  0.27 0.00 0.44  0.07** 0.036 
 120 
5.5.1. Empirical results 
This study examines the factors that influence the funding policy of DB pension schemes 
using a logit regression analysis with industry and year effects and clustered standard errors 
and a binary dependent variable that equals 1 if a company made a DRCs payment and zero 
otherwise. For continues variables, the coefficients represent the marginal effects of the 
probability (dy/dx) of making DRCs payment implied by the logit coefficient estimates that 
result from a unit change in the explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficients 
represent the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator variable from 0 to 
1. For ease interpretation of the results, odds ratios (Odds), that is, the exponential of each 
coefficient estimate is reported. It represents the factor change in odds for a unit increase in the 
explanatory variable. If the estimated factor change is less than 1, the impact is negative and if 
the change is positive, the impact is positive. 
Tables 5.5-5.8 report the results examining the determinants of the funding policy of deficit 
of DB pension schemes. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict that CEO and CFO DB pensions are 
associated with a higher probability of making DRCs. The results from the Logit provide strong 
support that CEO DB pension variable matter for DRCs, but the results fail to find any 
relationship between CFO DB pension variables and the probability of making DRCs. In 
particular, Table 5.5 reports results controlling for CEO/CFO Role-tenure. In Model (1) of 
Table 5.5 it is observed that CEO-aboveCAP-member is positively associated with the marginal 
probability of making DRCs payments. This finding suggests that CEOs with pensions above 
the compensation threshold are more likely to make DRCs to reduce the deficit in the pension 
scheme to secure their accruals, as predicted. The predicted probability of making DRCs is 
2.302 times higher when CEO have DB pension accruals above the compensation limit 
compared to companies whose CEOs who have DB pensions below the compensation cap or 
those whose are not members of DB schemes: the estimated coefficient is statistically 
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significant at 1% level. The results remain robust when controlling for CFO characteristics 
such as CFO-aboveCAP-member and CFO-Role-tenure (Model (3)): the predicted probability 
of making DRCs increases to 2.432 times (the estimated coefficient is statistically significant 
at 1% confidence level). 
Model (2) of Table 5.5 reports results examining CFO-aboveCAP-member. CFO-
aboveCAP-member is positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that when CFO is a 
member of DB pension schemes are less relevant for funding policy of DB schemes compared 
to CEOs. The results also remain insignificant when controlling for CEO characteristics such 
as CEO-aboveCAP-member and CEO-Role-tenure (Model (3)).  
The results shown in Models (4) – (6) which include CEO- and CFO- Annual-pension and 
Models (7) – (9) which include CEO- and CFO- Total-pension allow to come to the similar 
conclusions. CEO-Annual-pension is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. It is 
estimated that a one per cent change in CEO-Annual-pension increases the probability of 
making DRCs by 2.1% (Model 4) and by 2% when also controlling for CFO characteristics 
(Model 6). CEO-Total-pension is also positive and statistically significant at 1% level. It is 
estimated that a one per cent change in CEO-Total-pension increases the probability of making 
DRCs by 0.2% (Model 7) and by 0.1% when also controlling for CFO characteristics (Model 
9). CFO-Annual- or Total- pension remain insignificant across all model specifications shown 
in Table 5.5.  
The results discussed above are consistent across other model specifications when 
controlling for Company- (Table 5.6) or Board- tenure (Table 5.7) or Age (Table 5.8): 
estimated coefficients for CEO pension related variables are positive and statistically 
significant, and estimated coefficients CFO pension related variables remain statistically 
insignificant in all specifications. The results estimated results in Tables 5.6 – 5.8 are shown 
Appendix to this thesis. 
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Overall, these results indicate that companies managed by CEOs who have DB pensions are 
predicted to have a greater probability of making DRCs compared to companies whose CEOs 
are non-DB members. The results, however, show that CFOs DB pensions are not related to 
DRCs, suggesting that CEOs incentives are more influential than those of CFOs.  
These findings also supplement the findings discussed in the previous Chapter 4. While, this 
study findings show that CEO DB pensions are associated with higher probability of making 
DRCs, previous findings show that CEO DB pensions are associated with higher funding levels 
of DB pension schemes implying that pension schemes benefited from DRCs payments made 
by the companies. 
With respect to other variables, it also has been found that CEO-Role-tenure associated with 
a lower probability of making DRCs. The negative association suggest that long-tenured CEOs 
are less likely to make DRCs than short-tenured CEOs. This finding contradicts with the 
prediction that tenure positively associates with the probability of making DRCs and the 
previous study findings (Chapter 4) that show that Role-tenure associates with the higher 
funding levels of DB pension schemes. The possible explanation for these contracting results 
is that long-tenured CEOs tend to take less pension risk by setting more accurate (less 
optimistic) pension assumptions that leads to the more accurate pension contributions needed 
to cover the cost of DB pensions. In particular, the companies may apply higher discount rate 
and set higher expected rates of return on pension assets which would lead to lower pension 
contributions needed from the company. Making lower contributions may result in higher 
deficit if, for example, the expected rates of return will not materialise. Previous stream of 
studies already discussed in this thesis show that companies have discretion over the pension 
assumptions and thus the size of pension contributions. As long-tenured managers more likely 
to have DB pensions as DB pensions were a common form of retirement arrangements until 
recently (as discussed in the previous chapters), long-tenured CEOs are expected to take less 
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risk in respect to the pension schemes. Therefore, long-tenured CEOs may consider making 
the right pension contributions to cover the full cost of DB pensions that may negate the need 
to make DRCs as the pension scheme will be better funded. This explains why CEO Role-
tenure associates with the higher funding levels of DB pension schemes but with lower 
probability of making DRCs. It is estimated that ln (CEO-Role-tenure) is associated with, 
depending on the specifications, 5.3%-6.2% decrease in the probability of making DRCs. 
While CEO Role-tenure correlates with CEO Age and it common not to include CEO age 
together with tenure (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Chakraborty, Sheik, and Subramanian, 
2007; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012), it is also argued that the omission of CEO age may 
generate a bias on the coefficient of tenure (Chen and Zheng, 2014). Including both ln (CEO-
Role-tenure) and ln (CEO Age) do not change the coefficient on ln (CEO-Role-tenure): ln 
(CEO-Role-tenure) remains negative and statistically significant, suggesting that long-tenured 
take more risk regarding the pension scheme. Also, there is evidence that ln (CEO-Company-
tenure) and ln (CEO-Board-tenure) also associate with the lower probability of making DRCs. 
The coefficients on ln (CFO-Role-tenure), ln (CFO-Company-tenure) and ln (CFO-Board-
tenure) are not statistically significant in any model specifications suggesting that CFO tenure 
is not associated with a probability of making DRCs.  
There is an evidence that Accounting-background associates with a higher probability of 
making DRCs. This finding is consistent with the prediction. It was argued that CEOs with 
accounting background more likely to have a higher level of financial expertise to understand 
the implications of having a deficit in DB scheme. As a result, CEOs may consider making 
DRCs to reduce pension risk in order to avoid or at least lessen the negative consequences in 
the future. 
In line with the prediction, the relationship between %Equity and probability of making 
DRCs is negative. The negative coefficients suggest that companies appear to increase the 
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share of pension assets in equities to avoid paying DRCs payments to the schemes. This finding 
is consistent with Gold (2003) who argue that the allocation of pension assets to equities 
decreases the amount of pension contribution needed from the company through higher 
expected rates of return on pension assets (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006). Increasing 
%Equity to reduce the pension contributions more likely to lead to a higher deficit, which is 
consistent with findings obtained in Chapter 4. The estimates suggest that a 1% increase in 
%Equity increases the probability of making DRCs by more than 0.3%-0.4%, depending on 
the model specification: the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at least at 10% 
confidence levels in all model specifications.  
Also, in line with the prediction Closure-to-FA positively relates to the marginal probability 
of making DRCs suggesting that companies after the closure seem to focus more on how to 
bring the scheme to full funding. First, this is because companies might be pressurised by the 
trustees to make DRCs to justify the scheme closure. Second, by paying DRCs company shows 
that it deals with the deficit in the scheme assuring pension regulators of its intention to reduce 
the risk and avoiding the possible intervention of regulators into the management of the 
scheme.  However, the results from Chapters 4 suggest that Closure-to-FA negatively 
associates with the funding suggesting that DRCs might not be effective at reducing the deficit. 
For example, companies may make DRCs towards deficit reduction and reduce regular 
contributions needed to cover the ongoing cost of DB pensions. If so, DRCs will not reduce 
the deficit in the pension scheme as expected. The estimates suggest that a one -year increase 
in Closure-to-FA increases the probability of making DRCs by more than 4.1%-5.4%, 
depending on the model specification: the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 
least at 5% confidence levels.  
There is some evidence that Dividends associated with a higher probability of making 
DRCs. The positive relationship suggests that companies are more likely to pay DRCs when 
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they pay higher dividends, which is consistent with prior studies (Bunn, Mizen, and Smietanka, 
2018; Liu and Tonks, 2012). This finding, however, implies that shareholders in a company 
with a pension deficit should anticipate that future dividends are likely to be reduced, which 
may also have implications for future stock prices of companies with underfunded DB 
schemes. Combining the evidence from Chapter 4, it appears that DRCs worked well at 
reducing the deficit as Dividends also positively associated with the funding of DB schemes. 
It is estimated that a one per cent change in Dividends increases the probability of DRCs by 
1.7%-2.0%, depending on the specification. 
While a positive relationship is predicted between %FR and DRCs, it appears that %FR is 
irrelevant for funding policy of deficit. This indicates that DRCs do not always associate with 
the higher funding levels, suggesting that companies might reduce regular pension 
contributions through pension assumptions manipulation which is insufficient to cover the cost 
of DB pensions that decreases the effectiveness of DRCs. Other variables are less important 
are for funding policy of deficit of DB pension schemes.   
The results obtained from regressions using the extended sample (2004-2015) are similar in 
direction and significance of the coefficients to those obtained using the 2006-2015 sample 

















Table 5.5: Logit regressions of DRCs  
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the dependent variable DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs 
and 0 otherwise. Models 1 to 3 include a dummy variable aboveCAP-member that equals to 1 if CEO or CFO is a member of DB pension schemes with the pension above the 
compensation threshold. Models 4 to 6 include Annual-pension and Models 7 to 9 include Total-pension. Regressions reported in this table control for Role-tenure. All variables 
are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors 
are clustered at the company-level. 
Dependent variable:  
DRCs (dummy)                     
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx  Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx  Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                     
 
CEO-aboveCAP-member 2.302***    2.432***                
 (0.005)    (0.004)                
CEO-Annual-pension         0.021**    0.020**        
         (0.029)    (0.042)        
CEO-Total-pension                0.002***    0.001** 
                (0.006)    (0.019) 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure)  -0.062*    -0.043   -0.053*    -0.047   -0.057*    -0.048 
  (0.057)    (0.203)   (0.064)    (0.133)   (0.074)    (0.172) 
Accounting-background 1.740*    1.778*   1.549    1.633   2.002**    1.897**  
 (0.095)    (0.097)   (0.153)    (0.118)   (0.012)    (0.028)  
CFO-aboveCAP-member   1.456  1.201                
   (0.220)  (0.545)                
CFO-Annual-pension           0.006  0.001        
           (0.489)  (0.955)        
CFO-Total-pension                  0.001  0.000 
                  (0.181)  (0.606) 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure)    -0.053  -0.038     -0.022  0.007     -0.030  -0.009 
    (0.224  (0.347     (0.530  (0.839     (0.418  (0.797 
Single-scheme 1.447  1.348  1.591   1.317  1.278  1.417   1.450  1.238  1.531  
 (0.303)  (0.404)  (0.177)   (0.395)  (0.456)  (0.268)   (0.261)  (0.523)  (0.185)  
%Equity  -0.004**  -0.004*  -0.004**   -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004**   -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004** 
  (0.039)  (0.066)  (0.037)   (0.031)  (0.087)  (0.032)   (0.025)  (0.097)  (0.030) 
Closure-to-FA  0.051**  0.044**  0.054***   0.041*  0.041**  0.041*   0.047**  0.046**  0.050** 
  (0.014)  (0.030)  (0.009)   (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.054)   (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.015) 
Maturity  0.020  0.014  0.017   0.019  0.014  0.019   0.009  0.011  0.012 
  (0.378)  (0.560)  (0.475)   (0.327)  (0.522)  (0.360)   (0.654)  (0.625)  (0.570) 
ln (Company-size)  -0.025  -0.019  -0.020   -0.036  -0.025  -0.033   -0.037  -0.030  -0.039 
  (0.459)  (0.581)  (0.556)   (0.246)  (0.420)  (0.294)   (0.239)  (0.343)  (0.226) 
Leverage  0.000  0.000  0.001   0.000  0.000  0.001   0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.865)  (0.933)  (0.841)   (0.842)  (0.928)  (0.815)   (0.751)  (0.902)  (0.908) 
ROA  0.005  0.005  0.005   0.007*  0.004  0.006*   0.007*  0.003  0.006 
  (0.171)  (0.199)  (0.203)   (0.055)  (0.245)  (0.098)   (0.091)  (0.391)  (0.162) 
Dividends  0.010  0.017*  0.016   0.010  0.020**  0.014   0.018*  0.021**  0.018* 
  (0.346)  (0.087)  (0.131)   (0.307)  (0.027)  (0.138)   (0.071)  (0.026)  (0.063) 
Cash  -0.006  -0.004  -0.004   -0.005  -0.004  -0.003   -0.002  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.143)  (0.317)  (0.322)   (0.189)  (0.261)  (0.464)   (0.558)  (0.205)  (0.556) 
FR  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002   -0.002  -0.002  -0.002   -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.498)  (0.378)  (0.425)   (0.467)  (0.567)  (0.459)   (0.447)  (0.614)  (0.456) 
                     
Number of obs  1,171  1,162  1,130   1,224  1,299  1,179   1,201  1,240  1,137 
Wald chi2  97.05  94.15  102.99   173.97  116.71  209.77   180.96  135.59  395.08 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.1577  0.1424  0.1675   0.1581  0.1418  0.1619   0.1627  0.1421  0.1631 
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DB pension, age and funding policy of deficit (H3) 
 
Tables 5.9 - 5.11 present the results for hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the company 
is more likely to make DRCs when the CEO has a DB pension and who is near retirement. If 
this conjecture is true, it is expected that CEO pension related variables will be associated with 
higher probability making of DRCs for CEOs approaching closer to retirement. To identify 
CEOs who approach closer to retirement, 58 years is used as the cut-off point (similar to 
Chapter 4).  
The results shown in Table 5.9 – 5.11 provide some statistically significant evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. According to the first two columns of Table 5.9, CEO-aboveCAP-
member is both positive and statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient is larger for CEOs who are 58 years old or older. It is estimated that closer to retire 
CEO with DB pension above the compensation threshold is nearly 3 times more likely to make 
DRCs than CEOs who are farer to retirement. The probability of making DRCs also is higher 
when CEO-aboveCAP-member is replaced with CEO-Annual-pension (Table 5.10) and CEO-
Total-pension (Table 5.11). It is estimated that a 1% increase in CEO-Annual-pension is 
associated with 6.8% probability of making DRCs when CEO is closer to retirement compared 
to 4.7% when CEO is farer to retirement. However, the estimated coefficients are only 
statistically significant in models without controlling for CFO-characteristics.  
Overall, these results indicate that pensions become more important as CEOs approach 
retirement and CEOs become particularly concerned about the funding in the DB schemes. To 
improve the funding, CEOs are more likely to make DRCs to ensure the recipience of the full 
amount of DB pensions once they retire. Moreover, these findings also highlight that CEOs are 
more concerned about the schemes in which they participate, as consistent with findings from 
study in Chapter 4. 
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Table 5.9 
Logit regressions of DRCs  
 
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension are related to the dependent variable 
DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise for the sub-sample of CEOs older/younger 
than 58 years. The CEO pension variable is a dummy variable CEO-aboveCAP-member that takes the value of 1 
if CEO is a member of DB pension schemes with accrued pension above the compensation cap and 0 otherwise. 
Model 1 does not control for CFO characteristics while Model 2 controls for the CFO characteristics. All variables 
are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the 
estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the company-level.  
 
Dependent variable: DRCs (dummy)          
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx  Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
   Model 1     Model 2  
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No  Yes No 
 
CEO-aboveCAP-member 2.898*  2.025***   2.037  2.322***  
 (0.077)  (0.000)   (0.340)  (0.000)  
ln (CEO-Age)  -2.292*  0.083   -1.340  0.078 
  (0.075)  (0.680)   (0.314)  (0.711) 
Accounting-background 1.138  1.757***   4.075  2.019***  
 (0.888)  (0.007)   (0.125)  (0.001)  
CFO-aboveCAP      7.815***  0.901  
      (0.005)  (0.576)  
ln (CFO-Age)       -0.163  0.410** 
       (0.771)  (0.044) 
Single-scheme 44.90***  1.286   32.443***  1.487**  
 (0.000)  (0.185)   (0.000)  (0.040)  
%Equity  -0.007*  -0.005***   -0.006  -0.004*** 
  (0.051)  (0.001)   (0.176)  (0.002) 
Closure-to-FA  -0.035  0.052***   -0.014  0.051*** 
  (0.186)  (0.000)   (0.567)  (0.000) 
Maturity  0.016  0.015   0.022  0.004 
  (0.638)  (0.369)   (0.575)  (0.836) 
ln (Company-size)  -0.035  -0.031*   0.019  -0.032* 
  (0.527)  (0.096)   (0.774)  (0.097) 
Leverage  -0.008  0.002   -0.009*  0.002 
  (0.126)  (0.318)   (0.071)  (0.249) 
ROA  -0.021**  0.006   -0.018*  0.005 
  (0.037)  (0.120)   (0.053)  (0.206) 
Dividends  0.007  0.007   0.016  0.016* 
  (0.710)  (0.339)   (0.318)  (0.055) 
Cash  -0.025***  -0.005**   -0.015  -0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.041)   (0.153)  (0.453) 
FR  0.005  -0.004**   0.006  -0.004* 
  (0.276)  (0.040)   (0.120)  (0.052) 
          
Number of obs  166  989   152  961 
Wald chi2  55.62  147.59   45.39  155.12 
Prob > chi2  0.003  0.000   0.059  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.392  0.171   0.448  0.184 
Year effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 




















Logit regressions of DRCs  
 
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension are related to the dependent variable 
DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise for the sub-sample of CEOs older/younger 
than 58 years. The CEO pension variable is a is CEO-Annual-pension that is defined as the annual size of accrued 
pension divided by the CEO total wealth (%). Model 1 does not control for CFO characteristics while Model 2 
controls for the CFO characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors 
are clustered at the company-level.  
Dependent variable: DRCs (dummy)          
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx  Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
   Model 1     Model 2  
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No  Yes No 
 
CEO-Annual-pension  0.068*  0.047***  0.041   0.044*** 
  (0.090)  (0.000)  (0.250)   (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Age)  -2.482  1.176   -2.1461  1.059 
  (0.139)  (0.838)   (0.154)  (0.945) 
Accounting-background 0.748  1.553**   1.131  1.832***  
 (0.757)  (0.024)   (0.925)  (0.002)  
CFO-Annual-pension      1.368   1.030 
      (0.155)   (0.554) 
ln (CFO-Age)       -0.066  7.403*** 
       (0.911)  (0.010) 
Single-scheme 70.117***  1.261   79.95***  1.422*  
 (0.000)  (0.208)   (0.000)  (0.062)  
%Equity  -0.005  0.982***   -0.003  0.983*** 
  (0.270)  (0.000)   (0.527)  (0.002) 
Closure-to-FA  -0.070*  1.232***   -0.041  1.220*** 
  (0.081)  (0.000)   (0.369)  (0.000) 
Maturity  0.040  1.055   0.052*  1.020 
  (0.152)  (0.420)   (0.062)  (0.782) 
ln (Company-size)  -0.089  0.867**   -0.046  0.857** 
  (0.101)  (0.048)   (0.259)  (0.039) 
Leverage  -0.006  1.005   -0.007  1.005 
  (0.311)  (0.503)   (0.235)  (0.456) 
ROA  -0.017  1.034*   -0.016  1.028* 
  (0.167)  (0.033)   (0.141)  (0.086) 
Dividends  -0.004  1.040   -0.003  1.071** 
  (0.898)  (0.211)   (0.917)  (0.043) 
Cash  -0.020*  0.984   -0.015  0.995 
  (0.062)  (0.116)   (0.153)  (0.619) 
FR  0.008  0.988   0.008  0.988 
  (0.158)  (0.112)   (0.124)  (0.136) 
          
Number of obs  154  1,045   139  1,015 
Wald chi2  394.54  142.2   583.9  156.27 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000   0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.3994  0.1706   0.4183  0.183 
Year effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 












Logit regressions of DRCs  
 
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension are related to the dependent variable 
DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise for the sub-sample of CEOs older/younger 
than 58 years. The CEO pension variable is a is CEO-Total-pension that is defined as the annual size of accrued 
pension divided by the CEO total wealth (%). Model 1 does not control for CFO characteristics while Model 2 
controls for the CFO characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors 
are clustered at the company-level.  
Dependent variable: DRCs (dummy)          
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx  Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
   Model 1     Model 2  
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No  Yes No 
 
CEO-Total-pension  0.005*  0.003***   0.004  0.003*** 
  (0.052)  (0.000)   (0.241)  (0.001) 
ln (CEO-Age)  0.000*  0.712   0.000  0.727 
  (0.071)  (0.677)   (0.288)  (0.708) 
Accounting-background 1.438  1.968***   1.365  2.106***  
 (0.661)  (0.000)   (0.727)  (0.000)  
CFO-Total-pension       1.007  1.005 
       (0.671)  (0.226) 
ln (CFO-Age)       0.367  3.784* 
       (0.725)  (0.090) 
Single-scheme 44.243***  1.404*   32.551***  1.506**  
 (0.000)  (0.068)   (0.000)  (0.033)  
%Equity  0.976  0.980***  0.986   0.981*** 
  (0.190)  (0.000)  (0.529)   (0.001) 
Closure-to-FA  0.794*  1.233***  0.868   1.242*** 
  (0.090)  (0.000)  (0.326)   (0.000) 
Maturity  1.113  1.010   1.161  0.999 
  (0.518)  (0.882)   (0.474)  (0.989) 
ln (Company-size)  0.731  0.862**   0.783  0.842** 
  (0.219)  (0.042)   (0.338)  (0.025) 
Leverage  0.964  1.008   0.963  1.006 
  (0.141)  (0.270)   (0.214)  (0.438) 
ROA  0.888**  1.034**   0.895*  1.029* 
  (0.019)  (0.036)   (0.059)  (0.083) 
Dividends  1.024  1.084**   1.007  1.094*** 
  (0.853)  (0.016)   (0.963)  (0.010) 
Cash  0.953  0.998   0.978  0.998 
  (0.352)  (0.879)   (0.683)  (0.869) 
FR  1.024  0.985***   1.028  0.985** 
  (0.294)  (0.040)   (0.282)  (0.050) 
          
Number of obs  161  1,014   140  974 
Wald chi2  62.8  151.21   56.81  153.46 
Prob > chi2  0.0004  0.0000   0.0044  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.3669  0.1795   0.3715  0.1853 
Year effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 












This study questions whether managerial inside-debt incentives are related to the funding policy 
of deficit. The obtained findings provide evidence that CEO inside debt incentives, but not CFOs, 
are associated with a higher probability of making DRCs. Also, this study shows that CEOs with 
short career horizons tend to associate with a higher probability of making DRCs. These findings 
together suggest that companies tend to make DRCs when their CEOs have inside-debt and that 

















Chapter 6  
Corporate structure and funding policy of Defined-
Benefit pension schemes 
 
 
A company with a DB pension scheme is required to make pension contributions to cover 
the annual costs of DB pensions, e.g., yearly accruals. Pension contributions reduce the cash 
resources that otherwise may be used for other company activities such as capital investment. 
Moreover, the company is also exposed to the changes in the market and demographic 
environments that can significantly increase the rates of pension contributions. The impact on 
cash will be more significant in company with an underfunded pension scheme because the 
company needs to make even higher contributions to reduce the deficit. The company, 
however, may manage pension contributions in several ways. First, the company can defer 
additional pension contributions, DRCs, or extend the recovery plan that lowers annual DRCs 
when the pension scheme is underfunded. Second, the company may manage pension 
assumptions to reduce future service contributions, FSCs, which the company pays to cover 
the regular annual costs. This study examines whether companies reduce their pension 
contributions when they are financially constrained. 
Companies are less likely to reduce pension contributions under perfect capital markets as 
the company has no or little interest in accumulating cash. This is because the company’s cost 
of capital is the same whether that capital is raised internally through retained earnings or 
working capital or externally through the issuance of debt or equity (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). Or, put it differently, the opportunity cost of internal funds is the market interest rate, 
and the company can borrow and lend at that interest rate in the capital market (Hubbard, 1998). 
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The interest in accumulating cash (and perhaps motives to reduce pension contributions) may, 
however, arise when companies are financially restricted in a sense that they cannot easily raise 
funds in financial markets. Financially constrained companies may find it attractive to reduce 
some of the company’s costs such as cost on pensions when companies are more likely to have 
less easy access to capital markets or when the cost of the external financing is high (Cooper 
and Ross, 2002).  
However, the relationship between the company’s capital structure and pension 
contributions is complex. On the one hand, a company facing difficulties in raising new capital 
may particularly be inclined to reduce pension contributions and use this freed-up cash for 
company’s needs such as investments (Kisser, Kiff, and Soto, 2017). On the other hand, 
pension contributions are tax-deductible, and the company may benefit from making higher 
pension contributions via tax relief (Davies and de Haan, 2012). Moreover, higher pension 
contributions will return the pension scheme to full funding more rapidly if there is 
underfunding. This more likely would lead to the higher credit rating and market value of the 
company given that market view unfunded pension liabilities as a debt-like for the sponsoring 
company (Mckillop and Pogue, 2009; Franzoni and Marin, 2006; Rafle, 2004; Jin, Merton and 
Bodie, 2006). Higher funding also is of great importance to pension scheme members. Given 
these conflicting motives, existing studies on corporate DB pensions that examine the 
relationship between pension contributions and capital structure also produce mixed results 
(e.g., studies for review - Davies and de Haan, 2012; Cocco and Volpin, 2007; Bartram, 2012)20 
 
20 For example, while Davies and de Haan (2012) show that tax- effects are more important to pension 
contributions decision-making implying that more levered companies tend to make higher pension contributions, 
Cocco and Volpin (2007) find no direct evidence linking financial constraints to pension scheme financing 
decisions, perhaps due to presence of endogenous variable. However, estimating the instrumental variables 
regressions that effectively deals with the endogenous variable, they find that more financially constrained 
companies with higher proportion of insider-trustees make lower pension contributions. However, Bartram (2018) 
analysing sample of US companies finds strong evidence that financially distressed companies contribute less to 
the pension schemes, and these companies also have lower funding levels. 
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without there being provided reasons why companies are more likely to be inclined to 
underfund or overfund their pension schemes. Thus, more research is needed to understand 
whether the capital structure has any impact on the pension funding policy – the issue on which 
this study aims to provide some evidence.  
This study builds on the argument that pension regulation is important for pension funding 
policy. In particular, pension regulator must be regarded as an important motivator or, instead, 
demotivator for companies to use pensions as a source of funding. Given that UK pension 
regulation is less restrictive, this study hypothesizes that UK companies reduce pension 
contributions when they are financially restricted. Consistent with this hypothesis, this study 
shows that high-debt companies are associated with lower FSCs and DRCs, suggesting that 
companies tend to reduce both types of pension contributions when they are financially 
constrained. This study further documents that while dividends alone positively associated with 
pension contributions, it has been found that companies with high debt and high dividend 
payouts are associated with lower pension contributions. These findings suggest that risky 
companies act in the interests of their shareholders as they to transfer wealth from the pension 
scheme members to shareholders by increasing dividends and reducing the pension 
contributions to DB schemes. This harms pension scheme members as it increases the 
likelihood of the pension scheme default.  
This study extends the stream of research on corporate DB pension schemes and contributes 
to the literature in several ways. First of all, this study concentrates on UK companies reflecting 
UK- specific regulatory framework for companies with corporate DB pension schemes. 
Whereas Davies and de Haan (2012) show that tax effects play a more critical role, this study 
produces contrasting results which are more likely to be driven by the differences in pension 
regulation. Therefore, this study adds new insights on the pension contributions-capital 
structure relationship reflecting the unique regulatory background for the British companies 
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with DB pension arrangements. However, the findings of this study can also be applied to other 
countries with lighter pension regulation, such as the US. As evidence of applicability, the 
results of this study are consistent with those obtained in Bartram (2018) who, analysing the 
sample of US companies, also finds that high debt companies tend to reduce pension 
contributions. Moreover, findings can be used by countries which consider relaxing pension 
regulation to assess the implications for pension scheme members. 
Second, this is the first study that distinguishes between two types of pension contributions. 
By examining regular contributions and DRCs separately, this study allows establishing 
whether companies manage regular contributions, DRCs or both. To know whether or not 
companies manage regular contributions, DRCs or both is important because the companies 
are not expected to make pension contributions when they lack the cash or face borrowing 
restrictions except for DRCs which can be set up that best suit their financial needs. This 
study’s findings reveal that companies tend to manage both regular contributions and DRCs. 
This can harm the pension scheme members as it not only increases the likelihood of default 
but also lowers the amount of pension assets. First, making lower regular contributions would 
increase the deficit in DB schemes. This is because the reduction in regular contributions is 
driven by the company’s need for a higher cash and not by the lower cost of DB pensions. 
Second, DRCs may be less effective at reducing the deficit if the company also reduces regular 
contributions. This can explain why the deficit in DB schemes in some companies grows 
despite having DRCs (e.g., Carillion, BHS). Therefore, these findings reveal important 
regulatory implications for the management of DB schemes, which might also be of interests 
to pension regulators who may consider improving the existing pension regulation. To improve 
the current measures, regulators may consider more transparent reporting practices to prevent 
pension assumptions management and introduce the deadline for eliminating the deficit. These 
measures may help to improve the regulation regarding how companies deal with the pension 
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deficit and enchase the security of the members' benefits. Moreover, as a primitive measure, 
the pension regulators may pay more attention to companies whose schemes funding worsens, 
since this may indicate that some of the pension assumptions might be violated. The stronger 
attention should be paid to companies which make DRCs and whose schemes funding worsens 
and/or does not improve since there could be a substitution effect through pension assumptions 
manipulation. These steps may prevent the pension scheme to restore the funding levels. 
This study also contributes to the literature (Bunn, Mizen, and Smietanka, 2018; Liu and 
Tonks, 2012) by documenting the impact of dividends on pension contributions showing that 
shareholders are expected to reduce the pension deficit. However, more risky companies tend 
to reduce pension contributions to pay dividends. Therefore, this study contributes to the 
literature by showing how financial constraints distort pension financing decisions and how 
financial constraints affect the dividends-funding policy relationship.  
Lastly, this study contributes by utilising the most recent time-series cross-sectional data 
covering FTSE 350 companies over 2004-2015. This data starts from 2004 – the year when 
Pension Act 2004 was introduced, and previous funding requirements had been replaced by the 
new “scheme-specific” funding requirements. This would imply that empirical findings of this 
study reflect the company’s behaviour towards their pension schemes imposed by the current 
regulation. Therefore, this study findings may be used by regulators to respond to the problem 
of under-contributing in times when company face borrowing restrictions for future deficit 
prevention and better management of the schemes.  
The structure of the chapter is following: Section 6.2 develops the hypotheses; Section 6.3 





6.2. Hypotheses development 
 
High debt companies are more likely to have less easy access to capital markets or incur 
higher debt servicing costs due to escalated risk of existing outstanding debt (Acharya et al., 
2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2006). These constraints may result in companies not generating 
sufficient cash to cover their cash requirements for sustaining and growing their business. As 
a result, they may become more hesitant about the expenditure to save more cash for the 
company’s needs. Prior studies show that companies with high debt issuance tend to save cash 
out of cash to respond to the increase in cash flow risk (Harris and Roark, 2019; Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Ginglinger and Saddour, 2012; Bates, Kahle, and 
Stulz, 2009) to be able to meet their operating needs (Denis and Mckeon, 2012).  
The presence of high debt in the capital structure can also affect the pension funding 
decisions as DB pensions take away significant cash from the company. Cooper and Ross, 
(2002) argue that when the company is financially constrained, it may find it attractive to 
reduce pension contributions. For example, the company may borrow funds from the pension 
scheme members by making lower pension contributions to DB schemes without incurring 
significant cost. It might then repay if the situation improves or share the cost with the pension 
scheme members if the company bankrupts. Therefore, given that high debt may either limit 
the company to raise funds or raise new funds at the lower cost that may affect the company’s 
cash, it is expected that pension contributions to be negatively associated to the level of debt 
in a company capital structure. Prior studies on corporate DB pension schemes support this 
hypothesis by documenting that companies apply more aggressive pension assumptions to 
reduce the pension contributions when they are financially constrained, lack of cash or when 
they generate lower profit (Gold, 2003; Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006; Billings, O’brien, 
and Woods, 2016; Braswell, Chang, and Hsieh, 2017; Addoum, Binsbergen, and Brandt, 2010).  
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However, it is worth noting that this study predicts a negative relationship between pension 
contributions and debt that contradicts with the findings of Davies and de Haan (2012). This is 
due to the less restrictive regulation that more likely to induce companies to borrow from 
schemes rather than overfund and to benefit from higher tax relief. For example, In the 
Netherlands, the pension regulator imposes to submit a short-term recovery plan for pension 
schemes in deficit outlining how it expects to increase the funding ratio above the minimum 
(105%) required level within three years (de Haan, 2015). Such strict rules may give companies 
fewer incentives to reduce the pension contributions as borrowing today from the pension 
scheme members the company is obliged to pay back in the next two years which can 
significantly constrain the cash holdings. Contrary to the Netherlands, companies operated 
under UK law are given considerable leeway, and such difference in regulation may induce 
British companies to behave very differently compared to Dutch companies concerning their 
pension schemes. There is no specific deadline for eliminating the deficit and level and timing 
of additional contributions is entirely upon the company. Such regulatory “freedom” may 
underlie the incentives to delay making DRCs. Moreover, such regulatory flexibilities may also 
create incentives to reduce FSCs as the company can effectively spread the current deficit, 
which will occur as a result of under-contributing into future periods. Therefore, it is expected 
that British companies with high debt are more likely to underfund their DB schemes. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Companies with high debt in their corporate structure are negatively associated 
with the pension contributions  
 
Webb (2007) argues that companies may be more inclined to pay out cash to equity holders 
and to either underinvest (due to a debt-like overhang of pension liabilities) or invest in risky 
projects (due to risk-shifting). If so, companies may have even stronger incentives to pay 
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dividends when the company is more financially distressed, since this results in a wealth 
transfer from debt to equity holders. Studies show that financially distressed companies have 
higher dividend yield and a higher payout ratio than for non-financially distressed companies 
(Cohen and Yagil, 2009). Therefore, it is expected that companies with high debt and high 
dividends are associated with lower pension contributions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with high debt and high dividends are associated with lower pension 
contributions  
 
6.3 Research design 
6.3.1. Sample  
This study focuses on the companies in the FTSE 350 index with DB pension arrangements. 
The main sample used in the analysis consists of non-financial companies. The reason for 
excluding financial companies from the sample is due to the excessive leverage that is normal 
for the financial institutions but does not have the same meaning for non-financial companies, 
where high leverage more likely indicates distress (Fama and French, 1992). However, 
financial companies are included for robustness check. The main sample covers 145 non-
financial companies with DB pension arrangements over 2004-2015 period resulting in 1,402 
year-observations. The full sample covers 171 companies over 2004-2015 period resulting in 







6.3.2. Variables construction  
 
Dependent variables 
This study uses three dependent variables: TOTAL pension contributions, REGULAR (future 
service) pension contributions and deficit-repair contributions DRCs. TOTAL-contributions 
consist of both regular pension contributions and additional contributions, DRCs, to all DB 
pension schemes for a company-year, scaled by the pension liabilities. REGULAR-
contributions consist of regular contributions only (exclude DRCs) to all DB pension schemes 
for a company-year, scaled by the pension liabilities. DRCs include additional contributions 
made towards deficit reduction to all DB pension schemes, scaled by the pension liabilities.  
The data on the contribution policy of DB schemes is collected from annual reports.  
Financial constraint 
The financial constraint is the level of debt in the company’s corporate structure. This study 
uses two measures of financial constraints which were used in previous studies examining the 
contribution policy of DB schemes. In particular, this study follows the previous study of 
Bartram (2018) in using a measure of financial constraint as a debt to market capitalisation 
(Debt-to-MC) and the study of Davies and de Haan (2012) in using a measure of financial 
constraint as debt to total assets (Debt-to-TA). Higher ratio means that the company still has a 
relatively high amount of debt to be paid out that may limit the company’s access to capital 
markets or increase the cost of capital for the company. As predicted, this may motivate 
companies to reduce pension contributions implying the negative relationship between debt 
and the pension contributions.  




Other variables  
Similar to previous studies in Chapters 4-5, this study also controls for the effects of the 
company-specific factors on the contribution policy of DB schemes. In particular, it controls 
for the size of the company, profitability, cash and dividends. Larger companies are likely to 
have more resources and higher leverage capability (Wilden, Gudergan, Nielsen, and Lings, 
2013). This may suggest that larger companies may afford to pay higher pension contributions 
both regular contributions to cover the ongoing cost and additional contributions to reduce the 
deficit. Therefore, it is expected that the size of the company positively associated with pension 
contributions. This conjecture is supported by the prior studies (Davies and de Haan, 2012; 
Bartram, 2018) who find the positive relationship between the size of the company and the 
pension contributions and funding of DB schemes.  
How much to contribute to a DB scheme also depends upon whether the company generates 
enough profit because the company is more likely to make lower pension contributions when 
the company’s profitability falls (Cooper and Ross, 2001). Therefore, it is expected that 
company profitability, as measured by the returns on company’s assets (ROA), positively 
associated with pension contributions. Apart from ROA, it is important to control for the 
company’s cash because the company is more likely to make lower pension contributions when 
it has lower cash even when the company is more profitable. Therefore, it is expected that cash 
defined the company’s cash to total assets (Cash) positively associated with pension 
contributions. While studies in Chapters 4-5 find no evidence that profitability and cash matter 
for funding and funding policy of deficit of DB schemes, previous studies show that companies 
manage pension assumptions which affect the size of pension contributions when the company 
faces a decline in earnings (Godwin et al., 1996), when economic downturn affects profitability 
(Braswell, Chang, and Hsieh, 2017) and when they have insufficient cash holdings and 
generate lower profit (Bartram, 2018). Davies and de Haan (2012) investigating pension 
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contributions also find that more profitable companies pay higher pension contributions into 
their schemes. As previously discussed, companies are more likely to pay higher pension 
contributions when they pay out more in dividends. However, it is expected that companies 
pay higher DRCs, but not REGULAR-contributions, when they make higher dividends. 
Therefore, it is expected that Dividends positively associated with DRCs. 
This study also controls for pension scheme characteristics. In particular, it controls for the 
number of years of DB scheme closure to future accruals (Closure-to-FA), the maturity of the 
scheme (Maturity), the proportion of assets invested in equities %Equity and whether company 
sponsors only one DB scheme (Single-scheme). It is expected that Closure-to-FA negatively 
associated with the REGULAR-contributions as the ongoing cost of DB pensions reduces when 
the company closes its scheme. As previously discussed, companies can reduce the size of 
pension contributions by increasing the share of assets invested in equities. Therefore, it is 
expected that %Equity negatively associated with pension contributions. It is also expected that 
companies with single schemes pay lower pension contributions due to less operational costs 
and more effective investment strategies (DWP White Paper, 2018).  
Also, this study controls for funding levels of DB schemes and the performance of the 
pension assets. Funding of DB schemes is defined as the ratio of pension assets to pension 
liabilities, %FR, similar to studies in Chapters 4-5. Higher funding means that the DB scheme 
is better funded, and the company may consider reducing the pension contributions to avoid 
the scheme overfunding. The higher funding may also reflect the fall in pension liabilities or 
increase in the market performance of pension assets (due to the changes in economic and/or 
demographic factors).  Therefore, higher funding may suggest that the cost of DB schemes is 
lowered. As a result, companies more likely to reduce the size of pension contributions needed 
from the company. Therefore, it is expected to observe a negative relationship between %FR 
and the REGULAR-contributions. However, it is expected to observe a positive relationship 
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between %FR and DRCs because DRCs are made to improve the funding. While there is no 
research that examines the different types of pension contributions, prior studies find that 
funding levels of DB schemes negatively related to (total) pension contributions (Davies and 
de Haan, 2012; Jones, 2014; Bartram, 2017).  
With respect to the performance of pension assets, it is expected that companies that 
generate higher returns than expected are associated with lower pension contributions. High 
returns on pension assets allow the company to re-negotiate lower regular pension 
contributions as well as lower or no DRCs. Therefore, it is expected to observe a negative 
relationship between Scheme-returns and pension contributions. 
Table 6.1 reports the variables names, their definitions and the data sources and Table 6.2 
reports the pair-wise correlation. The correlation matrix in Table 6.2 does not reveal a high 
correlation between variables except for Debt-to-MC and Debt-to-TA, which is not an issue 
because these variables are used interchangeably. The results from the VIF also does not detect 















Variables definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition Data source 
 
TOTAL-contributions pension contributions made to cover the ongoing cost of 
pensions plus contributions towards deficit reduction in period 
t scaled by the pension liabilities in period t, % 
companies’ annual 
reports 
REGULAR-contributions pension contributions made to cover the ongoing cost of 




DRCs additional pension contributions towards deficit reduction in 
period t scaled by the pension liabilities in period t, % 
companies’ annual 
reports 
Financial constraint   
Debt-to-MC total liabilities in period t scaled by the market capitalisation in 
period t, % 
DataStream 
Debt-to-TA total liabilities in period t scaled by the total assets in period t, 
% 
DataStream 
Company characteristics   
Ln (Company-size) log of the company’s total assets in period t DataStream 
Profitability Operating income in period t to market capitalisation in period 
t, % 
DataStream 
Cash company’s cash and cash equivalents in period t to total assets 
in period t, % 
DataStream 
Dividends dividends in period t to market capitalisation in period t, % DataStream 
Pension scheme characteristics   




Maturity pension liabilities paid out in period t to total pension liabilities 
in period t, % 
DataStream/companies’ 
annual reports 
%Equity share of pension assets invested in equities, % DataStream/companies’ 
annual reports 
Single-scheme indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if company has only 
one DB scheme and 0 otherwise 
companies’ annual 
reports 
%FR pension assets in period t to pension liabilities in period t, % DataStream/companies’ 
annual reports 
Scheme-returns realized returns in period t minus the predicted returns in 






























TOTAL-contributions 1               
REGULAR-contributions 0.6685* 1              
DRCs 0.6007* -0.1608* 1             
Debt-to-MC -0.0413 -0.0460* -0.015 1            
Debt-to-TA -0.0675* -0.0327 -0.0511* 0.6583* 1           
Ln (Company-size) -0.0431 -0.0875* 0.0507* 0.5454* 0.3713* 1          
ROA 0.0774* 0.0802* 0.0267 -0.5803* -0.2445* -0.2705* 1         
Dividends 0.0731* -0.0047 0.0917* 0.1823* -0.0639* 0.0101 -0.0662* 1        
Cash 0.0578* -0.0531* 0.1283* 0.0941* -0.1326* -0.0623* 0.0233 0.7826* 1       
FR\ -0.0985* 0.0639* -0.2342* 0.0112 -0.0247 0.0691* -0.0608* -0.0052 -0.0079 1      
Equity 0.2037* 0.0187 0.2829* -0.1201* -0.0359 -0.2642* 0.1154* -0.0408 -0.0112 -0.3280* 1     
Closure-to-FA -0.1108* 0.0596* -0.2352* -0.0516* -0.1064* -0.1822* 0.0153 -0.0263 -0.0149 0.1012* -0.0659* 1    
Maturity -0.0675* -0.0753* -0.0358 0.0903* 0.0401 0.1400* -0.0690* -0.0076 -0.0366 0.0444* -0.2489* -0.0199 1   
Single-scheme 0.0465* 0.1037* -0.0625* -0.0915* -0.1596* -0.2232* 0.0514* -0.0488* -0.0626* 0.1493* 0.0529* 0.1816* -0.0827* 1  





6.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Few variables are found to have some outliers. In particular, there are outliers in the TOTAL-
, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs (Graph 6.1). While it is expected to observe some 
variation in DRCs because companies’ decisions to pay lower/higher DRCs more likely depend 
on the companies’ circumstances, some variation is also observed in REGULAR-contributions. 
The variation in REGULAR-contributions more likely to be due to the additional costs may 
arise as a result of the specific activities. For example, additional costs can be associated with 
the equalisation of the scheme obligations, acquisition of the company with DB scheme/s, the 
merger of pension schemes, unfunded pension obligations, indexation of the pension liabilities, 
additional consultation costs, enhanced transfer offers. These one-off costs are additional to the 
company that increase the overall costs of DB pensions. To ensure that the results are not 
influenced by these outliers, TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs are winsorized at 
98%. This study also winsorizes Debt-to-TA, Profitability, Cash, Dividends and Scheme-
returns at 2% and 98% levels to minimise the influence of outliers in these variables. 
Table 6.3 reports descriptive statistics such as minimum (Min), mean (Mean), median 
(Median) and maximum (Max) values and standard deviation (SD) of the variables used in the 
study both for the sample of all companies (All companies) and the sample of non-financial 
companies (Non-financial companies). According to the statistics reported for the sample of 
all companies, the average value of TOTAL-contributions is 3.875%, with a standard deviation 
of 2.8% and the minimum and the maximum value of 0% and 13.463%. The average 
REGULAR-contributions is 2.313%, with a standard deviation of 1.891% and the minimum 
and the maximum value of 0% and 8.101%. The average value of DRCs is 1.488%, with a 
standard deviation of 2.167% and the minimum and the maximum value of 0 and 9.358%. The 
 147 
average value of Debt-to-MC is 41.493%, with a standard deviation of 18.354% and the 
minimum and the maximum value of 7.671% and 96.751%. The average value of Debt-to-TA 
is estimated at 61.441%, with a standard deviation of 19.089% and the minimum and the 
maximum value of 19.532% and 104.908%. DB schemes, on average, generate returns 1.751% 
of the pension assets, with a standard deviation of 9.759% and the minimum and the maximum 
value of -26.741% and 21.815%. Other companies and pension-schemes characteristics have 
been discussed in previous Chapters. 
According to the statistics reported for the sample of non-financial companies, removal of 
the financial companies from the sample does not significantly affect the statistics on TOTAL-
, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. However, financial companies appear to have higher 
debt as the average Debt-to-MC and Debt-to-TA is lower in the sample that excludes the 




Variables Min Mean Median Max SD N of observations 
Non-financial companies      
TOTAL-contributions, % 0.000 3.875 3.198 13.463 2.800 1960 
REGULAR-contributions, % 0.000 2.313 1.991 8.101 1.891 1960 
DRCs, % 0.000 1.488 0.382 9.358 2.167 1960 
       
Debt-to-MC, % 7.671 41.493 40.243 96.751 18.354 1729 
Debt-to-TA, % 19.532 61.441 62.054 104.908 19.089 1746 
Ln (Company-size), £ mil 4.331 7.706 7.536 12.344 1.415 1758 
ROA, % -84.040 8.568 7.715 100.830 9.049 1732 
Dividends, % 0.000 4.408 2.834 210.612 13.459 1722 
Cash, % 0.000 10.516 6.257 632.046 31.741 1528 
       
FR, % 14.342 87.185 87.846 136.658 13.824 1960 
Equity, % 0.000 48.576 49.000 100.000 19.757 1854 
Closure-to-FA, years 0.000 0.734 0.000 15.000 1.984 1920 
Maturity, % 0.000 3.747 3.563 36.971 2.144 1841 
Single-scheme, 0-1 0.000 0.275 0.000 1.000 0.446 1894 
Scheme-returns, % -26.741 1.751 2.847 21.815 9.759 1667 
       
 
All-companies       
Variables Min Mean Median Max SD N of observations 
TOTAL-contributions, % 0.000 3.879 3.169 13.463 2.857 2276 
REGULAR-contributions, % 0.000 2.317 1.987 8.101 1.894 2276 
DRCs, % 0.000 1.479 0.301 9.358 2.195 2276 
       
Debt-to-MC, % 7.671 45.445 42.424 96.751 22.159 1999 
Debt-to-TA, % 19.532 63.790 64.038 104.908 20.383 2016 
Ln (Company-size), £ mil 3.615 7.983 7.624 14.689 1.822 2033 
ROA, % -84.040 7.900 7.025 100.830 8.928 1994 
Dividends, % 0.000 4.392 2.918 210.612 12.585 1992 
Cash, % 0.000 10.482 6.210 632.046 31.493 1556 
       
FR, % 14.342 88.137 88.566 160.540 14.541 2276 
Equity, % 0.000 47.978 48.130 100.000 20.126 2137 
Closure-to-FA, years 0.000 0.879 0.000 15.000 2.205 2237 
Maturity, % 0.000 3.713 3.488 36.971 2.158 2136 
Single-scheme, 0-1 0.000 0.282 0.000 1.000 0.450 2211 




6.4.2. Empirical results 
 
At the empirical stage of the analysis, this study employs a fixed effect (FE) panel regression 
estimation method with year effects and clustered standard errors. FE panel regression controls 
for unobserved company and time effects and produces standard errors which are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Because panels with much more cross-sections than 
periods may also suffer from spatial correlation, Hoechle (2007) estimation method with 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors is used. Driscoll-Kraay provides standard errors which are 
robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial correlation. In addition to these 
models, the FGLS is also used for the estimation. This method can achieve effective estimation 
results (Wooldridge, 2002) and could be used when time-variation in the data is lower than the 
cross-sectional variation (Davies and de Haan, 2012). This study uses FGLS with robust to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors and adjustment for panel- specific first-order autoregression 
in the error.  
 
Debt and the contribution policy of DB schemes (H1) 
 
Results from FE, Hoechle and FGLS regressions are reported in Tables 6.4 – 6.5: Table 6.4 
reports results examining the relationship between Debt-to-MC and the pension contributions 
and Table 6.5 reports results examining the relationship between Debt-to-TA and the pension 
contributions. Each regression includes (unreported) year dummies to control for any 
unobserved time- related effects. FGLS regressions also include (unreported) industry effects 
to control unobserved industry- related effects. Specifications from (1) – (3) examine TOTAL-
contributions and specifications from (4) – (6) and (7) – (9) examine REGULAR-contributions 
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and DRCs, respectively. Estimates from VIF suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue as 
the VIF does not exceed the critical value of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). Estimates 
from VIF for each model specification are reported in the Appendix. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that high-debt companies reduce their pension contributions to DB 
schemes. The results from the FE, Hoechle and FGLS estimators provide strong support in 
favour of this hypothesis. In particular, the estimated coefficients on Debt-to-MC in Models 
(1) – (3) are all negative and statistically significant at 1% levels. The negative relationship 
implies that companies with high debt tend to reduce their pension contributions to DB 
schemes. It is estimated that an increase in one standard deviation in Debt-to-MC results, on 
average, in a decrease, depending on the estimator, of 0.155 - 0.246 standard deviations in 
TOTAL-contributions. The negative relationship is also observed between Debt-to-MC and 
REGULAR-contributions (Models (4) – (6)) and between Debt-to-MC and DRCs (Models (7) 
– (9)): the estimated coefficients on Debt-to-MC are all negative and statistically significant at 
the conventional levels. These findings indicate that companies tend to manage both 
REGULAR-contributions and DRCs when they have more debt. It is estimated that an increase 
in one standard deviation in Debt-to-MC results, on average, in a decrease, depending on the 
estimator, of 0.125 - 0.129 standard deviations in REGULAR-contributions and 0.117 – 0.209 
standard deviations in DRCs. It is worth noting that Debt-to-MC is negative and statistically 
significant in all models - models that distinct within effect only (FE) and models that distinct 
within and between effects (FGLS). Therefore, these results provide fairly support for the 
stated hypothesis. 
The results reported in Table 6.5 that examines the relationship between Debt-to-TA and the 
pension contributions provide further support for the stated hypothesis. The coefficients on 
Debt-to-TA are negative and statistically significant in all model specifications.  It is estimated 
that an increase in one standard deviation in Debt-to-TA results, on average, in a decrease, 
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depending on the estimator, of 0.115 - 0.133 standard deviations in TOTAL-contributions, 
0.078 – 0.060 standard deviations in REGULAR-contributions and 0.065 - 0.133 standard 
deviations in DRCs. Comparing the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, it appears that the 
pension contributions are more sensitive to the debt relative to the market capitalisation. 
Overall, these results imply that high-debt companies tend to reduce the expenditure on 
pensions to have more cash for the company’s needs, as consistent with the stated hypothesis.  
The results also suggest that larger companies tend to make higher TOTAL- REGULAR- 
pension contributions and DRCs. These results are consistent with the prediction that larger 
companies can afford to make higher contributions as they have more financial resources and 
higher leverage capability. The ROA and Cash are found to be important for REGULAR-
contributions only, suggesting that more profitable companies and companies with higher cash 
tend to make higher contributions to cover the ongoing cost of DB pensions. However, these 
factors are less of importance for DRCs. 
As consistent with previous studies in Chapter 4-5, it is found that companies which pay 
higher dividends are associated with higher DRCs. This finding implies that shareholders in a 
company with a pension deficit should expect to cover the deficit. It is estimated that an 
increase in one standard deviation in Dividends increases, depending on the estimator, 0.075 - 
0.090 standard deviations in DRCs: the estimated coefficients on Dividends are statistically 
significant at 1% levels in DRCs regressions. Moreover, combining the evidence from previous 
Chapters, it appears that Dividends worked well at reducing the deficit as Dividends are also 
found to be positively associated with the funding of DB schemes. 
As consistent with the prediction, there is evidence that Closure-to-FA negatively associated 
with REGULAR-contributions, but the coefficients on Closure-to-FA are only significant in 
FGLS. However, it also has been found that Closure-to-FA positively associated with DRCs, 
as consistent with the findings in Chapter 5. The positive relationship suggests that companies 
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pay higher DRCs after the company closes its scheme. As previously argued, in closed schemes 
there could be a shift of power more towards the scheme trustees whose function will be to 
continue to look after the interests of all scheme members to justify the reasons of closure the 
scheme. As a result, trustees may pressurise companies to make DRCs to reduce the deficit. 
However, results from Chapter 4 suggest that Closure-to-FA negatively associated with the 
funding suggesting that DRCs might not be effective at reducing the deficit.  
It also has been found that more mature schemes pay higher REGULAR-contributions. 
Moreover, %Equity is found to be positively associated with REGULAR-contributions but 
negatively with DRCs. These results suggest that companies increase the share of pension 
assets into equities to pay lower DRCs. The analysis also reveals that companies with single-
schemes pay lower REGULAR-contributions due to lower operational costs, as consistent with 
the prediction. Moreover, combining the evidence from the previous Chapters, it appears that 
companies significantly benefit from having only one DB schemes - companies with single-
schemes pay lower REGULAR-contributions and also show have funding levels.  
Consistent with the prediction, companies tend to reduce REGULAR-contributions when the 
funding improves. There is some evidence that %FR positively associated with DRCs, but the 
estimated coefficients are only significant in FE regression with clustered standard errors 
(Model (7)).  
Estimates from regressions reported in Tables 5.5 are similar in direction and significance 







Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs.  
All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  Total-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Debt-to-MC B -0.0336*** -0.0336*** -0.0212*** -0.0109* -0.0109** -0.0113*** -0.0211** -0.0211** -0.0118*** 
 β -0.2464*** -0.2464*** -0.1554*** -0.1247* -0.1247** -0.1294*** -0.2093** -0.2093** -0.1169*** 
 p-value (0.0010) (0.0040) (0.0000)  (0.0640) (0.0140) (0.0000)  (0.0230) (0.0130) (0.0000)  
Ln (Company-size) B 0.9247** 0.9247* -0.0117 0.4716** 0.4716*** 0.1910*** 0.4579* 0.4579 -0.1163** 
 β 0.5570** 0.5570* -0.0070 0.4432** 0.4432*** 0.1795*** 0.3729* 0.3729 -0.0947** 
 p-value (0.0270) (0.0530) (0.8280) (0.0420) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0940) (0.2320) (0.0120) 
Profitability B 0.0199 0.0199 0.0146* 0.0165* 0.0165** 0.0070* 0.0066 0.0066 0.0066 
 β 0.0435 0.0435 0.0319* 0.0561* 0.0561** 0.0240* 0.0194 0.0194 0.0195 
 p-value (0.3520) (0.2380) (0.0580) (0.0840) (0.0430) (0.0850) (0.7230) (0.5530) (0.2450) 
Dividends B 0.0363* 0.0363*** 0.0216** -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0036 0.0391*** 0.0391*** 0.0328*** 
 β 0.0616* 0.0616*** 0.0366** -0.0150 -0.0150 -0.0095 0.0898*** 0.0898*** 0.0754*** 
 p-value (0.0780) (0.0040) (0.0270) (0.6410) (0.1550) (0.3040) 0.0000  (0.0090) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0261 0.0261 0.0150* 0.0303*** 0.0303** 0.0155*** -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0072 
 β 0.0553 0.0553 0.0317* 0.1001*** 0.1001** 0.0514*** -0.0270 -0.0270 -0.0207 
 p-value (0.1360) (0.1110) (0.0730) (0.0060) (0.0130) (0.0000)  (0.5030) (0.3460) (0.1790) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0732 0.0732* -0.0622* 0.0240 0.0240 -0.1253*** 0.0401 0.0401* 0.0079 
 β 0.0531 0.0531* -0.0451* 0.0272 0.0272 -0.1418*** 0.0393 0.0393* 0.0077 
 p-value (0.3910) (0.0560) (0.0890) (0.6270) (0.3600) 0.0000  (0.5350) (0.0770) (0.7650) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0072** -0.0054 -0.0054* -0.0041** 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0016 
 β -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0228** -0.0269 -0.0269* -0.0204** 0.0104 0.0104 -0.0069 
 p-value (0.5280) (0.5430) (0.0430) (0.2370) (0.0920) (0.0210) (0.6740) (0.6760) (0.4630) 
Maturity B 0.1687* 0.1687** -0.0539 0.1329** 0.1329** 0.0006 -0.0229 -0.0229 -0.0358* 
 β 0.0827* 0.0827** -0.0264 0.1017** 0.1017** 0.0004 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0237* 
 p-value (0.0620) (0.0400) (0.1180) (0.0220) (0.0110) (0.9770) (0.7350) (0.7220) (0.0610) 
%Equity B -0.0168 -0.0168* 0.0029 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0096*** -0.0164* -0.0164* -0.0042** 
 β -0.1108 -0.1108* 0.0193 0.0266 0.0266* 0.0990*** -0.1465* -0.1465* -0.0372** 
 p-value (0.1380) (0.0530) (0.3440) (0.5870) (0.0750) 0.0000  (0.0710) (0.0560) (0.0430) 
Single-scheme B -0.7312 -0.7312 0.1845 -0.5904** -0.5904** -0.4334*** -0.0056 -0.0056 0.5565*** 
 β -0.2396 -0.2396 0.0605 -0.3019** -0.3019** -0.2216*** -0.0025 -0.0025 0.2466*** 
 p-value (0.2270) (0.3550) (0.2970) (0.0260) (0.0150) 0.0000  (0.9910) (0.9930) 0.0000  
%FR B 0.0167 0.0167 -0.0101** -0.0107* -0.0107* -0.0089*** 0.0266** 0.0266 0.0005 
 β 0.0777 0.0777 -0.0470** -0.0777* -0.0777* -0.0649*** 0.1674** 0.1674 0.0034 
 p-value (0.1960) (0.2810) (0.0210) (0.0890) (0.0840) 0.0000  (0.0280) (0.1280) (0.8640) 
_cons B -3.1245 -3.1245 5.1042*** -0.6295 -0.6295 1.5919*** -2.5618 -2.5618 2.7679*** 
 p-value (0.4010) (0.4360) 0.0000  (0.7530) (0.5200) 0.0000  (0.3040) (0.4930) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
Number of companies  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.68 631.26  8.42 1183.28  3.06 1246.97  
Wald chi    692.43   1574.24   223.45 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.1354 0.1354  0.2174 0.2174  0.0564 0.0564  
Between  0.0024   0.085   0.0198   
Overall  0.0167   0.1317   0.0003   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
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Table 6.5 
Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs.  
All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  Total-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Debt-to-TA B -0.0200* -0.0200*** -0.0173*** -0.0057 -0.0057* -0.0075*** -0.0148* -0.0148*** -0.0073*** 
 β -0.1326* -0.1326*** -0.1145*** -0.0595 -0.0595* -0.0780*** -0.1329* -0.1329*** -0.0654*** 
 p-value (0.0710) (0.0080) (0.0000)  (0.3020) (0.0800) (0.0000)  (0.0980) (0.0080) (0.0090) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.7229* 0.7229* -0.0658 0.4061* 0.4061*** 0.1552*** 0.3312 0.3312 -0.1488*** 
 β 0.4354* 0.4354* -0.0397 0.3817* 0.3817*** 0.1459*** 0.2697 0.2697 -0.1212*** 
 p-value (0.0790) (0.0740) (0.2130) (0.0870) (0.0020) (0.0000)  (0.2090) (0.3250) (0.0010) 
Profitability B -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0016 0.0093 0.0093 -0.0020 -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0032 
 β -0.0030 -0.0030 0.0034 0.0317 0.0317 -0.0069 -0.0177 -0.0177 -0.0096 
 p-value (0.9430) (0.9500) (0.8290) (0.2290) (0.3250) (0.5740) (0.6930) (0.6960) (0.5070) 
Dividends B 0.0276 0.0276*** 0.0166* -0.0086 -0.0086* -0.0054 0.0340*** 0.0340*** 0.0295*** 
 β 0.0469 0.0469*** 0.0282* -0.0227 -0.0227* -0.0144 0.0780*** 0.0780*** 0.0677*** 
 p-value (0.1390) (0.0020) (0.0760) (0.4560) (0.0700) (0.1140) (0.0000)  (0.0050) (0.0000)  
Cash B 0.0263 0.0263 0.0183** 0.0304*** 0.0304** 0.0163*** -0.0096 -0.0096 -0.0064 
 β 0.0556 0.0556 0.0387** 0.1005*** 0.1005** 0.0540*** -0.0275 -0.0275 -0.0184 
 p-value (0.1370) (0.1200) (0.0310) (0.0050) (0.0150) (0.0000)  (0.4970) (0.3540) (0.2300) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0836 0.0836** -0.0740** 0.0275 0.0275 -0.1419*** 0.0463 0.0463** 0.0106 
 β 0.0606 0.0606** -0.0537** 0.0311 0.0311 -0.1606*** 0.0454 0.0454** 0.0104 
 p-value (0.3260) (0.0420) (0.0450) (0.5740) (0.3240) (0.0000)  (0.4740) (0.0170) (0.6850) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0072 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0038** 0.0035 0.0035 -0.0014 
 β -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0229 -0.0240 -0.0240 -0.0190** 0.0151 0.0151 -0.0059 
 p-value (0.6780) (0.7150) (0.0420) (0.2980) (0.1520) (0.0330) (0.5450) (0.5790) (0.5260) 
Maturity B 0.1499* 0.1499* -0.0416 0.1269** 0.1269** -0.0067 -0.0348 -0.0348 -0.0346* 
 β 0.0735* 0.0735* -0.0204 0.0970** 0.0970** -0.0051 -0.0230 -0.0230 -0.0229* 
 p-value (0.0950) (0.0530) (0.2200) (0.0290) (0.0120) (0.7330) (0.6050) (0.5820) (0.0730) 
%Equity B -0.0166 -0.0166* 0.0034 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0092*** -0.0163* -0.0163* -0.0031* 
 β -0.1095 -0.1095* 0.0228 0.0273 0.0273* 0.0946*** -0.1455* -0.1455* -0.0277* 
 p-value (0.1440) (0.0620) (0.2500) (0.5770) (0.0540) (0.0000)  (0.0740) (0.0610) (0.1000) 
Single-scheme B -0.6817 -0.6817 0.2315 -0.5724** -0.5724** -0.3795*** 0.0195 0.0195 0.4907*** 
 β -0.2234 -0.2234 0.0759 -0.2927** -0.2927** -0.1941*** 0.0087 0.0087 0.2174*** 
 p-value (0.2790) (0.4110) (0.1890) (0.0380) (0.0110) (0.0000)  (0.9690) (0.9780) (0.0020) 
%FR B 0.0167 0.0167 -0.0078* -0.0106* -0.0106* -0.0096*** 0.0264** 0.0264 -0.0002 
 β 0.0779 0.0779 -0.0364* -0.0771* -0.0771* -0.0697*** 0.1663** 0.1663 -0.0012 
 p-value (0.2000) (0.3000) (0.0820) (0.0960) (0.0650) (0.0000)  (0.0300) (0.1420) (0.9510) 
_cons B -1.5476 -1.5476 5.6154*** -0.1674 -0.1674 1.9844*** -1.4187 -1.4187 3.0128*** 
 p-value (0.6840) (0.7070) (0.0000)  (0.9380) (0.8470) (0.0000)  (0.5730) (0.7030) (0.0000)             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
Number of companies  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.25 1634.65  8.15 2714.63  3.16 1141.3  
Wald chi    481.26   1848.26   223.08 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.1294 0.1294  0.2145 0.2145  0.0533 0.0533  
between  0.0031   0.086   0.0115   
overall  0.0169   0.1332   0.001   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
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Debt, dividends and the contribution policy of DB schemes (H2) 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that companies with high debt and higher dividend payouts are 
associated with lower pension contributions. The results in Tables 6.6 - 6.7 provide plausible 
evidence for this hypothesis.  In particular, the estimated coefficients on Debt-to-
MC*Dividends in Table 6.6 are negative when examining TOTAL-contributions and DRCs. 
The negative relationship of Debt-to-MC*Dividends suggests that high-debt companies which 
also pay higher dividends tend to pay lower DRCs. These findings indicate that risky 
companies seem to transfer wealth from the pension scheme members to shareholders by 
increasing dividends and reducing the additional pension contributions to DB schemes. This 
harms pension scheme members as it increases the likelihood of the pension scheme default.  
Table 6.7 reports results on the combined effect of Debt-to-TA and Dividends on the 
contribution policy of DB schemes. The coefficients on Debt-to-TA*Dividends suggest that 
high debt companies which also pay higher dividends tend to reduce REGULAR-contributions.  
These findings suggest that risky companies seem to transfer wealth from the pension scheme 
members to shareholders by reducing regular pension contributions to DB schemes. This also 
harms the pension scheme members as it not only increases the likelihood of default but also 
lowers the value of pension assets. While it has been found that dividends alone have a positive 
effect on pension contributions, these results demonstrate how risk encompassed in the 
leverage induce companies to transfer the risk from shareholders to debtholders. 
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Table 6.6 
Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  Total-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-MC B -0.0314*** -0.0314*** -0.0171*** -0.0106* -0.0106** -0.0110*** -0.0195** -0.0195** -0.0100*** 
 Β -0.2304*** -0.2304*** -0.1253*** -0.1211* -0.1211** -0.1259*** -0.1930** -0.1930** -0.0990*** 
 p-value (0.0020) (0.0060) (0.0000)  (0.0730) (0.0160) (0.0000)  (0.0370) (0.0170) (0.0010) 
Dividends B 0.2495** 0.2495*** 0.1525*** 0.0254 0.0254 0.0078 0.1994** 0.1994*** 0.1429*** 
 Β 0.4237** 0.4237*** 0.2590*** 0.0674 0.0674 0.0208 0.4578** 0.4578*** 0.3280*** 
 p-value (0.0120) (0.0030) (0.0000)  (0.6850) (0.5370) (0.5590) (0.0160) (0.0040) (0.0000)  
Debt-to-MC*Dividends B -0.0024** -0.0024*** -0.0015*** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0018** -0.0018*** -0.0013*** 
 Β -0.3581** -0.3581*** -0.2254*** -0.0815 -0.0815 -0.0319 -0.3640** -0.3640*** -0.2676*** 
 p-value (0.0160) (0.0060) (0.0010) (0.5710) (0.4070) (0.3760) (0.0370) (0.0100) (0.0000)  
Ln (Company-size) B 0.9271** 0.9271** -0.0037 0.4719** 0.4719*** 0.1885*** 0.4597* 0.4597 -0.1279*** 
 Β 0.5584** 0.5584** -0.0023 0.4435** 0.4435*** 0.1771*** 0.3744* 0.3744 -0.1041*** 
 p-value (0.0280) (0.0440) (0.9440) (0.0430) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0940) (0.2080) (0.0050) 
Profitability B 0.0120 0.0120 0.0123 0.0153 0.0153** 0.0073* 0.0006 0.0006 0.0050 
 Β 0.0263 0.0263 0.0270 0.0522 0.0522** 0.0247* 0.0018 0.0018 0.0148 
 p-value (0.5280) (0.4240) (0.1520) (0.1050) (0.0380) (0.0730) (0.9720) (0.9580) (0.3650) 
Cash B 0.0270 0.0270* 0.0170** 0.0304*** 0.0304** 0.0157*** -0.0088 -0.0088 -0.0055 
 Β 0.0572 0.0572* 0.0360** 0.1006*** 0.1006** 0.0520*** -0.0251 -0.0251 -0.0158 
 p-value (0.1100) (0.0890) (0.0450) (0.0060) (0.0130) (0.0000)  (0.5370) (0.3870) (0.3090) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0726 0.0726* -0.0580 0.0239 0.0239 -0.1255*** 0.0395 0.0395* 0.0042 
 Β 0.0526 0.0526* -0.0421 0.0271 0.0271 -0.1420*** 0.0388 0.0388* 0.0041 
 p-value (0.4060) (0.0530) (0.1160) (0.6320) (0.3580) (0.0000)  (0.5350) (0.0750) (0.8750) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0070* -0.0053 -0.0053* -0.0044** 0.0030 0.0030 -0.0010 
 β -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0221* -0.0263 -0.0263* -0.0219** 0.0129 0.0129 -0.0045 
 p-value (0.5840) (0.5910) (0.0520) (0.2420) (0.0940) (0.0140) (0.6000) (0.5970) (0.6340) 
Maturity B 0.1839** 0.1839** -0.0558** 0.1352** 0.1352** 0.0013 -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.0324* 
 β 0.0901** 0.0901** -0.0273** 0.1034** 0.1034** 0.0010 -0.0076 -0.0076 -0.0215* 
 p-value (0.0370) (0.0480) (0.0900) (0.0170) (0.0130) (0.9470) (0.8660) (0.8640) (0.0770) 
%Equity B -0.0167 -0.0167* 0.0038 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0094*** -0.0164* -0.0164* -0.0030 
 β -0.1106 -0.1106* 0.0248 0.0267 0.0267* 0.0969*** -0.1463* -0.1463* -0.0265 
 p-value (0.1420) (0.0540) (0.2470) (0.5860) (0.0740) (0.0000)  (0.0730) (0.0550) (0.1450) 
Single-scheme B -0.8240 -0.8240 0.2366 -0.6039** -0.6039** -0.4268*** -0.0753 -0.0753 0.5112*** 
 β -0.2701 -0.2701 0.0775 -0.3088** -0.3088** -0.2182*** -0.0334 -0.0334 0.2265*** 
 p-value (0.1900) (0.3110) (0.1730) (0.0240) (0.0120) (0.0000)  (0.8830) (0.9130) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0138 0.0138 -0.0080* -0.0111* -0.0111* -0.0089*** 0.0244** 0.0244 0.0006 
 β 0.0642 0.0642 -0.0372* -0.0807* -0.0807* -0.0648*** 0.1537** 0.1537 0.0041 
 p-value (0.2830) (0.3780) (0.0700) (0.0710) (0.0690) (0.0000)  (0.0420) (0.1620) (0.8300) 
_cons B -3.2360 -3.2360 4.5137*** -0.6458 -0.6458 1.5945*** -2.6456 -2.6456 2.5167*** 
 p-value (0.3880) (0.4110) (0.0000)  (0.7480) (0.5260) (0.0000)  (0.2910) (0.4690) (0.0000)             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.01 817.19  8.29 736.77  3.26 815.28  
Wald chi    599.17   1474.51   256.36 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.1434 0.1434  0.2181 0.2181  0.0636 0.0636  
between  0.0021   0.0841   0.0183   
overall  0.0172   0.1309   0.0004   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  Total-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-TA B -0.0165 -0.0165** -0.0163*** -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0050** -0.0158* -0.0158*** -0.0077*** 
 β -0.1095 -0.1095** -0.1083*** -0.0254 -0.0254 -0.0522** -0.1415* -0.1415*** -0.0689*** 
 p-value (0.1590) (0.0320) (0.0000)  (0.6810) (0.4660) (0.0210) (0.0870) (0.0080) (0.0100) 
Dividends B 0.1340 0.1340*** 0.0428 0.0921 0.0921*** 0.0400** 0.0046 0.0046 0.0216 
 β 0.2275 0.2275*** 0.0727 0.2441 0.2441*** 0.1061** 0.0106 0.0106 0.0496 
 p-value (0.1960) (0.0000)  (0.3080) (0.1160) (0.0000)  (0.0270) (0.9180) (0.8340) (0.4360) 
Debt-to-TA*Dividends B -0.0013 -0.0013*** -0.0003 -0.0013* -0.0013*** -0.0006** 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 
 β -0.1822 -0.1822*** -0.0428 -0.2693* -0.2693*** -0.1301** 0.0680 0.0680 0.0190 
 p-value (0.2480) (0.0000)  (0.5620) (0.0540) (0.0000)  (0.0120) (0.4980) (0.1010) (0.7780) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.7121* 0.7121* -0.0680 0.3959* 0.3959*** 0.1508*** 0.3341 0.3341 -0.1476*** 
 β 0.4289* 0.4289* -0.0410 0.3721* 0.3721*** 0.1417*** 0.2721 0.2721 -0.1202*** 
 p-value (0.0840) (0.0780) (0.2000) (0.0970) (0.0050) (0.0000)  (0.2060) (0.3210) (0.0020) 
Profitability B -0.0104 -0.0104 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0026 
 β -0.0227 -0.0227 0.0017 0.0026 0.0026 -0.0105 -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0076 
 p-value (0.5650) (0.6110) (0.9160) (0.9300) (0.9400) (0.4070) (0.8210) (0.8320) (0.6060) 
Cash B 0.0252 0.0252 0.0187** 0.0294*** 0.0294** 0.0164*** -0.0093 -0.0093 -0.0058 
 β 0.0532 0.0532 0.0396** 0.0970*** 0.0970** 0.0541*** -0.0266 -0.0266 -0.0167 
 p-value (0.1360) (0.1120) (0.0280) (0.0040) (0.0110) (0.0000)  (0.5100) (0.3660) (0.2800) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0814 0.0814** -0.0732** 0.0254 0.0254 -0.1339*** 0.0469 0.0469** 0.0058 
 β 0.0590 0.0590** -0.0531** 0.0287 0.0287 -0.1515*** 0.0460 0.0460** 0.0057 
 p-value (0.3400) (0.0430) (0.0480) (0.6090) (0.3620) (0.0000)  (0.4680) (0.0190) (0.8270) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0071 -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0043 0.0036 0.0036 -0.0012 
 β -0.0126 -0.0126 -0.0227 -0.0260 -0.0260 -0.0215 0.0156 0.0156 -0.0053 
 p-value (0.6450) (0.6720) (0.0450) (0.2600) (0.1120) (0.0160) (0.5320) (0.5710) (0.5730) 
Maturity B 0.1588* 0.1588* -0.0419 0.1353** 0.1353** -0.0042 -0.0372 -0.0372 -0.0351* 
 β 0.0778* 0.0778* -0.0205 0.1035** 0.1035** -0.0032 -0.0247 -0.0247 -0.0233* 
 p-value (0.0690) (0.0550) (0.2150) (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.8300) (0.5830) (0.5560) (0.0730) 
%Equity B -0.0166 -0.0166* 0.0034 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0093*** -0.0163* -0.0163* -0.0036* 
 β -0.1095 -0.1095* 0.0228 0.0272 0.0272* 0.0955*** -0.1455* -0.1455* -0.0326* 
 p-value (0.1440) (0.0650) (0.2580) (0.5780) (0.0540) (0.0000)  (0.0740) (0.0600) (0.0670) 
Single-scheme B -0.7112 -0.7112 0.2357 -0.6004** -0.6004*** -0.3923*** 0.0277 0.0277 0.5144*** 
 β -0.2331 -0.2331 0.0773 -0.3070** -0.3070*** -0.2006*** 0.0123 0.0123 0.2279*** 
 p-value (0.2730) (0.4020) (0.1830) (0.0360) (0.0050) (0.0000)  (0.9560) (0.9690) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0160 0.0160 -0.0077* -0.0113* -0.0113* -0.0100*** 0.0266** 0.0266 0.0000 
 β 0.0747 0.0747 -0.0360* -0.0818* -0.0818* -0.0729*** 0.1675** 0.1675 0.0001 
 p-value (0.2210) (0.3160) (0.0870) (0.0690) (0.0610) (0.0000)  (0.0300) (0.1390) (0.9970) 
_cons B -1.5901 -1.5901 5.5757*** -0.2076 -0.2076 1.8869*** -1.4070 -1.4070 3.0428*** 
 p-value (0.6760) (0.7000) (0.0000)  (0.9240) (0.8260) (0.0000)  (0.5760) (0.7070) (0.0000)             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  6.63 402.45  9.46 3853.79  3.12 180.72  
Wald chi    456.71   2250.74   221.21 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.1317 0.1317  0.2233 0.2233  0.0536 0.0536  
Between  0.0033   0.0836   0.0112   
overall  0.0168   0.1345   0.0012   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






As the level of debt may vary from industry to industry, this study uses the difference 
between the company’s debt ratio and industry average debt ratio to check the robustness of 
the results.  It is expected that the difference between the company’s debt ratio and industry 
average debt ratio are negatively associated with the pension contribution. The higher 
difference means that the company’s debt ratio exceeds the industry average and companies 
may face difficulties in raising new funds or incur higher of cost of borrowing additional funds 
because of the higher risk of bankruptcy. The results reported in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 are similar 
in direction and significance to the results discussed above. In particular, in Table 6.8, it is 
found that the difference between the company’s Debt-to-MC and industry average Debt-to-
MC, Debt-to-MC-IndustryDiff, are negatively associated with TOTAL-, REGULAR- 
contributions and DRCs. The estimated coefficients also remain negative and statistically 
significant when the difference between the company’s Debt-to-TA and industry average Debt-
to-TA is used (Table 6.9).  
As the level of debt may also vary from year to year, this study uses the difference between 
the company’s debt ratio in period t and the average debt ratio in period t. The results in Tables 
6.10 - 6.11 are also similar in direction and significance to the results discussed above. In 
particular, TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs are found to be negatively related to 
the difference between company’s Debt-to-MC in period t and year average Debt-to-MC n 
period t (Table 6.10) and between company’s Debt-to-TA in period t and year average Debt-
to-TA in period t (Table 6.11).  
Tables 6.12-6.13 further report estimates on the interaction effect of the difference between 
the company’s debt and industry average debt relative to the market capitalisation (Debt-to-
MC-Industry) and total assets (Debt-to-TA-Industry) and Dividends. The estimated effects 
remain consistent with the effects discussed previously. Tables 6.14-6.15 further report 
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estimates on the interaction effect of the difference between the company’s debt in period t and 
year average debt period t relative to the market capitalisation (Debt-to-MC-Industry) and total 
assets (Debt-to-TA-Industry)  
Tables 6.16 and 6.17 report results from the regressions examining all companies in the 
sample. The results are also similar in direction and significance to the estimated obtained for 
the sample of non-financial companies. Therefore, results are also robust to the inclusion of 
financial companies in the analysis. Lastly, regressions are re-run without winsorizing 
dependent variables. The obtained results (results are not tabulated) remain consistent with 





Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-MC-Industry B -0.0336*** -0.0336*** -0.0212*** -0.0109* -0.0109** -0.0113*** -0.0211** -0.0211** -0.0118*** 
 β -0.2081*** -0.2081*** -0.1312*** -0.1053* -0.1053** -0.1093*** -0.1767** -0.1767** -0.0987*** 
 p-value (0.0010) (0.0040) 0.0000  (0.0640) (0.0140) 0.0000  (0.0230) (0.0130) 0.0000  
Ln (Company-size) B 0.9247** 0.9247* -0.0117 0.4716** 0.4716*** 0.1910*** 0.4579* 0.4579 -0.1163** 
 β 0.5570** 0.5570* -0.0070 0.4432** 0.4432*** 0.1795*** 0.3729* 0.3729 -0.0947** 
 p-value (0.0270) (0.0530) (0.8280) (0.0420) 0.0000  0.0000  (0.0940) (0.2320) (0.0120) 
Profitability B 0.0199 0.0199 0.0146* 0.0165* 0.0165** 0.0070* 0.0066 0.0066 0.0066 
 β 0.0435 0.0435 0.0319* 0.0561* 0.0561** 0.0240* 0.0194 0.0194 0.0195 
 p-value (0.3520) (0.2380) (0.0580) (0.0840) (0.0430) (0.0850) (0.7230) (0.5530) (0.2450) 
Dividends B 0.0363* 0.0363*** 0.0216** -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0036 0.0391*** 0.0391*** 0.0328*** 
 β 0.0616* 0.0616*** 0.0366** -0.0150 -0.0150 -0.0095 0.0898*** 0.0898*** 0.0754*** 
 p-value (0.0780) (0.0040) (0.0270) (0.6410) (0.1550) (0.3040) 0.0000  (0.0090) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0261 0.0261 0.0150* 0.0303*** 0.0303** 0.0155*** -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0072 
 β 0.0553 0.0553 0.0317* 0.1001*** 0.1001** 0.0514*** -0.0270 -0.0270 -0.0207 
 p-value (0.1360) (0.1110) (0.0730) (0.0060) (0.0130) 0.0000  (0.5030) (0.3460) (0.1790) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0732 0.0732* -0.0622* 0.0240 0.0240 -0.1253*** 0.0401 0.0401* 0.0079 
 β 0.0531 0.0531* -0.0451* 0.0272 0.0272 -0.1418*** 0.0393 0.0393* 0.0077 
 p-value (0.3910) (0.0560) (0.0890) (0.6270) (0.3600) 0.0000  (0.5350) (0.0770) (0.7650) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0072** -0.0054 -0.0054* -0.0041** 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0016 
 β -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0228** -0.0269 -0.0269* -0.0204** 0.0104 0.0104 -0.0069 
 p-value (0.5280) (0.5430) (0.0430) (0.2370) (0.0920) (0.0210) (0.6740) (0.6760) (0.4630) 
Maturity B 0.1687* 0.1687** -0.0539 0.1329** 0.1329** 0.0006 -0.0229 -0.0229 -0.0358* 
 β 0.0827* 0.0827** -0.0264 0.1017** 0.1017** 0.0004 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0237* 
 p-value (0.0620) (0.0400) (0.1180) (0.0220) (0.0110) (0.9770) (0.7350) (0.7220) (0.0610) 
%Equity B -0.0168 -0.0168* 0.0029 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0096*** -0.0164* -0.0164* -0.0042** 
 β -0.1108 -0.1108* 0.0193 0.0266 0.0266* 0.0990*** -0.1465* -0.1465* -0.0372** 
 p-value (0.1380) (0.0530) (0.3440) (0.5870) (0.0750) 0.0000  (0.0710) (0.0560) (0.0430) 
Single-scheme B -0.7312 -0.7312 0.1845 -0.5904** -0.5904** -0.4334*** -0.0056 -0.0056 0.5565*** 
 β -0.2396 -0.2396 0.0605 -0.3019** -0.3019** -0.2216*** -0.0025 -0.0025 0.2466*** 
 p-value (0.2270) (0.3550) (0.2970) (0.0260) (0.0150) 0.0000  (0.9910) (0.9930) 0.0000  
%FR B 0.0167 0.0167 -0.0101** -0.0107* -0.0107* -0.0089*** 0.0266** 0.0266 0.0005 
 β 0.0777 0.0777 -0.0470** -0.0777* -0.0777* -0.0649*** 0.1674** 0.1674 0.0034 
 p-value (0.1960) (0.2810) (0.0210) (0.0890) (0.0840) 0.0000  (0.0280) (0.1280) (0.8640) 
_cons B -4.4992 -4.4992 4.2772*** -1.0754 -1.0754 1.1504*** -3.4252 -3.4252 2.3079*** 
 p-value (0.2300) (0.3010) 0.0000  (0.5850) (0.2470) (0.0010) (0.1710) (0.3900) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
Number of companies  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.68 631.26  8.42 1183.28  3.06 1246.97  
Wald chi    692.43   1574.24   223.45 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.1354 0.1354  0.2174 0.2174  0.0564 0.0564  
between  0.0018   0.0826   0.0155   
overall  0.0175   0.1296   0.0006   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-MC-Year B -0.0306*** -0.0306*** -0.0207*** -0.0106** -0.0106*** -0.0096*** -0.0187** -0.0187*** -0.0108*** 
 β -0.2188*** -0.2188*** -0.1484*** -0.1187** -0.1187*** -0.1077*** -0.1811** -0.1811*** -0.1047*** 
 p-value (0.0020) (0.0010) 0.0000  (0.0500) (0.0080) 0.0000  (0.0380) (0.0080) 0.0000  
Ln (Company-size) B 0.9009** 0.9009** -0.0155 0.4680** 0.4680*** 0.1885*** 0.4402 0.4402 -0.1238*** 
 β 0.5426** 0.5426** -0.0093 0.4399** 0.4399*** 0.1772*** 0.3585 0.3585 -0.1008*** 
 p-value (0.0310) (0.0500) (0.7700) (0.0450) 0.0000  0.0000  (0.1070) (0.2250) (0.0080) 
Profitability B 0.0168 0.0168 0.0138** 0.0160* 0.0160** 0.0046 0.0042 0.0042 0.0051 
 β 0.0368 0.0368 0.0302** 0.0547* 0.0547** 0.0157 0.0125 0.0125 0.0149 
 p-value (0.4230) (0.3510) (0.0490) (0.0860) (0.0420) (0.2470) (0.8140) (0.7460) (0.3610) 
Dividends B 0.0352* 0.0352*** 0.0217** -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0039 0.0383*** 0.0383*** 0.0325*** 
 β 0.0597* 0.0597*** 0.0368** -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0104 0.0878*** 0.0878*** 0.0745*** 
 p-value (0.0850) (0.0030) (0.0260) (0.6320) (0.1220) (0.2660) 0.0000  (0.0070) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0264 0.0264 0.0163** 0.0304*** 0.0304** 0.0158*** -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0063 
 β 0.0559 0.0559 0.0344** 0.1003*** 0.1003** 0.0521*** -0.0265 -0.0265 -0.0181 
 p-value (0.1310) (0.1110) (0.0410) (0.0060) (0.0140) 0.0000  (0.5130) (0.3550) (0.2400) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0720 0.0720* -0.0635* 0.0233 0.0233 -0.1250*** 0.0395 0.0395* 0.0075 
 β 0.0522 0.0522* -0.0461* 0.0264 0.0264 -0.1414*** 0.0387 0.0387* 0.0074 
 p-value (0.3990) (0.0660) (0.0790) (0.6370) (0.3890) 0.0000  (0.5400) (0.0770) (0.7760) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0054 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0034* 0.0043 0.0043 -0.0010 
 β -0.0075 -0.0075 -0.0173 -0.0221 -0.0221 -0.0167* 0.0182 0.0182 -0.0042 
 p-value (0.7800) (0.8060) (0.1220) (0.3380) (0.1770) (0.0570) (0.4690) (0.4990) (0.6580) 
Maturity B 0.1633* 0.1633** -0.0547 0.1315** 0.1315*** -0.0018 -0.0265 -0.0265 -0.0334* 
 β 0.0800* 0.0800** -0.0268 0.1006** 0.1006*** -0.0014 -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0221* 
 p-value (0.0710) (0.0410) (0.1130) (0.0230) (0.0100) (0.9250) (0.6950) (0.6800) (0.0790) 
%Equity B -0.0171 -0.0171* 0.0032 0.0025 0.0025* 0.0095*** -0.0166* -0.0166* -0.0041** 
 β -0.1129 -0.1129* 0.0214 0.0254 0.0254* 0.0979*** -0.1482* -0.1482* -0.0370** 
 p-value (0.1310) (0.0540) (0.2800) (0.6030) (0.0910) 0.0000  (0.0690) (0.0560) (0.0440) 
Single-scheme B -0.7143 -0.7143 0.1855 -0.5869** -0.5869** -0.4206*** 0.0064 0.0064 0.5484 
 β -0.2341 -0.2341 0.0608 -0.3001** -0.3001** -0.2151*** 0.0028 0.0028 0.2430 
 p-value (0.2400) (0.3740) (0.2930) (0.0280) (0.0150) 0.0000  (0.9900) (0.9930) 0.0000  
%FR B 0.0164 0.0164 -0.0109 -0.0108* -0.0108* -0.0090*** 0.0264** 0.0264 0.0000 
 β 0.0764 0.0764 -0.0506** -0.0787* -0.0787* -0.0655*** 0.1665** 0.1665 -0.0002 
 p-value (0.2060) (0.2900) (0.0110) (0.0850) (0.0810) 0.0000  (0.0300) (0.1320) (0.9920) 
_cons B -4.5605 -4.5605 4.1002*** -1.1342 -1.1342 1.0885*** -3.4375 -3.4375 2.2696*** 
 p-value (0.2240) (0.2870) 0.0000  (0.5650) (0.2210) (0.0030) (0.1700) (0.3760) 0.0000                        
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
Number of companies  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.77 431.01  8.42 16616.56  3.06 10847.15  
Wald chi    706.35   1481.5   220.3 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.1343 0.1343  0.2174 0.2174  0.0555 0.0555  
between  0.0029   0.0848   0.0201   
overall  0.0164   0.1319   0.0003   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-TA-Industry B -0.0107 -0.0107 -0.0150*** -0.0048 -0.0048* -0.0064*** -0.0090 -0.0090 -0.0062** 
 β -0.0757 -0.0757 -0.1064*** -0.0528 -0.0528* -0.0705*** -0.0869 -0.0869 -0.0593** 
 p-value (0.3590) (0.2970) 0.0000  (0.3460) (0.0900) (0.0010) (0.3160) (0.2020) (0.0240) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.7207* 0.7207* -0.0785 0.4052* 0.4052*** 0.1535*** 0.3293 0.3293 -0.1459*** 
 β 0.4341* 0.4341* -0.0473 0.3808* 0.3808*** 0.1443*** 0.2682 0.2682 -0.1188*** 
 p-value (0.0790) (0.0750) (0.1410) (0.0880) (0.0020) 0.0000  (0.2120) (0.3270) (0.0020) 
Profitability B -0.0045 -0.0045 0.0009 0.0090 0.0090 -0.0020 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0033 
 β -0.0098 -0.0098 0.0020 0.0308 0.0308 -0.0067 -0.0233 -0.0233 -0.0098 
 p-value (0.8140) (0.8480) (0.9010) (0.2440) (0.3430) (0.5860) (0.6050) (0.6400) (0.4970) 
Dividends B 0.0264 0.0264*** 0.0159* -0.0087 -0.0087* -0.0057* 0.0332*** 0.0332*** 0.0289*** 
 β 0.0449 0.0449*** 0.0270* -0.0230 -0.0230* -0.0152* 0.0763*** 0.0763*** 0.0664*** 
 p-value (0.1540) (0.0020) (0.0890) (0.4500) (0.0650) (0.0940) 0.0000  (0.0050) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0271 0.0271 0.0183** 0.0304*** 0.0304** 0.0164*** -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0060 
 β 0.0573 0.0573 0.0388** 0.1006*** 0.1006** 0.0542*** -0.0262 -0.0262 -0.0172 
 p-value (0.1300) (0.1050) (0.0310) (0.0050) (0.0150) 0.0000  (0.5200) (0.3700) (0.2600) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0853 0.0853** -0.0766** 0.0279 0.0279 -0.1404*** 0.0475 0.0475** 0.0106 
 β 0.0619 0.0619** -0.0556** 0.0316 0.0316 -0.1589*** 0.0466 0.0466** 0.0104 
 p-value (0.3200) (0.0420) (0.0380) (0.5670) (0.3200) 0.0000  (0.4640) (0.0160) (0.6830) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0070** -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0038** 0.0036 0.0036 -0.0014 
 β -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0223** -0.0239 -0.0239 -0.0187** 0.0154 0.0154 -0.0058 
 p-value (0.6860) (0.7260) (0.0480) (0.3010) (0.1570) (0.0350) (0.5340) (0.5720) (0.5310) 
Maturity B 0.1514* 0.1514** -0.0401 0.1274** 0.1274** -0.0068 -0.0336 -0.0336 -0.0355* 
 β 0.0742* 0.0742** -0.0196 0.0974** 0.0974** -0.0052 -0.0223 -0.0223 -0.0235* 
 p-value (0.0910) (0.0480) (0.2320) (0.0290) (0.0120) (0.7310) (0.6150) (0.5890) (0.0670) 
%Equity B -0.0165 -0.0165* 0.0033 0.0027 0.0027* 0.0092*** -0.0162* -0.0162* -0.0031 
 β -0.1090 -0.1090* 0.0219 0.0276 0.0276* 0.0951*** -0.1449* -0.1449* -0.0274 
 p-value (0.1480) (0.0650) (0.2700) (0.5730) (0.0540) 0.0000  (0.0760) (0.0630) (0.1030) 
Single-scheme B -0.6567 -0.6567 0.2047 -0.5696** -0.5696** -0.3788*** 0.0350 0.0350 0.5018*** 
 β -0.2153 -0.2153 0.0671 -0.2913** -0.2913** -0.1937*** 0.0155 0.0155 0.2224*** 
 p-value (0.3020) (0.4340) (0.2500) (0.0390) (0.0120) 0.0000  (0.9460) (0.9610) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0171 0.0171 -0.0083* -0.0107* -0.0107* -0.0096*** 0.0266** 0.0266 0.0002 
 β 0.0799 0.0799 -0.0388* -0.0777* -0.0777* -0.0697*** 0.1674** 0.1674 0.0011 
 p-value (0.1920) (0.3110) (0.0630) (0.0970) (0.0610) 0.0000  (0.0300) (0.1530) (0.9530) 
_cons B -2.7848 -2.7848 4.8295*** -0.5060 -0.5060 1.5899*** -2.3245 -2.3245 2.5642*** 
 p-value (0.4470) (0.4810) 0.0000  (0.8040) (0.6100) 0.0000  (0.3400) (0.5290) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  6.99 1843.7  8.12 3169.86  3.05 691.39  
Wald chi    490.5   1870.38   216.35 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.1274 0.1274  0.2142 0.2142  0.0518 0.0518  
between  0.0037   0.084   0.0104   
overall  0.015   0.1301   0.0011   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-TA-Year B -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0154*** -0.0041 -0.0041* -0.0060*** -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0064** 
 β -0.0808 -0.0808 -0.1187*** -0.0496 -0.0496* -0.0728*** -0.0990 -0.0990 -0.0672** 
 p-value (0.3670) (0.2830) 0.0000  (0.4060) (0.0960) (0.0010) (0.2930) (0.1610) (0.0190) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.7200* 0.7200* -0.0778 0.4050* 0.4050*** 0.1537*** 0.3285 0.3285 -0.1459*** 
 β 0.4337* 0.4337* -0.0469 0.3806* 0.3806*** 0.1444*** 0.2675 0.2675 -0.1188*** 
 p-value (0.0790) (0.0750) (0.1450) (0.0880) (0.0020) 0.0000  (0.2130) (0.3280) (0.0020) 
Profitability B -0.0046 -0.0046 0.0011 0.0088 0.0088 -0.0020 -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0033 
 β -0.0099 -0.0099 0.0023 0.0299 0.0299 -0.0069 -0.0228 -0.0228 -0.0098 
 p-value (0.8110) (0.8440) (0.8820) (0.2570) (0.3500) (0.5740) (0.6120) (0.6440) (0.4990) 
Dividends B 0.0264 0.0264*** 0.0162* -0.0088 -0.0088* -0.0058* 0.0333*** 0.0333*** 0.0291*** 
 β 0.0449 0.0449*** 0.0276* -0.0233 -0.0233* -0.0153* 0.0764*** 0.0764*** 0.0667*** 
 p-value (0.1550) (0.0020) (0.0820) (0.4450) (0.0600) (0.0900) 0.0000  (0.0050) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0270 0.0270 0.0182** 0.0305*** 0.0305** 0.0163*** -0.0093 -0.0093 -0.0060 
 β 0.0572 0.0572 0.0385** 0.1008*** 0.1008** 0.0540*** -0.0266 -0.0266 -0.0173 
 p-value (0.1310) (0.1060) (0.0320) (0.0050) (0.0150) 0.0000  (0.5150) (0.3660) (0.2590) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0852 0.0852** -0.0775** 0.0279 0.0279 -0.1397*** 0.0475 0.0475** 0.0105 
 β 0.0618 0.0618** -0.0562** 0.0316 0.0316 -0.1581*** 0.0465 0.0465** 0.0103 
 p-value (0.3200) (0.0430) (0.0360) (0.5670) (0.3220) 0.0000  (0.4650) (0.0160) (0.6860) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0065* -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0036** 0.0039 0.0039 -0.0012 
 β -0.0098 -0.0098 -0.0206* -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0178** 0.0167 0.0167 -0.0052 
 p-value (0.7170) (0.7520) (0.0670) (0.3140) (0.1700) (0.0440) (0.5060) (0.5470) (0.5730) 
Maturity B 0.1513* 0.1513** -0.0407 0.1274** 0.1274** -0.0071 -0.0336 -0.0336 -0.0352* 
 β 0.0742* 0.0742** -0.0199 0.0974** 0.0974** -0.0054 -0.0223 -0.0223 -0.0233* 
 p-value (0.0910) (0.0480) (0.2260) (0.0290) (0.0120) (0.7180) (0.6150) (0.5900) (0.0690) 
%Equity B -0.0165 -0.0165* 0.0033 0.0027 0.0027* 0.0092*** -0.0162* -0.0162* -0.0030 
 β -0.1090 -0.1090* 0.0221 0.0275 0.0275* 0.0946*** -0.1450* -0.1450* -0.0271 
 p-value (0.1480) (0.0650) (0.2680) (0.5740) (0.0540) 0.0000  (0.0760) (0.0630) (0.1060) 
Single-scheme B -0.6569 -0.6569 0.2035 -0.5682** -0.5682** -0.3789*** 0.0333 0.0333 0.4995*** 
 β -0.2153 -0.2153 0.0667 -0.2906** -0.2906** -0.1938*** 0.0148 0.0148 0.2214*** 
 p-value (0.3020) (0.4340) (0.2530) (0.0390) (0.0120) 0.0000  (0.9480) (0.9630) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0171 0.0171 -0.0084* -0.0106* -0.0106* -0.0096*** 0.0265** 0.0265 0.0001 
 β 0.0798 0.0798 -0.0391* -0.0772* -0.0772* -0.0696*** 0.1668** 0.1668 0.0004 
 p-value (0.1930) (0.3110) (0.0610) (0.0990) (0.0640) 0.0000  (0.0300) (0.1540) (0.9850) 
_cons B -2.8159 -2.8159 4.6512*** -0.5241 -0.5241 1.5188*** -2.3465 -2.3465 2.4975*** 
 p-value (0.4410) (0.4730) 0.0000  (0.7970) (0.6010) 0.0000  (0.3360) (0.5230) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.01 1212.74  8.11 2131.71  3.06 1144.95  
Wald chi    487.23   1887.29   217.27 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.1274 0.1274  0.214 0.214  0.0519 0.0519  
Between  0.0042   0.085   0.0124   
Overall  0.0145   0.1312   0.0007   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
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Table 6.12 
Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-MC-Industry B -0.0311*** -0.0311*** -0.0168*** -0.0107* -0.0107** -0.0111*** -0.0191** -0.0191** -0.0096*** 
 β -0.1929*** -0.1929*** -0.1040*** -0.1031* -0.1031** -0.1077*** -0.1601** -0.1601** -0.0802*** 
 p-value (0.0020) (0.0060) 0.0000  (0.0720) (0.0160) 0.0000  (0.0400) (0.0180) (0.0010) 
Dividends B 0.1461** 0.1461*** 0.0934*** 0.0045 0.0045 0.0002 0.1283*** 0.1283*** 0.0964*** 
 β 0.2481** 0.2481*** 0.1587*** 0.0119 0.0119 0.0005 0.2945*** 0.2945*** 0.2213*** 
 p-value (0.0110) (0.0020) 0.0000  (0.9030) (0.8450) (0.9800) (0.0060) (0.0010) 0.0000  
Debt-to-MC-Industry*Dividends B -0.0023** -0.0023*** -0.0016*** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0019** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** 
 β -0.1926** -0.1926*** -0.1331*** -0.0278 -0.0278 -0.0118 -0.2115** -0.2115*** -0.1724*** 
 p-value (0.0200) (0.0070) 0.0000  (0.7240) (0.5980) (0.5590) (0.0280) (0.0080) 0.0000  
Ln (Company-size) B 0.9252** 0.9252** -0.0021 0.4716** 0.4716*** 0.1890*** 0.4583* 0.4583 -0.1246*** 
 β 0.5573** 0.5573** -0.0013 0.4433** 0.4433*** 0.1776*** 0.3732* 0.3732 -0.1014*** 
 p-value (0.0290) (0.0460) (0.9680) (0.0430) 0.0000  0.0000  (0.0950) (0.2100) (0.0060) 
Profitability B 0.0132 0.0132 0.0130 0.0158* 0.0158** 0.0073* 0.0011 0.0011 0.0053 
 β 0.0289 0.0289 0.0284 0.0540* 0.0540** 0.0249* 0.0033 0.0033 0.0156 
 p-value (0.4870) (0.3920) (0.1270) (0.0960) (0.0350) (0.0710) (0.9480) (0.9230) (0.3400) 
Cash B 0.0271 0.0271* 0.0174** 0.0304*** 0.0304** 0.0157*** -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0049 
 β 0.0574 0.0574* 0.0369** 0.1004*** 0.1004** 0.0519*** -0.0248 -0.0248 -0.0139 
 p-value (0.1100) (0.0880) (0.0390) (0.0060) (0.0130) 0.0000  (0.5430) (0.3960) (0.3680) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0714 0.0714* -0.0580 0.0239 0.0239 -0.1260*** 0.0385 0.0385* 0.0026 
 β 0.0518 0.0518* -0.0420 0.0270 0.0270 -0.1426*** 0.0378 0.0378* 0.0026 
 p-value (0.4140) (0.0560) (0.1150) (0.6310) (0.3590) 0.0000  (0.5450) (0.0800) (0.9210) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0071** -0.0054 -0.0054* -0.0044** 0.0030 0.0030 -0.0011 
 β -0.0146 -0.0146 -0.0224** -0.0266 -0.0266* -0.0219** 0.0128 0.0128 -0.0048 
 p-value (0.5790) (0.5870) (0.0490) (0.2380) (0.0930) (0.0140) (0.6000) (0.5990) (0.6060) 
Maturity B 0.1834** 0.1834** -0.0556* 0.1343** 0.1343** 0.0008 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0315* 
 β 0.0899** 0.0899** -0.0272* 0.1027** 0.1027** 0.0006 -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0209* 
 p-value (0.0380) (0.0470) (0.0900) (0.0180) (0.0120) (0.9680) (0.8720) (0.8690) (0.0830) 
%Equity B -0.0167 -0.0167* 0.0038 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0094*** -0.0163* -0.0163* -0.0028 
 β -0.1103 -0.1103* 0.0248 0.0267 0.0267* 0.0967*** -0.1459* -0.1459* -0.0248 
 p-value (0.1430) (0.0550) (0.2450) (0.5860) (0.0750) 0.0000  (0.0740) (0.0560) (0.1730) 
Single-scheme B -0.8154 -0.8154 0.2301 -0.5981** -0.5981** -0.4258*** -0.0740 -0.0740 0.5104*** 
 β -0.2672 -0.2672 0.0754 -0.3059** -0.3059** -0.2178*** -0.0328 -0.0328 0.2262*** 
 p-value (0.1920) (0.3150) (0.1840) (0.0250) (0.0140) 0.0000  (0.8850) (0.9150) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0137 0.0137 -0.0082* -0.0110* -0.0110* -0.0089*** 0.0242** 0.0242 0.0007 
 β 0.0639 0.0639 -0.0384* -0.0797* -0.0797* -0.0647*** 0.1522** 0.1522 0.0043 
 p-value (0.2850) (0.3800) (0.0600) (0.0740) (0.0710) 0.0000  (0.0440) (0.1660) (0.8190) 
_cons B -4.5015 -4.5015 3.8469*** -1.0756 -1.0756 1.1662*** -3.4270 -3.4270 2.0772*** 
 p-value (0.2310) (0.2920) 0.0000  (0.5850) (0.2560) (0.0010) (0.1690) (0.3780) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
Number of companies  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.06 585.21  8.27 6691.96  3.26 407.06  
Wald chi    618.43   1483.78   263.34 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.143 0.143  0.2177 0.2177  0.0644 0.0644  
Between  0.0015   0.0819   0.0135   
overall  0.0184   0.1291   0.001   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-MC-Year B -0.0259*** -0.0259*** -0.0148*** -0.0096* -0.0096** -0.0089*** -0.0157* -0.0157** -0.0084*** 
 β -0.1856*** -0.1856*** -0.1057*** -0.1074* -0.1074** -0.1000*** -0.1520* -0.1520** -0.0810*** 
 p-value (0.0080) (0.0020) 0.0000  (0.0830) (0.0130) 0.0000  (0.0820) (0.0200) (0.0040) 
Dividends B 0.1478*** 0.1478*** 0.0891*** 0.0187 0.0187 0.0036 0.1113*** 0.1113*** 0.0755*** 
 β 0.2510*** 0.2510*** 0.1513*** 0.0495 0.0495 0.0095 0.2555*** 0.2555*** 0.1734*** 
 p-value (0.0040) 0.0000  0.0000  (0.6140) (0.3840) (0.6020) (0.0090) (0.0020) 0.0000  
Debt-to-MC-Year*Dividends B -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0019*** -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0020** -0.0020*** -0.0013*** 
 β -0.2126*** -0.2126*** -0.1273*** -0.0721 -0.0721 -0.0248 -0.1864** -0.1864*** -0.1218*** 
 p-value (0.0080) (0.0010) 0.0000  (0.4020) (0.1700) (0.2070) (0.0480) (0.0100) 0.0000  
Ln (Company-size) B 0.8918** 0.8918** -0.0137 0.4660** 0.4660*** 0.1851*** 0.4342 0.4342 -0.1339*** 
 β 0.5371** 0.5371** -0.0083 0.4380** 0.4380*** 0.1740*** 0.3536 0.3536 -0.1091*** 
 p-value (0.0340) (0.0470) (0.7930) (0.0460) (0.0010) 0.0000  (0.1110) (0.2170) (0.0030) 
Profitability B 0.0073 0.0073 0.0101 0.0140 0.0140* 0.0047 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0026 
 β 0.0159 0.0159 0.0222 0.0476 0.0476* 0.0160 -0.0058 -0.0058 0.0078 
 p-value (0.6930) (0.6670) (0.2060) (0.1320) (0.0520) (0.2370) (0.9080) (0.8890) (0.6270) 
Cash B 0.0269 0.0269* 0.0186** 0.0305*** 0.0305** 0.0161*** -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0053 
 β 0.0569 0.0569* 0.0393** 0.1006*** 0.1006** 0.0530*** -0.0256 -0.0256 -0.0152 
 p-value (0.1040) (0.0820) (0.0150) (0.0050) (0.0120) 0.0000  (0.5310) (0.3760) (0.3270) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0703 0.0703* -0.0596 0.0229 0.0229 -0.1236*** 0.0384 0.0384* 0.0042 
 β 0.0510 0.0510* -0.0433 0.0260 0.0260 -0.1399*** 0.0377 0.0377* 0.0041 
 p-value (0.4200) (0.0670) (0.1060) (0.6480) (0.3940) 0.0000  (0.5460) (0.0660) (0.8750) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0036 0.0052 0.0052 -0.0004 
 β -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0163 -0.0206 -0.0206 -0.0180 0.0221 0.0221 -0.0018 
 p-value (0.9060) (0.9180) (0.1520) (0.3640) (0.1970) (0.0420) (0.3750) (0.4130) (0.8460) 
Maturity B 0.1810** 0.1810** -0.0555* 0.1353** 0.1353** -0.0001 -0.0150 -0.0150 -0.0301 
 β 0.0887** 0.0887** -0.0272* 0.1035** 0.1035** -0.0001 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0199 
 p-value (0.0390) (0.0470) (0.0910) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.9970) (0.8250) (0.8200) (0.1010) 
%Equity B -0.0171 -0.0171* 0.0041 0.0025 0.0025* 0.0093*** -0.0166* -0.0166* -0.0031 
 β -0.1131 -0.1131* 0.0268 0.0253 0.0253* 0.0960*** -0.1484* -0.1484* -0.0281 
 p-value (0.1330) (0.0550) (0.2080) (0.6060) (0.0870) 0.0000  (0.0690) (0.0550) (0.1200) 
Single-scheme B -0.8129 -0.8129 0.2336 -0.6083** -0.6083*** -0.4142*** -0.0575 -0.0575 0.5020*** 
 β -0.2664 -0.2664 0.0766 -0.3111** -0.3111*** -0.2118*** -0.0255 -0.0255 0.2225*** 
 p-value (0.2040) (0.3250) (0.1790) (0.0240) (0.0100) 0.0000  (0.9120) (0.9350) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0132 0.0132 -0.0086** -0.0115* -0.0115* -0.0091*** 0.0244** 0.0244 0.0003 
 β 0.0617 0.0617 -0.0401** -0.0837* -0.0837* -0.0663*** 0.1536** 0.1536 0.0020 
 p-value (0.3050) (0.4000) (0.0440) (0.0610) (0.0640) 0.0000  (0.0430) (0.1640) (0.9170) 
_cons B -4.4822 -4.4822 3.7530*** -1.1172 -1.1172 1.1162*** -3.3867 -3.3867 2.1182*** 
 p-value (0.2310) (0.2920) 0.0000  (0.5710) (0.2460) (0.0030) (0.1730) (0.3780) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  7.18 735.61  8.23 2313.31  3.21 1675.81  
Wald chi    598.54   1414.78   246.64 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.1446 0.1446  0.2194 0.2194  0.0624 0.0624  
between  0.0029   0.0829   0.019   
overall  0.0173   0.1308   0.0005   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-TA-Industry B -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0118*** -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0042** -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0056* 
 β -0.0438 -0.0438 -0.0840*** -0.0153 -0.0153 -0.0468** -0.0901 -0.0901 -0.0541* 
 p-value (0.6150) (0.5520) (0.0020) (0.8060) (0.6440) (0.0410) (0.3070) (0.1990) (0.0520) 
Dividends B 0.0572* 0.0572*** 0.0340*** 0.0145 0.0145 0.0027 0.0310** 0.0310** 0.0320*** 
 β 0.0971* 0.0971*** 0.0578*** 0.0383 0.0383 0.0072 0.0711** 0.0711** 0.0735*** 
 p-value (0.0900) 0.0000  (0.0070) (0.4710) (0.1250) (0.5640) (0.0330) (0.0340) 0.0000  
Debt-to-TA-Industry*Dividends B -0.0018 -0.0018*** -0.0011* -0.0013* -0.0013*** -0.0006** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 
 β -0.0816 -0.0816*** -0.0489* -0.0959* -0.0959*** -0.0432** 0.0082 0.0082 -0.0173 
 p-value (0.1740) (0.0010) (0.0820) (0.0870) (0.0010) (0.0280) (0.8150) (0.6290) (0.4500) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.6967* 0.6967* -0.0844 0.3871 0.3871*** 0.1492*** 0.3311 0.3311 -0.1476*** 
 β 0.4197* 0.4197* -0.0508 0.3638 0.3638*** 0.1403*** 0.2696 0.2696 -0.1202*** 
 p-value (0.0890) (0.0860) (0.1160) (0.1050) (0.0080) 0.0000  (0.2100) (0.3230) (0.0010) 
Profitability B -0.0157 -0.0157 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0033 
 β -0.0343 -0.0343 -0.0012 0.0019 0.0019 -0.0108 -0.0208 -0.0208 -0.0097 
 p-value (0.3870) (0.4810) (0.9390) (0.9500) (0.9570) (0.3950) (0.6450) (0.6950) (0.5100) 
Cash B 0.0254 0.0254* 0.0193** 0.0292*** 0.0292*** 0.0164*** -0.0090 -0.0090 -0.0055 
 β 0.0537 0.0537* 0.0408** 0.0964*** 0.0964*** 0.0542*** -0.0259 -0.0259 -0.0157 
 p-value (0.1330) (0.0920) (0.0230) (0.0040) (0.0090) 0.0000  (0.5260) (0.3740) (0.3080) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0798 0.0798** -0.0787** 0.0237 0.0237 -0.1358*** 0.0479 0.0479** 0.0051 
 β 0.0579 0.0579** -0.0571** 0.0269 0.0269 -0.1536*** 0.0470 0.0470** 0.0050 
 p-value (0.3530) (0.0500) (0.0350) (0.6320) (0.4020) 0.0000  (0.4600) (0.0170) (0.8470) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0072** -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0045** 0.0036 0.0036 -0.0012 
 β -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0228** -0.0255 -0.0255 -0.0220** 0.0156 0.0156 -0.0052 
 p-value (0.6490) (0.6770) (0.0440) (0.2670) (0.1210) (0.0130) (0.5310) (0.5700) (0.5770) 
Maturity B 0.1663* 0.1663** -0.0391 0.1387** 0.1387** -0.0049 -0.0347 -0.0347 -0.0354* 
 β 0.0815* 0.0815** -0.0192 0.1061** 0.1061** -0.0037 -0.0230 -0.0230 -0.0234* 
 p-value (0.0550) (0.0480) (0.2380) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.8030) (0.6090) (0.5750) (0.0710) 
%Equity B -0.0163 -0.0163* 0.0031 0.0028 0.0028** 0.0092*** -0.0162* -0.0162* -0.0033* 
 β -0.1079 -0.1079* 0.0207 0.0288 0.0288** 0.0952*** -0.1450* -0.1450* -0.0292* 
 p-value (0.1500) (0.0680) (0.3170) (0.5560) (0.0470) 0.0000  (0.0760) (0.0620) (0.0950) 
Single-scheme B -0.6913 -0.6913 0.1966 -0.5957** -0.5957*** -0.3937*** 0.0376 0.0376 0.5106*** 
 β -0.2266 -0.2266 0.0644 -0.3046** -0.3046*** -0.2013*** 0.0167 0.0167 0.2263*** 
 p-value (0.2970) (0.4240) (0.2750) (0.0370) (0.0060) 0.0000  (0.9410) (0.9580) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0159 0.0159 -0.0083* -0.0116* -0.0116* -0.0101*** 0.0267** 0.0267 0.0003 
 β 0.0741 0.0741 -0.0387* -0.0846* -0.0846* -0.0731*** 0.1680** 0.1680 0.0021 
 p-value (0.2290) (0.3440) (0.0660) (0.0640) (0.0520) 0.0000  (0.0300) (0.1510) (0.9160) 
_cons B -2.4817 -2.4817 4.8570*** -0.2775 -0.2775 1.6551*** -2.3471 -2.3471 2.5679*** 
 p-value (0.4960) (0.5310) 0.0000  (0.8920) (0.8000) 0.0000  (0.3390) (0.5230) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  6.3 233.29  9.16 5083.67  2.94 146.18  
Wald chi    447.34   2054.9   216.2 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
within  0.131 0.131  0.2229 0.2229  0.0519 0.0519  
between  0.0047   0.0802   0.0103   
overall  0.0152   0.1315   0.0011   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9            
 
Debt-to-TA-Year B -0.0070 -0.0070 -0.0146*** -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0041** -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0069** 
 Β -0.0539 -0.0539 -0.1130*** -0.0093 -0.0093 -0.0489** -0.1100 -0.1100 -0.0722** 
 p-value (0.5640) (0.4790) 0.0000  (0.8870) (0.7720) (0.0450) (0.2520) (0.1360) (0.0180) 
Dividends B 0.0446 0.0446*** 0.0213* 0.0087 0.0087 -0.0008 0.0278** 0.0278** 0.0277*** 
 Β 0.0758 0.0758*** 0.0362* 0.0231 0.0231 -0.0020 0.0638** 0.0638** 0.0635*** 
 p-value (0.1260) 0.0000  (0.0530) (0.5910) (0.2100) (0.8490) (0.0230) (0.0270) 0.0000  
Debt-to-TA-Year*Dividends B -0.0013 -0.0013*** -0.0003 -0.0012* -0.0012*** -0.0005** 0.0004 0.0004* 0.0001 
 Β -0.0586 -0.0586*** -0.0124 -0.0878* -0.0878*** -0.0380** 0.0239 0.0239* 0.0092 
 p-value (0.2720) (0.0010) (0.6090) (0.0590) 0.0000  (0.0230) (0.4720) (0.0590) (0.6800) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.7078* 0.7078* -0.0798 0.3933* 0.3933*** 0.1498*** 0.3322 0.3322 -0.1445*** 
 β 0.4263* 0.4263* -0.0481 0.3696* 0.3696*** 0.1408*** 0.2705 0.2705 -0.1177*** 
 p-value (0.0850) (0.0810) (0.1360) (0.0990) (0.0060) 0.0000  (0.2090) (0.3230) (0.0020) 
Profitability B -0.0130 -0.0130 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0030 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0025 
 β -0.0283 -0.0283 0.0012 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0103 -0.0153 -0.0153 -0.0074 
 p-value (0.4730) (0.5520) (0.9390) (0.9340) (0.9450) (0.4160) (0.7370) (0.7700) (0.6180) 
Cash B 0.0260 0.0260* 0.0186** 0.0295*** 0.0295*** 0.0163*** -0.0090 -0.0090 -0.0055 
 β 0.0549 0.0549* 0.0394** 0.0974*** 0.0974*** 0.0538*** -0.0256 -0.0256 -0.0157 
 p-value (0.1310) (0.0980) (0.0290) (0.0040) (0.0100) 0.0000  (0.5300) (0.3780) (0.3110) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0831 0.0831** -0.0769** 0.0259 0.0259 -0.1332*** 0.0481 0.0481** 0.0065 
 β 0.0603 0.0603** -0.0558** 0.0293 0.0293 -0.1507*** 0.0472 0.0472** 0.0064 
 p-value (0.3330) (0.0440) (0.0380) (0.6010) (0.3620) 0.0000  (0.4590) (0.0180) (0.8050) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0065* -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0041** 0.0040 0.0040 -0.0011 
 β -0.0110 -0.0110 -0.0206* -0.0249 -0.0249 -0.0203** 0.0172 0.0172 -0.0047 
 p-value (0.6880) (0.7150) (0.0690) (0.2780) (0.1320) (0.0220) (0.4940) (0.5420) (0.6210) 
Maturity B 0.1611* 0.1611** -0.0411 0.1367** 0.1367** -0.0044 -0.0365 -0.0365 -0.0356* 
 β 0.0790* 0.0790** -0.0202 0.1046** 0.1046** -0.0033 -0.0242 -0.0242 -0.0236* 
 p-value (0.0640) (0.0490) (0.2190) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.8230) (0.5890) (0.5570) (0.0700) 
%Equity B -0.0165 -0.0165* 0.0032 0.0026 0.0026* 0.0092*** -0.0162* -0.0162* -0.0035* 
 β -0.1092 -0.1092* 0.0213 0.0273 0.0273* 0.0948*** -0.1449* -0.1449* -0.0316* 
 p-value (0.1470) (0.0670) (0.2940) (0.5770) (0.0550) 0.0000  (0.0760) (0.0620) (0.0730) 
Single-scheme B -0.6826 -0.6826 0.2075 -0.5929** -0.5929*** -0.3932*** 0.0411 0.0411 0.5264*** 
 β -0.2237 -0.2237 0.0680 -0.3032** -0.3032*** -0.2011*** 0.0182 0.0182 0.2333*** 
 p-value (0.2990) (0.4270) (0.2460) (0.0380) (0.0050) 0.0000  (0.9360) (0.9540) (0.0010) 
%FR B 0.0164 0.0164 -0.0084* -0.0113* -0.0113* -0.0100*** 0.0267** 0.0267 0.0003 
 β 0.0764 0.0764 -0.0391* -0.0824* -0.0824* -0.0730*** 0.1683** 0.1683 0.0019 
 p-value (0.2140) (0.3290) (0.0620) (0.0700) (0.0590) 0.0000  (0.0300) (0.1510) (0.9210) 
_cons B -2.6228 -2.6228 4.6817*** -0.3386 -0.3386 1.5837*** -2.4047 -2.4047 2.4895*** 
 p-value (0.4720) (0.5040) 0.0000  (0.8680) (0.7550) 0.0000  (0.3280) (0.5120) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 1,403 1403 1,402 
  146 146 145 146 146 145 146 146 145 
F-stat  6.58 1121.78  9.4 2240.87  2.99 150.37  
Wald chi    464.79   2197   216.34 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.1296 0.1296  0.2226 0.2226  0.0523 0.0523  
Between  0.0052   0.0815   0.0117   
Overall  0.0143   0.1323   0.0008   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay  FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay  FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay  FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Debt-to-MC B -0.0280*** -0.0280** -0.0150*** -0.0086* -0.0086** -0.0108*** -0.0174** -0.0174** -0.0071*** 
 β -0.2054*** -0.2054** -0.1102*** -0.0981* -0.0981** -0.1238*** -0.1729** -0.1729** -0.0703*** 
 p-value (0.0030) (0.0190) 0.0000  (0.0770) (0.0500) 0.0000  (0.0340) (0.0270) (0.0080) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.7828*** 0.7828** 0.0171 0.3013* 0.3013*** 0.1131*** 0.4603*** 0.4603 -0.0458 
 β 0.4715*** 0.4715** 0.0103 0.2832* 0.2832*** 0.1063*** 0.3749*** 0.3749 -0.0373 
 p-value (0.0040) (0.0440) (0.7050) (0.0780) 0.0000  0.0000  (0.0090) (0.1080) (0.2670) 
Profitability B 0.0134 0.0134 0.0046 0.0126* 0.0126** 0.0050 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 
 β 0.0292 0.0292 0.0100 0.0431* 0.0431** 0.0172 0.0037 0.0037 0.0048 
 p-value (0.4210) (0.2110) (0.5110) (0.0660) (0.0480) (0.1480) (0.9280) (0.9070) (0.6860) 
Dividends B 0.0398* 0.0398*** 0.0244*** -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0031 0.0413*** 0.0413*** 0.0315*** 
 β 0.0676* 0.0676*** 0.0414*** -0.0131 -0.0131 -0.0082 0.0948*** 0.0948*** 0.0723*** 
 p-value (0.0620) (0.0040) (0.0100) (0.6860) (0.2040) (0.3650) 0.0000  (0.0090) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0208 0.0208 0.0197** 0.0210** 0.0210* 0.0138*** -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0037 
 β 0.0440 0.0440 0.0416** 0.0694** 0.0694* 0.0457*** -0.0173 -0.0173 -0.0106 
 p-value (0.2430) (0.1590) (0.0170) (0.0500) (0.0870) 0.0000  (0.6510) (0.5090) (0.4710) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0721 0.0721** -0.0248 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.1253*** 0.0759 0.0759*** 0.0422* 
 β 0.0523 0.0523** -0.0180 -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.1418*** 0.0744 0.0744*** 0.0414* 
 p-value (0.3360) (0.0250) (0.4590) (0.8310) (0.5820) 0.0000  (0.2480) (0.0100) (0.0830) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0067** -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0040** 0.0023 0.0023 -0.0017 
 β -0.0194 -0.0194 -0.0213** -0.0309 -0.0309 -0.0197** 0.0100 0.0100 -0.0073 
 p-value (0.4370) (0.5420) (0.0500) (0.1650) (0.1460) (0.0190) (0.6670) (0.6780) (0.4260) 
Maturity B 0.1023 0.1023 -0.0701** 0.1034* 0.1034* -0.0031 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0362** 
 β 0.0502 0.0502 -0.0344** 0.0791* 0.0791* -0.0024 -0.0308 -0.0308 -0.0240** 
 p-value (0.2410) (0.2760) (0.0300) (0.0570) (0.0980) (0.8660) (0.4190) (0.4270) (0.0440) 
%Equity B -0.0169* -0.0169** 0.0037 0.0023 0.0023 0.0110*** -0.0160* -0.0160* -0.0046** 
 β -0.1117* -0.1117** 0.0245 0.0240 0.0240 0.1132*** -0.1427* -0.1427* -0.0415** 
 p-value (0.1000) (0.0270) (0.2190) (0.6290) (0.3500) 0.0000  (0.0580) (0.0620) (0.0140) 
Single-scheme B -0.6073 -0.6073 0.2925* -0.4655* -0.4655** -0.3431*** -0.0274 -0.0274 0.4337*** 
 β -0.1991 -0.1991 0.0959* -0.2381* -0.2381** -0.1755*** -0.0122 -0.0122 0.1922*** 
 p-value (0.3080) (0.4170) (0.0710) (0.0950) (0.0450) 0.0000  (0.9570) (0.9670) (0.0030) 
%FR B 0.0186 0.0186 -0.0090** -0.0105* -0.0105* -0.0086*** 0.0275** 0.0275* 0.0007 
 β 0.0904 0.0904 -0.0436** -0.0799* -0.0799* -0.0653*** 0.1810** 0.1810* 0.0044 
 p-value (0.1440) (0.1870) (0.0230) (0.0610) (0.0720) 0.0000  (0.0180) (0.0640) (0.8300) 
_cons B -2.1595 -2.1595 4.6582*** 0.7762 0.7762 2.1304*** -2.7902* -2.7902 2.1741*** 
 p-value (0.3800) (0.4890) 0.0000  (0.6000) (0.2350) 0.0000  (0.0740) (0.3210) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,567 1567 1,566 1,567 1567 1,566 1,567 1567 1,566 
Number of companies  163 163 162 163 163 162 163 163 162 
F-stat  8.21 252.24  9.38 404.57  3.44 14848.86  
Wald chi    1425.65   1327.66   204.58 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.1374 0.1374  0.2113 0.2113  0.0605 0.0605  
Between  0.0048   0.0631   0.0129   
Overall  0.0192   0.1251   0.0011   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Regressions of TOTAL-, REGULAR- contributions and DRCs. All variables are defined in Table 6.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Table reports both unstandardized (B) and standardised coefficients (β). 
 
Dependent variable  TOTAL-contributions REGULAR-contributions DRCs 
  FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay  FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay  FGLS FE cluster Driscoll-Kraay  FGLS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
Debt-to-TA B -0.0198** -0.0198*** -0.0160*** -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0072*** -0.0142* -0.0142*** -0.0054** 
 β -0.1310** -0.1310*** -0.1060*** -0.0450 -0.0450 -0.0746*** -0.1276* -0.1276*** -0.0482** 
 p-value (0.0370) (0.0090) 0.0000  (0.3510) (0.2580) 0.0000  (0.0690) (0.0070) (0.0400) 
Ln (Company-size) B 0.5888** 0.5888** -0.0389 0.2334 0.2334*** 0.0599** 0.3493** 0.3493 -0.0691* 
 β 0.3546** 0.3546** -0.0234 0.2193 0.2193*** 0.0563** 0.2845** 0.2845 -0.0563* 
 p-value (0.0330) (0.0210) (0.3750) (0.1850) (0.0010) (0.0390) (0.0280) (0.1100) (0.0820) 
Profitability B 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0031 0.0084 0.0084 -0.0019 -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0023 
 β 0.0022 0.0022 -0.0067 0.0287 0.0287 -0.0066 -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0068 
 p-value (0.9480) (0.9440) (0.6330) (0.1660) (0.1350) (0.5380) (0.6290) (0.6780) (0.5320) 
Dividends B 0.0327* 0.0327*** 0.0221** -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0055* 0.0370*** 0.0370*** 0.0293*** 
 β 0.0554* 0.0554*** 0.0375** -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.0147* 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0673*** 
 p-value (0.0890) (0.0010) (0.0150) (0.5290) (0.1260) (0.0960) 0.0000  (0.0060) 0.0000  
Cash B 0.0208 0.0208 0.0212*** 0.0212** 0.0212* 0.0147*** -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0026 
 β 0.0440 0.0440 0.0448*** 0.0702** 0.0702* 0.0485*** -0.0180 -0.0180 -0.0076 
 p-value (0.2420) (0.1800) (0.0100) (0.0460) (0.0970) 0.0000  (0.6370) (0.5040) (0.5980) 
Closure-to-FA B 0.0821 0.0821** -0.0286 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.1310*** 0.0820 0.0820*** 0.0460* 
 β 0.0596 0.0596** -0.0208 -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.1483*** 0.0805 0.0805*** 0.0451* 
 p-value (0.2700) (0.0130) (0.3930) (0.8760) (0.7090) 0.0000  (0.2110) (0.0020) (0.0550) 
Scheme-returns B -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0066* -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0033** 0.0034 0.0034 -0.0010 
 β -0.0139 -0.0139 -0.0210* -0.0281 -0.0281 -0.0163** 0.0145 0.0145 -0.0044 
 p-value (0.5880) (0.6920) (0.0520) (0.2110) (0.2150) (0.0490) (0.5360) (0.5670) (0.6140) 
Maturity B 0.0886 0.0886 -0.0599* 0.0991* 0.0991 -0.0041 -0.0549 -0.0549 -0.0340* 
 β 0.0434 0.0434 -0.0294* 0.0758* 0.0758 -0.0031 -0.0364 -0.0364 -0.0225* 
 p-value (0.3070) (0.3390) (0.0630) (0.0680) (0.1050) (0.8250) (0.3360) (0.3450) (0.0590) 
%Equity B -0.0167 -0.0167** 0.0035 0.0024 0.0024 0.0111*** -0.0159* -0.0159* -0.0036** 
 β -0.1104 -0.1104** 0.0231 0.0248 0.0248 0.1146*** -0.1418* -0.1418* -0.0323** 
 p-value (0.1050) (0.0300) (0.2400) (0.6180) (0.3220) 0.0000  (0.0600) (0.0660) (0.0340) 
Single-scheme B -0.5832 -0.5832 0.3163** -0.4543 -0.4543** -0.2837*** -0.0168 -0.0168 0.3763*** 
 β -0.1912 -0.1912 0.1037** -0.2323 -0.2323** -0.1451*** -0.0075 -0.0075 0.1668*** 
 p-value (0.3420) (0.4530) (0.0470) (0.1140) (0.0380) (0.0010) (0.9740) (0.9810) (0.0090) 
%FR B 0.0181 0.0181 -0.0078** -0.0105* -0.0105* -0.0087*** 0.0271** 0.0271* 0.0004 
 β 0.0883 0.0883 -0.0381** -0.0798* -0.0798* -0.0664*** 0.1782** 0.1782* 0.0029 
 p-value (0.1570) (0.2080) (0.0500) (0.0630) (0.0550) 0.0000  (0.0200) (0.0740) (0.8840) 
_cons B -0.4877 -0.4877 5.4258*** 1.2379 1.2379* 2.5603*** -1.6925 -1.6925 2.3369*** 
 p-value (0.8490) (0.8570) 0.0000  (0.4340) (0.0620) 0.0000  (0.2770) (0.5030) 0.0000             
Number of obs  1,567 1567 1,566 1,567 1567 1,566 1,567 1567 1,566 
Number of companies  163 163 162 163 163 162 163 163 162 
F-stat  8.1 2232.94  9.16 1215.48  3.62 18592.14  
Wald chi    1567.52   1901.99   207.8 
Prob>F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Within  0.1339 0.1339  0.2094 0.2094  0.0589 0.0589  
Between  0.0048   0.0639   0.0067   
Overall  0.0217   0.1265   0.0024   
Year effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





High debt in the corporate structure can make it more difficult and more costly to raise new 
funds. As a result, companies may seek to reduce pension contributions because pension 
contributions significantly reduce cash. However, studies for US and Dutch companies provide 
opposing effects of debt on funding policy of DB schemes. This study examines the effects of 
debt on funding policy of DB schemes sponsored by British companies. While prior studies do 
not discuss the role of pension regulation in funding policy of DB schemes, this study argues 
that regulation can influence the way how companies fund their pension schemes. 
Hypothesising that British companies more likely to reduce pension contributions when the 
debt is high due to less strict regulation, this study provides plausible results for this hypothesis. 
In particular, this study finds that companies with high debt relative to market capitalisation 
and total assets reduce regular pension contributions which companies make to cover the 
annual cost of pensions and additional pension contributions which companies make to reduce 
the deficit. These findings have important implications for DB schemes because they provide 
useful insights regarding the effectiveness of the Pension Act of 2004. Managing regular 
pension contributions can harm the pension scheme members as it not only increases the 
likelihood of default but also lowers the amount of pension assets. In particular, making lower 
regular contributions would increase the deficit in DB schemes because the reduction in regular 
contributions is driven by the company’s need for a higher cash and not by the lower cost of 
DB pensions. Second, DRCs may be less effective at reducing the deficit if the company also 
reduces regular contributions. This can explain why the deficit in DB schemes in some 
companies grows despite having paid DRCs (e.g., Carillion, BHS). Therefore, these findings 
reveal important implications for the management of DB schemes, which might also be of 
interests to pension regulators who may consider improving the existing pension regulation.  
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On a more general note, this study findings highlight that companies are motivated to 
transfer wealth from debt to equity holders when the risk is high. Moreover, the obtained 
findings also suggest that pension contributions are influenced by the dividend policy. In 
particular, companies tend to increase additional contributions toward deficit reduction when 
companies also pay higher dividends. This finding is in line with prior studies of Bunn, Mizen 
and Smietanka (2018) and Liu and Tonks (2012). However, the interaction effect of debt and 
dividends suggest that high debt-financed companies tend to engage in risk-shifting strategies 






















This thesis had four main objectives. The first objective was to investigate the relationship 
between CEO inside debt incentives generated by DB pensions and the funding of DB pension 
schemes. The second objective was to examine whether CFO inside debt incentives also matter 
for the funding of DB pension schemes. The third objective was to explore whether inside debt 
incentives of CEOs and CFOs are related to the funding policy of deficit of DB pension 
schemes. The last objective was to examine whether companies with DB pension arrangements 
reduce pension contributions when they are financially constrained.  
The first objective was addressed in Chapter 4. The analysis showed that CEO inside debt 
incentives are associated with higher funding of DB pension schemes. These results suggest 
that DB pension schemes are better funded when CEO participates in a DB scheme, e.g., when 
he has a DB pension. The results also show that CEO DB pensions are more strongly related 
to the funding of pension schemes in companies with single-schemes. This finding suggests 
that the CEO cares more about the scheme in which he participates and less about other 
schemes. The analysis also shows that funding of DB schemes negatively related to short career 
horizon, suggesting that CEOs start to behave myopically as they get closer to retirement. 
However, DB pensions induce CEOs with short career horizon to look better after the pension 
scheme to ensure of getting the promised level of pensions.  
The second objective was addressed in Chapter 5. The analysis reveals that CFO inside debt 
incentives are not associated with higher funding of DB pension schemes. This suggests that 
CFOs incentives are less influential than those of CEOs. Although CFO is in charge of 
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financials, it appears that CEOs might exert significant influence over CFOs decisions to 
induce CFOs to make decisions to regard the interests of CEOs which are not always in 
interests of CFOs themselves. This may also explain why DB schemes are found to be 
associated with higher DB pension schemes only when CEO participates in DB schemes. 
The third objective was addressed in Chapter 6. The analysis showed that only companies 
whose CEOs participate in DB schemes are associated with a higher probability of making 
DRCs. These findings suggest that a company is more likely to make additional contributions 
to reduce the deficit when the CEO has a DB pension. However, the analysis fails to find any 
relationship between companies whose CFOs participate in DB schemes and the probability of 
making DRCs. This finding provides further assurance that CEOs inside-debt incentives are 
more influential than those of CFOs. The analysis also reveals that the probability of making 
DRCs increases as CEO gets closer to retirement. This suggests that CEOs tend to initiate 
decisions to reduce the riskiness of the pension scheme to protect pension accruals. 
The fourth and last objective of this thesis is addressed in Chapter 7. The analysis shows 
that high-debt companies are associated with lower regular pension contributions and DRCs. 
This implies that companies tend to reduce both types of pension contributions when they are 
financially constrained. This study further documents that while dividends alone positively 
associated with pension contributions, it has been found that companies with high debt and 
high dividend payouts are associated with lower pension contributions. These findings suggest 
that risky companies act in the interests of their shareholders as they tend to transfer wealth 
from the pension scheme members to shareholders by increasing dividends and reducing the 
pension contributions to DB schemes. This harms pension scheme members as it increases the 
likelihood of the pension scheme default.  
This thesis makes several contributions. First, this thesis contributes to the literature on 
corporate DB pension schemes. In particular, it provides empirical evidence on whether inside- 
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debt incentives are important for the deficit funding approaches of DB schemes. Second, it 
contributes to the limited literature on the role of CFO inside debt incentives. Third, this 
research establishes whether DRCs are effective at reducing the deficit. Fourth, this thesis 
contributes to the literature by examining the impact of debt in the corporate structure of 
companies on pension contributions. It is worth noting that this thesis is the first that examines 
different types of pension contributions – regular pension contributions and DRCs. These 
contributions differ significantly in their stated objectives, and thus it is important to understand 
the impact of debt on both - regular pension contributions and DRCs. Overall, this thesis 
contributes to a better understanding of the factors that influence the funding positions of DB 
schemes. The limited empirical evidence on corporate DB schemes in the UK makes this 
thesis’s findings particularly valuable to the pension regulators, policymakers and the boards 
who can improve the management of DB schemes and prevent the schemes from being 
underfunded. Apart from this, this study also contributes to the literature on the usefulness of 















Limitations and avenues for future research 
 
This thesis has potential limitations. A major concern is the causal interpretation of the 
relation between CEO DB pension holdings and the funding levels of DB pension schemes is 
the endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem arises from four sources. The first is 
omitted variables, which refers to variables that are likely to affect the funding levels of DB 
pension schemes and should be included in the set of explanatory variables, but they are not 
because they are not directly observable. The second is simultaneity or reverse causality, which 
occurs when it can be argued that either independent variable causes the dependent variable to 
change or that dependent variable causes the independent variable to change. For example, in 
the context of the study presented in Chapter 4, it is argued that CEO incentives affect the 
funding level of DB schemes, but causality can run the other way. For example, it is likely that 
a certain funding levels of the DB scheme may encourage the company to retain open DB 
pension schemes that may encourage CEOs to accept a certain compensation package that 
includes DB pension benefits. The third source of endogeneity problem is a measurement error. 
Measurement error arises when variables used in the study are measured imperfectly because 
they are not directly observable and hence, they are difficult to quantify (such as the retirement 
age of CEO). To address the potential endogeneity concerns, it will be useful to provide 
evidence-based on an instrumental variable. For this approach, an instrumental variable is 
needed that is correlated with the CEO DB pension holdings and has no direct effect on the 
funding levels. 
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The fourth source of endogeneity is related to CEO ownership. The obtained findings 
suggest that CEOs significantly influence the funding levels of DB pension schemes. One 
potential concern with this interpretation, however, is that there might be several companies in 
the sample in which the decision-making power is centralized in the hands of CEOs with high 
ownership that may also encourage the CEO to reduce any deficit. For example, high CEO 
ownership may also encourage the CEO to reduce the deficit (e.g. to avoid criticism by the 
press, stock market pressure and decline in wealth). To the contrary, a high level of option-like 
holdings may encourage excessive risk-taking and hence a corporate strategy that supports a 
large deficit. If the sample includes a large number of companies whose CEOs have high 
ownership, this undermines the findings of the important role played by CEOs. To address this 
issue, it will be useful to control for the number of shares owned by the CEO and the amount 
of options or LTIPS held by the CEO to ensure the robustness of the findings. 
The research presented in this thesis can also be extended in at least in two ways. For 
example, the study can be extended by addressing the question of how CFO matter to corporate 
financial policies of DB pension schemes. The obtained findings suggest that CFOs do not 
influence the funding levels of DB pension schemes. One potential concern with this 
interpretation, however, is that there might be several companies in the sample in which the 
decision-making power is centralized in the hands of powerful CEOs (Adams et al., 2005), 
who make most of the major decisions. However, the degree to which a CEO retains formal 
decision-making authority and delegates the real decision-making control over to other top 
executives − such as the CFO − depends on firm characteristics such as the size and complexity 
of operations, and the CEO’s knowledge of a given policy (Graham et al. (2015)). Therefore, 
to address the question of how CFO matter to corporate financial policies of DB pension 
schemes, the future research can draw on studies that aim to conceptualize and measure the 
power and influence of boards and their directors (see e.g., Florackis and Sainani, 2018). To 
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capture the capacity of the CFO to exert influence over corporate decisions, it might be useful 
to identify conditions under which CFOs more likely to matter and construct proxies of CEO 
& CFO incentives and proxies of CEO & CFO power in order to be able to capture the ability 
of the CFO to influence key financial policies (Florackis and Sainani, 2018; Finkelstein, 1992). 
The study presented in the last empirical chapter that examines the relationship between 
contribution policies and the corporate structure can be extended by considering the role of 
CEO and potentially CFO. In particular, it might be useful to perform subsample analysis to 
investigate the extent to which the capital structure influences the contribution policy of DB 
pension schemes when CEO and CFO have DB pension holdings. Based on the CEO 
hypothesis discussed in Chapter 4, one would expect the negative effect of the debt on 
contribution policies of DB pension schemes to be less pronounced (if at all) for companies 
whose CEOs are DB members. 
The last empirical research can also be extended by the construction of an index of 
financially constrained companies based on other company-specific characteristics other than 
debt. With this respect, the future research can be drawn on studies that aim to conceptualize 
and measure the influence of other measures that best proxy for financial constraints (such as 
annual-payout ratio, debt-rating, paper-rating (see e.g., Denis and Siblikov, 2009). 
On a more general note, there is a need to understand the sources through which companies 
reduce their pension contributions. In particular, while one side of the story says that companies 
tend to reduce pension contributions when they are financially constrained, from the other side, 
it is yet unclear how companies reduce their pension contributions to DB schemes. Precisely, 
there is no clear evidence in the literature concerning what financially constrained companies 
do to reduce their pension contributions. To investigate the channels through which financially 
constrained companies to manage contributions is important because companies are not 
expected to pay lower contributions when they wish to do so, and accurate level of 
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contributions are vital to maintaining the financial health of DB schemes. However, companies 
may manage pension assumptions to lower the cost of DB pensions, and the future research 
may fall within the area of pension assumptions to contribute to the knowledge about the 















































FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Company-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in 




Dependent variable - %FR       
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -1.041***  -1.359*** -0.052**  -0.087*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.045)  (0.000)  
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.349***  -3.979*** -3.285***  -3.831*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)  
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.116***  1.459*** 0.056**  0.089*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.031)  (0.000)  
Single-scheme 4.160*** 4.596*** 3.785*** 4.245*** 5.162*** 3.946*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) -0.070  0.052 0.327  0.359 
 (0.825)  (0.874) (0.255)  (0.247) 
Accounting-background -0.275  -0.273 0.184  -0.036 
 (0.684)  (0.708) (0.768)  (0.958) 
CFO-DB-pension 0.146 0.105  0.028 0.013 
  (0.427) (0.593)  (0.107) (0.365) 
CFO-aboveCAP 0.946 1.172*  1.324* 2.360*** 
  (0.149) (0.080)  (0.072) (0.001) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member -0.229 -0.195  -0.035** -0.022 
  (0.228) (0.337)  (0.047) (0.127) 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure) -0.472* -0.436  -0.435 -0.568* 
  (0.100) (0.134)  (0.138) (0.060) 
%Equity -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.116*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Closure-to-FA -0.450*** -0.292* -0.444*** -0.494*** -0.371** -0.492*** 
 (0.006) (0.051) (0.004) (0.002) (0.016) (0.001) 
Maturity 0.566*** 0.596*** 0.526*** 0.663*** 0.630*** 0.648*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
ln (Company-size) 0.016 -0.258 -0.023 -0.456 -0.361 -0.568** 
 (0.956) (0.408) (0.936) (0.108) (0.268) (0.049) 
Leverage -0.042** -0.042** -0.045** -0.043** -0.045** -0.032* 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.080) 
ROA -0.027 -0.057* -0.047 -0.043 -0.051 -0.059* 
 (0.383) (0.063) (0.136) (0.153) (0.115) (0.060) 
Dividends 0.146** 0.142** 0.157** 0.111* 0.158** 0.146** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.060) (0.014) (0.019) 
Cash 0.074** 0.078** 0.081** 0.082** 0.076** 0.099*** 
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.003) 
_cons 93.181*** 98.118*** 94.834*** 97.450*** 99.567*** 99.870*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
             
Number of obs 1,090 1,156 1,048 1,065 1,098 1,005 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 946.12 1030.54 976.46 980.46 928.56 970.73 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Dependent variable - %FR              
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.509  -1.077*** -0.03  -0.078*** 
 (0.113)  (0.001) (0.196)  (0.000)  
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.694***  -3.864*** -3.24***  -3.683*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.607*  1.151*** 0.035  0.077*** 
 (0.063)  (0.000) (0.137)  (0.000) 
Single-scheme 3.528*** 4.913*** 3.215*** 4.481*** 5.303*** 4.120*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -3.363**  -2.509* -0.564***  -0.517** 
 (0.012)  (0.063) (0.001)  (0.014) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.584*  2.641* 0.044  0.900 
 (0.079)  (0.085) (0.979)  (0.616) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 3.240**  2.408* 0.559***  0.517** 
 (0.016)  (0.076) (0.002)  (0.014) 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) -0.084  -0.026 0.294  0.413 
 (0.789)  (0.937) (0.305)  (0.187) 
Accounting-background -0.307  -0.551 0.093  -0.277 
 (0.656)  (0.460) (0.882)  (0.689) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.493 -0.243  0.062** 0.018 
  (0.149) (0.482)  (0.011) (0.370) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.690 0.355  0.978 1.618** 
  (0.340) (0.639)  (0.219) (0.038) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.406 0.305  -0.056** -0.014 
  (0.243) (0.389)  (0.022) (0.492) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  -0.442 0.363  -0.062* -0.014 
  (0.278) (0.370)  (0.069) (0.646) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.692 1.316  0.761 1.064 
  (0.638) (0.404)  (0.625) (0.504) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.088 -0.750*  0.036 -0.009 
  (0.837) (0.079)  (0.311) (0.770) 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure)  -0.516* -0.371  -0.55* -0.595* 
  (0.089) (0.237)  (0.076) (0.063) 
%Equity -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.104*** -0.113*** -0.105*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Closure-to-FA -0.365** -0.291** -0.335** -0.511*** -0.357*** -0.457*** 
 (0.029) (0.050) (0.033) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) 
Maturity 0.495*** 0.559*** 0.459*** 0.655*** 0.553*** 0.594*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ln (Company-size) 0.025 -0.199 0.049 -0.578** -0.301 -0.514* 
 (0.933) (0.524) (0.868) (0.040) (0.360) (0.079) 
Leverage -0.043** -0.044** -0.042** -0.040** -0.047** -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.143) 
ROA -0.026 -0.060* -0.046 -0.040 -0.058* -0.051 
 (0.405) (0.055) (0.149) (0.182) (0.075) (0.106) 
Dividends 0.140** 0.173*** 0.181*** 0.110* 0.184*** 0.158** 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.007) (0.060) (0.005) (0.012) 
Cash 0.075** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.079** 0.084** 0.098*** 
 (0.025) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.003) 
_cons 93.659*** 97.669*** 94.638*** 98.67*** 98.427*** 98.081*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
             
Number of obs 1,090 1,156 1,048 1,065 1,098 1,005 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 940.16 1034.27 959.44 1009.9 911.38 945.12 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Board-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 





Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension        
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -1.065***  -1.349*** -0.054**  -0.089*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.000) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.603***  -4.269*** -3.202***  -3.787*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.141***  1.453*** 0.057**  0.091*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.029)  (0.000) 
Single-scheme 4.256*** 4.920*** 3.831*** 4.379*** 5.013*** 3.919*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure) 0.175  0.268 0.357  0.254 
 (0.565)  (0.394) (0.209)  (0.404) 
Accounting-background -0.274  -0.151 0.181  0.058 
 (0.687)  (0.838) (0.772)  (0.933) 
CFO-DB-pension 0.007 0.085  0.025 0.010 
  (0.970) (0.670)  (0.151) (0.466) 
CFO-aboveCAP 0.329 0.644  0.926 2.064*** 
  (0.546) (0.319)  (0.194) (0.003) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member -0.073 -0.177  -0.032* -0.019 
  (0.709) (0.391)  (0.068) (0.172) 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure) -0.317 -0.103  -0.135 -0.368 
  (0.235) (0.706)  (0.628) (0.197) 
%Equity -0.104*** -0.113*** -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.111*** -0.118*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.493*** -0.311** -0.490*** -0.540*** -0.377** -0.526*** 
 (0.003) (0.041) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000)  
Maturity 0.579*** 0.502*** 0.549*** 0.680*** 0.620*** 0.667*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.079 -0.366 0.048 -0.479* -0.354 -0.612** 
 (0.791) (0.234) (0.871) (0.097) (0.282) (0.038) 
Leverage -0.042** -0.038** -0.048*** -0.042** -0.044** -0.034* 
 (0.018) (0.031) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020) (0.059) 
ROA -0.025 -0.064** -0.046 -0.038 -0.050 -0.058* 
 (0.422) (0.037) (0.146) (0.211) (0.125) (0.063) 
Dividends 0.139** 0.130** 0.165*** 0.114* 0.160** 0.154** 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.009) (0.052) (0.013) (0.012) 
Cash 0.073** 0.075** 0.080** 0.084** 0.070** 0.100*** 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.034) (0.003) 
_cons 91.857*** 98.654*** 92.746*** 97.591*** 98.750*** 100.150*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,085 1,136 1,048 1,065 1,098 1,005 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 944.51 1029.66 984.82 996.36 922.77 973.36 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Dependent variable - %FR              
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.540  -1.069*** -0.032  -0.079*** 
 (0.105) 
 (0.001) (0.172)  (0.000) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.935***  -4.180*** -3.165***  -3.572*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.633*  1.143*** 0.036  0.078*** 
 (0.061) 
 (0.001) (0.129)  (0.000) 
Single-scheme 3.725*** 5.090*** 3.363*** 4.589*** 5.426*** 4.060*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -3.337**  -2.557* -0.575***  -0.528** 
 (0.014) 
 (0.062) (0.001)  (0.012) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.206  2.291 -0.136  0.708 
 (0.135) 
 (0.133) (0.934)  (0.694) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 3.242**  2.478* 0.572***  0.530** 
 (0.017) 
 (0.071) (0.001)  (0.012) 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) 0.217  0.274 0.362  0.394 
 (0.489) 
 (0.402) (0.206)  (0.203) 
Accounting-background -0.323  -0.437 0.068  -0.275 
 (0.644) 
 (0.564) (0.914)  (0.695) 
CFO-DB-pension  -0.352 -0.295  0.009 0.016 
 
 (0.287) (0.389)  (0.647) (0.426) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.144 -0.098  0.276 1.225 
 
 (0.811) (0.892)  (0.675) (0.103) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.436 0.347  -0.004 -0.012 
 
 (0.195) (0.323)  (0.826) (0.558) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  0.456 0.396  -0.004 -0.014 
 
 (0.245) (0.327)  (0.893) (0.666) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.781 1.301  0.611 1.038 
 
 (0.598) (0.412)  (0.697) (0.515) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.791* -0.774*  -0.02 -0.011 
 
 (0.055) (0.069)  (0.529) (0.736) 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure)  -0.264 -0.058  -0.301 -0.377 
 
 (0.323) (0.839)  (0.269) (0.205) 
%Equity -0.105*** -0.117*** -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.123*** -0.107*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.417** -0.306** -0.388 -0.549*** -0.370** -0.485*** 
 (0.014) (0.041) (0.015) (0.001) (0.017) (0.002) 
Maturity 0.509*** 0.462*** 0.479*** 0.673*** 0.475*** 0.597*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.092 -0.323 0.113 -0.595** -0.566* -0.522* 
 (0.758) (0.283) (0.701) (0.039) (0.073) (0.080) 
Leverage -0.044** -0.035** -0.046*** -0.039** -0.038** -0.031* 
 (0.015) (0.048) (0.010) (0.027) (0.049) (0.091) 
ROA -0.023 -0.065** -0.045 -0.035 -0.065** -0.049 
 (0.459) (0.035) (0.160) (0.242) (0.041) (0.122) 
Dividends 0.136** 0.156** 0.189*** 0.114* 0.162** 0.169*** 
 (0.032) (0.014) (0.005) (0.052) (0.013) (0.007) 
Cash 0.073** 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.081** 0.078** 0.101*** 
 (0.030) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.019) (0.002) 
_cons 92.177*** 98.281*** 92.557*** 98.706*** 100.738*** 97.762*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,085 1,136 1,048 1,065 1,078 1,005 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 128 127 
Wald chi2 937.28 1001.93 967.29 1024.01 877.67 942.4 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Age. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 





Dependent variable - %FR       
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.935***  -0.835** -0.045*  -0.036 
 (0.005)  (0.012) (0.071)  (0.107) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.348***  -3.535*** -2.708***  -2.788*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.007***  0.918*** 0.049*  0.035 
 (0.003)  (0.006) (0.054)  (0.113) 
Single-scheme 4.104*** 4.258*** 3.943*** 4.282*** 4.672*** 3.705*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Age) 2.458  3.990* 2.068  1.263 
 (0.230)  (0.063) (0.286)  (0.528) 
Accounting-background 0.134  -0.335 0.440  -0.225 
 (0.843)  (0.645) (0.488)  (0.743) 
CFO-DB-pension 0.139 0.126  0.027 0.011 
  (0.443) (0.510)  (0.116) (0.493) 
CFO-aboveCAP 1.238** 1.039*  1.489** 1.962*** 
  (0.033) (0.077)  (0.020) (0.002) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member -0.247 -0.232  -0.034** -0.019 
  (0.187) (0.237)  (0.048) (0.240) 
ln (CFO-Age)  -9.693*** -7.206***  -9.404*** -8.915*** 
  (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) 
%Equity -0.102*** -0.118*** -0.109*** -0.105*** -0.122*** -0.124*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.436*** -0.276** -0.404*** -0.484*** -0.319** -0.509*** 
 (0.007) (0.048) (0.004) (0.002) (0.029) (0.000)  
Maturity 0.592 0.654 0.688 0.660 0.687 0.740 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.106 -0.152 0.176 -0.482* -0.279 -0.575** 
 (0.721) (0.622) (0.544) (0.094) (0.378) (0.048) 
Leverage -0.045** -0.046*** -0.057*** -0.041** -0.049*** -0.032* 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) (0.021) (0.009) (0.082) 
ROA -0.031 -0.065** -0.053* -0.040 -0.062* -0.057* 
 (0.320) (0.033) (0.089) (0.188) (0.053) (0.076) 
Dividends 0.145** 0.159*** 0.182*** 0.099* 0.166*** 0.153** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.004) (0.094) (0.009) (0.018) 
Cash 0.073** 0.066** 0.074** 0.087*** 0.062* 0.094*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.020) (0.007) (0.058) (0.004) 
_cons 82.166*** 134.557*** 104.527*** 90.174*** 134.702*** 91.174*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,084 1,120 1,041 1,059 1,097 998 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 963.74 1054.04 982.45 1031.02 975.98 1018.28 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Dependent variable - %FR              
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.454  -0.382 -0.027  -0.031 
 (0.161) 
 (0.224) (0.234)  (0.130) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.556***  -3.406*** -2.66***  -2.611*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.544*  0.45 0.031  0.028 
 (0.099) 
 (0.159) (0.177)  (0.165) 
Single-scheme 3.553*** 4.422*** 3.397*** 4.568*** 4.761*** 3.771*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -3.434**  -3.297** -0.578***  -0.533** 
 (0.012) 
 (0.017) (0.001)  (0.013) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.116  1.426 -0.08  0.495 
 (0.146) 
 (0.335) (0.961)  (0.776) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 3.326**  3.217** 0.573***  0.533** 
 (0.016) 
 (0.020) (0.002)  (0.013) 
ln (CEO-Age) 1.884  3.049 1.963  0.58 
 (0.355) 
 (0.154) (0.305)  (0.769) 
Accounting-background 0.021  -0.532 0.292  -0.436 
 (0.976) 
 (0.472) (0.645)  (0.525) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.42 -0.152  0.062** 0.010 
 
 (0.203) (0.633)  (0.012) (0.572) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.907 0.324  1.030 1.247* 
 
 (0.157) (0.625)  (0.139) (0.066) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.369 0.169  -0.056** -0.007 
 
 (0.273) (0.605)  (0.024) (0.720) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  -0.361 0.271  -0.061* -0.009 
 
 (0.365) (0.477)  (0.078) (0.764) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.210 1.366  0.400 1.311 
 
 (0.887) (0.387)  (0.800) (0.411) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  0.046 -0.611  0.035 -0.015 
 
 (0.912) (0.131)  (0.329) (0.626) 
ln (CFO-Age)  -9.613*** -6.578***  -9.772*** -9.057*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.000) 
%Equity -0.103*** -0.12*** -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.121*** -0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.372** -0.251* -0.327** -0.503*** -0.288** -0.496*** 
 (0.024) (0.071) (0.025) (0.001) (0.050) (0.001) 
Maturity 0.522*** 0.597*** 0.574*** 0.658*** 0.602*** 0.699*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.075 -0.057 0.178 -0.614** -0.193 -0.606** 
 (0.801) (0.854) (0.543) (0.032) (0.545) (0.039) 
Leverage -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.054*** -0.039** -0.052*** -0.034* 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.029) (0.006) (0.067) 
ROA -0.028 -0.067** -0.049 -0.036 -0.069** -0.058* 
 (0.376) (0.030) (0.124) (0.236) (0.032) (0.073) 
Dividends 0.141** 0.191*** 0.208*** 0.103* 0.193*** 0.181*** 
 (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.078) (0.003) (0.006) 
Cash 0.071** 0.074** 0.080** 0.083*** 0.071** 0.096*** 
 (0.032) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.032) (0.003) 
_cons 85.337*** 132.864*** 106.05*** 91.921*** 134.56*** 132.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,084 1,155 1,041 1,059 1,097 998 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 946.15 1081.74 963.26 1051.38 950.83 1012.87 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4.10 (2004-2015 period) 
FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Role-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 





Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -1.021***  -1.172*** -0.054**  -0.082*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.036)  (0.001) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.459***  -3.480*** -3.245***  -3.687*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.060***  1.213*** 0.054**  0.079*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.038)  (0.001) 
Single-scheme 4.688*** 4.458*** 4.012*** 4.676*** 4.998*** 4.086*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) 0.540**  0.602** 0.635***  0.710*** 
 (0.018)  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.005) 
Accounting-background -0.032  -0.302 0.207  -0.254 
 (0.962)  (0.669) (0.751)  (0.713) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.106 0.015  0.010 0.007 
  (0.528) (0.938)  (0.553) (0.663) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.802 -0.021  -0.838 0.834 
  (0.131) (0.971)  (0.144) (0.184) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.160 -0.089  -0.014 -0.012 
  (0.355) (0.651)  (0.414) (0.503) 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure)  0.056 -0.163  0.098 -0.170 
  (0.824) (0.523)  (0.701) (0.524) 
%Equity -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.117*** -0.126*** -0.124*** -0.128*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.425*** -0.266 -0.418*** -0.419** -0.334** -0.423*** 
 (0.010) (0.109) (0.010) (0.011) (0.046) (0.010) 
Maturity 0.651*** 0.649*** 0.642*** 0.760*** 0.719*** 0.849*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.290 0.066 0.213 -0.224 -0.073 -0.336 
 (0.338) (0.835) (0.488) (0.457) (0.821) (0.269) 
Leverage -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.046** -0.055*** -0.039** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.037) 
ROA -0.025 -0.055* -0.041 -0.036 -0.060* -0.046 
 (0.401) (0.062) (0.178) (0.252) (0.053) (0.153) 
Dividends 0.177*** 0.195*** 0.167*** 0.160*** 0.202*** 0.181*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001) (0.005) 
Cash 0.048 0.063** 0.048 0.057* 0.060* 0.057* 
 (0.128) (0.046) (0.133) (0.073) (0.067) (0.070) 
_cons 84.441*** 69.265*** 71.086*** 86.942*** 71.807*** 75.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,224 1,298 1,177 1,199 1,237 1,134 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1314.9 1301.92 1284.71 1280.28 1259.14 1368.61 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.625*  -0.957*** -0.034  -0.071*** 
 (0.067)  (0.006) (0.147)  (0.003) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.420***  -3.281*** -3.026***  -3.421*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.637*  0.958*** 0.034  0.066*** 
 (0.065)  (0.006) (0.154)  (0.006) 
Single-scheme 4.277*** 5.433*** 4.195*** 5.093*** 5.9158*** 4.927*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -2.273*  -1.157 -0.457***  -0.426** 
 (0.069)  (0.276) (0.009)  (0.036) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme -0.020  0.272 -1.517  -0.772 
 (0.985)  (0.831) (0.206)  (0.600) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.298*  1.180 0.458***  0.433** 
 (0.067)  (0.267) (0.009)  (0.034) 
ln (CEO-Role-tenure) 0.551**  0.591** 0.663***  0.802*** 
 (0.020)  (0.018) (0.005)  (0.002) 
Accounting-background 0.0501  -0.264 0.141  -0.567 
 (0.941)  (0.710) (0.829)  (0.408) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.183 -0.453  0.025 0.005 
  (0.588) (0.196)  (0.324) (0.817) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.470 -0.224  -0.461 0.841 
  (0.423) (0.729)  (0.461) (0.223) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.195 0.445  -0.025 -0.002 
  (0.569) (0.210)  (0.331) (0.915) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  -0.102 0.595  -0.022 0.004 
  (0.795) (0.142)  (0.508) (0.901) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -1.135 -0.031  -1.263 -0.156 
  (0.307) (0.980)  (0.261) (0.907) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.053 -0.828**  0.011 -0.021 
  (0.898) (0.049)  (0.744) (0.542) 
ln (CFO-Role-tenure)  0.097 -0.086  0.118 -0.187 
  (0.706) (0.743)  (0.654) (0.494) 
%Equity -0.123*** -0.125*** -0.117*** -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.383** -0.313* -0.422*** -0.444*** -0.374** -0.439*** 
 (0.021) (0.056) (0.009) (0.007) (0.026) (0.008) 
Maturity 0.6105*** 0.6278*** 0.6086*** 0.7747*** 0.6885*** 0.832*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.210 0.117 0.264 -0.383 -0.027 -0.279 
 (0.480) (0.715) (0.383) (0.197) (0.935) (0.361) 
Leverage -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.044** -0.053*** -0.035* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.017) (0.005) (0.061) 
ROA -0.029 -0.052* -0.044 -0.035 -0.058* -0.044 
 (0.335) (0.082) (0.152) (0.262) (0.065) (0.173) 
Dividends 0.175*** 0.219*** 0.191*** 0.161*** 0.222*** 0.200*** 
 (0.003) 0.000  (0.002) (0.010) 0.000  (0.002) 
Cash 0.044 0.069** 0.050 0.053* 0.063* 0.057* 
 (0.162) (0.026) (0.119) (0.095) (0.051) (0.067) 
_cons 85.720*** 68.660*** 69.996*** 89.078*** 71.125*** 73.371*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,224 1,298 1,177 1,199 1,237 1,134 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1264.32 1330.16 1257.71 1299.48 1298.33 1416.47 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 4.11 (2004-2015 period) 
FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Company-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 




Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -1.022***  -1.196*** -0.048*  -0.076*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.058)  (0.001) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.184***  -3.206*** -3.207***  -3.641*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.047***  1.221*** 0.047*  0.074*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.061)  (0.002) 
Single-scheme 4.525*** 4.607*** 3.781*** 4.634*** 5.115*** 4.172*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) -0.014  0.012 0.347  0.384 
 (0.960)  (0.968) (0.188)  (0.170) 
Accounting-background -0.076  -0.319 0.176  -0.273 
 (0.909)  (0.650) (0.789)  (0.692) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.104 0.033  0.010 0.005 
  (0.533) (0.861)  (0.552) (0.760) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.806 0.033  -0.847 0.779 
  (0.138) (0.955)  (0.148) (0.225) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.158 -0.100  -0.014 -0.010 
  (0.359) (0.608)  (0.413) (0.583) 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure)  0.041 -0.163  0.071 -0.131 
  (0.872) (0.534)  (0.783) (0.631) 
%Equity -0.126*** -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.130*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.376** -0.269 -0.355** -0.374** -0.335** -0.399** 
 (0.023) (0.103) (0.027) (0.025) (0.045) (0.016) 
Maturity 0.611*** 0.655*** 0.597*** 0.741*** 0.723*** 0.823*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.170 0.065 0.111 -0.275 -0.069 -0.379 
 (0.569) (0.837) (0.715) (0.357) (0.831) (0.207) 
Leverage -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.045** -0.054*** -0.036* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.057) 
ROA -0.032 -0.056* -0.049 -0.042 -0.061** -0.051 
 (0.294) (0.059) (0.114) (0.184) (0.048) (0.110) 
Dividends 0.174*** 0.191*** 0.169*** 0.150** 0.199*** 0.168*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.017) (0.001) (0.009) 
Cash 0.050 0.065** 0.048 0.055* 0.062* 0.058* 
 (0.112) (0.038) (0.136) (0.089) (0.055) (0.066) 
_cons 86.444*** 69.403*** 72.814*** 87.375*** 71.909*** 75.817*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,224 1,298 1,177 1,199 1,237 1,134 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1281.73 1303.49 1255.82 1263.11 1260.64 1370.32 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.568*  -0.936*** -0.028  -0.063*** 
 (0.086) 
 (0.006) (0.220)  (0.007) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.162***  -2.910*** -2.922***  -3.280*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.077*  0.005*** 0.028  0.059** 
 (0.086) 
 (0.006) (0.219)  (0.013) 
Single-scheme 4.192*** 5.564*** 3.978*** 5.075*** 6.021*** 4.950*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -2.557**  -1.413 -0.443**  -0.402** 
 (0.044) 
 (0.205) (0.011)  (0.048) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 0.220  0.380 -1.457  -0.772 
 (0.842) 
 (0.769) (0.225)  (0.604) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.540**  1.390 0.442**  0.406** 
 (0.047) 
 (0.215) (0.011)  (0.047) 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure) -0.034  -0.099 0.299  0.355 
 (0.903) 
 (0.738) (0.257)  (0.213) 
Accounting-background 0.047  -0.191 0.126  -0.514 
 (0.945) 
 (0.787) (0.848)  (0.453) 
CFO-DB-pension  0.174 -0.488  0.025 -0.002 
 
 (0.609) (0.165)  (0.330) (0.917) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.477 -0.246  -0.470 0.719 
 
 (0.427) (0.708)  (0.460) (0.308) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.588 0.481  -0.025 0.004 
 
 (0.609) (0.177)  (0.336) (0.862) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  -0.092 0.647  -0.022 0.014 
 
 (0.815) (0.111)  (0.509) (0.683) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -1.187 0.164  -1.315 -0.133 
 
 (0.285) (0.897)  (0.243) (0.921) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.061 -0.880**  0.011 -0.029 
 
 (0.883) (0.038)  (0.746) (0.399) 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure)  0.082 -0.093  0.092 -0.071 
 
 (0.755) (0.736)  (0.728) (0.803) 
%Equity -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.129*** -0.130*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.331** -0.313* -0.376** -0.404** -0.372** -0.414** 
 (0.045) (0.055) (0.017) (0.015) (0.026) (0.012) 
Maturity 0.572*** 0.633*** 0.572*** 0.753*** 0.692*** 0.801*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.098 0.115 0.118 -0.451 -0.013 -0.353 
 (0.740) (0.716) (0.693) (0.127) (0.969) (0.241) 
Leverage -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.042** -0.052*** -0.030 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.023) (0.006) (0.113) 
ROA -0.033 -0.052* -0.051* -0.040 -0.059* -0.047 
 (0.274) (0.081) (0.096) (0.204) (0.061) (0.143) 
Dividends 0.171*** 0.216*** 0.182*** 0.150** 0.222*** 0.184*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.017) (0.000) (0.005) 
Cash 0.046 0.071** 0.053 0.050 0.065** 0.059* 
 (0.147) (0.022) (0.101) (0.118) (0.044) (0.061) 
_cons 87.746*** 68.767*** 72.261*** 89.734*** 71.100*** 74.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,224 1,298 1,177 1,199 1,237 1,134 
Number of companies 128 130 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1246.5 1331.96 1246.76 1281.27 1298.35 1416.01 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4.12 (2004-2015 period) 
FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Board-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 




Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -1.035***  -1.207*** -0.050*  -0.078*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.052)  (0.001) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.266***  -3.375*** -3.179***  -3.597*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 1.064***  1.236*** 0.049*  0.076*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.053)  (0.002) 
Single-scheme 4.731*** 4.705*** 4.043*** 4.778*** 5.029*** 4.237*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure) 0.150  0.216 0.377  0.375 
 (0.583)  (0.447) (0.154)  (0.181) 
Accounting-background -0.098  -0.322 0.102  -0.327 
 (0.884)  (0.648) (0.877)  (0.639) 
CFO-DB-pension  -0.025 0.018  0.010 0.005 
  (0.891) (0.927)  (0.561) (0.745) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.860* -0.122  -0.905 0.737 
  (0.087) (0.830)  (0.115) (0.240) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.006 -0.088  -0.013 -0.010 
  (0.975) (0.658)  (0.419) (0.570) 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure)  -0.090 -0.023  0.181 -0.058 
  (0.725) (0.928)  (0.473) (0.827) 
%Equity -0.124*** -0.133*** -0.121*** -0.130*** -0.124*** -0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.413** -0.326** -0.414*** -0.415** -0.333** -0.428*** 
 (0.013) (0.046) (0.010) (0.012) (0.047) (0.009) 
Maturity 0.618*** 0.622*** 0.620*** 0.743*** 0.716*** 0.827*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.210 -0.131 0.141 -0.274 -0.064 -0.382 
 (0.487) (0.685) (0.646) (0.362) (0.841) (0.206) 
Leverage -0.049*** -0.044** -0.052*** -0.045** -0.054*** -0.036** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.057) 
ROA -0.027 -0.062** -0.045 -0.037 -0.060* -0.047 
 (0.378) (0.043) (0.143) (0.233) (0.055) (0.143) 
Dividends 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.170*** 0.153** 0.202*** 0.172*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) (0.008) 
Cash 0.045 0.066** 0.047 0.056* 0.060* 0.059* 
 (0.152) (0.036) (0.144) (0.078) (0.065) (0.060) 
_cons 83.767*** 72.190*** 72.225*** 87.222*** 71.678*** 75.939*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,219 1,268 1,177 1,199 1,237 1,134 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1291.73 1221.54 1270.24 1272.79 1261.03 1364.91 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.588*  -0.955*** -0.029  -0.066*** 
 (0.083) 
 (0.006) (0.200)  (0.006) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.230***  -3.112*** -2.917***  -3.282*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.608*  0.963*** 0.202  0.010*** 
 (0.076) 
 (0.006) (0.200)  (0.006) 
Single-scheme 4.385*** 5.585*** 4.237*** 5.200*** 5.953*** 5.026*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -2.450*  -1.355 -0.450***  -0.410** 
 (0.056) 
 (0.224) (0.010)  (0.045) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme -0.076  0.205 -1.550  -0.875 
 (0.944) 
 (0.874) (0.197)  (0.557) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.449*  1.354 0.450**  0.415** 
 (0.057) 
 (0.226) (0.011)  (0.043) 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure) 0.160  0.157 0.366  0.425 
 (0.575) 
 (0.595) (0.170)  (0.138) 
Accounting-background 0.023  -0.231 0.045  -0.612 
 (0.973) 
 (0.745) (0.945)  (0.375) 
CFO-DB-pension  -0.390 -0.504  0.024 0.001 
 
 (0.257) (0.147)  (0.349) (0.978) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.656 -0.337  -0.525 0.734 
 
 (0.237) (0.600)  (0.402) (0.289) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.422 0.494  0.351 0.001 
 
 (0.227) (0.162)  (0.349) (0.954) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  0.472 0.662  -0.021 0.010 
 
 (0.231) (0.102)  (0.537) (0.773) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.875 0.057  -1.356 -0.145 
 
 (0.433) (0.964)  (0.230) (0.914) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.652 -0.893**  0.011 -0.026 
 
 (0.113) (0.034)  (0.762) (0.458) 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure)  -0.094 0.035  0.194 -0.062 
 
 (0.715) (0.892)  (0.451) (0.821) 
%Equity -0.125*** -0.137*** -0.122*** -0.130*** -0.128*** -0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.364** -0.350** -0.413*** -0.439*** -0.374** -0.442*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.010) (0.008) (0.026) (0.007) 
Maturity 0.580*** 0.610*** 0.589*** 0.757*** 0.685*** 0.806*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.141 -0.087 0.174 -0.441 -0.020 -0.343 
 (0.636) (0.780) (0.563) (0.139) (0.953) (0.260) 
Leverage -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.052*** -0.042** -0.051*** -0.031* 
 (0.004) (0.022) (0.003) (0.022) (0.007) (0.100) 
ROA -0.030 -0.059* -0.048 -0.036 -0.057* -0.043 
 (0.326) (0.054) (0.122) (0.244) (0.070) (0.181) 
Dividends 0.165*** 0.185*** 0.188*** 0.153** 0.220*** 0.190*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.000)  (0.004) 
Cash 0.042 0.071** 0.051 0.052 0.064** 0.059* 
 (0.192) (0.023) (0.118) (0.103) (0.048) (0.058) 
_cons 85.542*** 71.212*** 71.391*** 89.444*** 71.009*** 74.298*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,219 1,268 1,177 1,199 1,237 1,134 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1247.92 1255.54 1251.24 1292.08 1298.14 1404.82 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Table 4.13 (2004-2015 period) 
FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions on whether CEO DB pension holdings are related to the 
dependent variable, Funding Ratio, which is defined as the ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities. 
Panel A reports results from regressions including a two-way interaction term and Panel B reports results from 
regressions including a three-way interaction term. Models 1 to 3 include a two-way interaction Annual-
pension*aboveCAP-member and Models 4 to 6 include a two-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member. 
Models 7 to 9 include a three-way interaction Annual-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme and Models 
10 to 12 include a three-way interaction Total-pension*aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme. Regressions reported 
in this table control for Age. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 





Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.892***  -0.866*** -0.046*  -0.051** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) (0.068)  (0.031) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -3.177***  -2.882*** -2.957***  -2.953*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.918***  0.881*** 0.045*  0.048** 
 (0.007)  (0.007) (0.072)  (0.044) 
Single-scheme 4.348*** 4.689*** 3.774*** 4.488*** 4.727*** 3.720*** 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
ln (CEO-Age) 3.402*  4.590** 3.648**  3.481* 
 (0.071)  (0.022) (0.049)  (0.075) 
Accounting-background 0.199  0.013 0.360  -0.168 
 (0.766)  (0.985) (0.584)  (0.806) 
CFO-DB-pension  -0.016 0.038  0.009 0.004 
  (0.928) (0.830)  (0.566) (0.825) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.821* -0.043  -0.406 0.722 
  (0.099) (0.936)  (0.455) (0.219) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.015 -0.099  -0.012 -0.006 
  (0.935) (0.591)  (0.471) (0.736) 
ln (CFO-Age)  3.487* -4.176**  -5.929*** -6.129*** 
  (0.066) (0.049)  (0.005) (0.004) 
%Equity -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.113*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.370** -0.299* -0.381*** -0.350** -0.338** -0.440*** 
 (0.020) (0.072) (0.008) (0.031) (0.033) (0.004) 
Maturity 0.634*** 0.670*** 0.669*** 0.742*** 0.736*** 0.867*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.198 -0.039 0.191 -0.272 -0.051 -0.397 
 (0.509) (0.904) (0.523) (0.368) (0.873) (0.185) 
Leverage -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.044** -0.061*** -0.038** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.042) 
ROA -0.035 -0.045 -0.046 -0.032 -0.070** -0.048 
 (0.240) (0.135) (0.139) (0.300) (0.024) (0.140) 
Dividends 0.154*** 0.167*** 0.152** 0.145** 0.200*** 0.160** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.021) (0.001) (0.015) 
Cash 0.050 0.051* 0.056* 0.059* 0.062* 0.064** 
 (0.114) (0.098) (0.072) (0.066) (0.055) (0.039) 
_cons 72.847*** 56.599*** 70.097*** 75.041*** 95.531*** 87.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,218 1,252 1,170 1,193 1,236 1,127 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1293.89 1259.57 1386.46 1294.31 1300.87 1374.94 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 









Dependent variable - %FR        
Explanatory pension variable - Annual- or Total- pension            
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Annual-pension Total-pension 
         
CEO-DB-pension -0.518  -0.561* -0.028  -0.041* 
 (0.117) 
 (0.099) (0.220)  (0.067) 
CEO-aboveCAP -3.174***  -2.714*** -2.707***  -2.624*** 
 (0.000) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.541  0.557 0.028  0.036 
 (0.106) 
 (0.105) (0.223)  (0.114) 
Single-scheme 3.980*** 5.608*** 3.907*** 4.958*** 5.576*** 4.412*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO-DB-pension*Single-scheme -2.479*  -1.587 -0.439**  -0.396* 
 (0.053) 
 (0.140) (0.013)  (0.054) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 0.253  0.066 -1.407  -1.029 
 (0.818) 
 (0.959) (0.242)  (0.485) 
CEO-DB-pension*CEO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme 2.456*  1.577 0.437**  0.401* 
 (0.056) 
 (0.144) (0.013)  (0.051) 
ln (CEO-Age) 3.338*  4.801** 3.459*  3.572* 
 (0.077) 
 (0.017) (0.062)  (0.067) 
Accounting-background 0.305  0.103 0.306  -0.394 
 (0.652) 
 (0.884) (0.640)  (0.562) 
CFO-DB-pension  -0.328 -0.310  0.037 0.003 
 
 (0.335) (0.363)  (0.143) (0.897) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member  -0.584 -0.193  -0.001 0.642 
 
 (0.285) (0.747)  (0.998) (0.318) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member  0.370 0.318  -0.035 0.003 
 
 (0.283) (0.357)  (0.172) (0.891) 
CFO-DB-pension*Single-scheme  0.401 0.441  -0.040 0.004 
 
 (0.304) (0.256)  (0.229) (0.906) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.695 0.423  -1.053 0.371 
 
 (0.533) (0.735)  (0.349) (0.784) 
CFO-DB-pension*CFO-aboveCAP-member*Single-scheme  -0.613 -0.679*  0.028 -0.021 
 
 (0.131) (0.094)  (0.416) (0.503) 
ln (CFO-Age)  3.614** -3.889*  -5.745*** -6.160*** 
 
 (0.050) (0.069)  (0.007) (0.004) 
%Equity -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.117*** -0.127*** -0.131*** -0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.321** -0.332** -0.346** -0.381** -0.354** -0.448*** 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.004) 
Maturity 0.594*** 0.671*** 0.620*** 0.757*** 0.706*** 0.852*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) 0.131 -0.046 0.194 -0.432 -0.005 -0.385 
 (0.657) (0.881) (0.506) (0.148) (0.989) (0.201) 
Leverage -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.042** -0.060*** -0.035* 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.065) 
ROA -0.035 -0.049* -0.044 -0.031 -0.067** -0.047 
 (0.237) (0.097) (0.153) (0.316) (0.033) (0.145) 
Dividends 0.155*** 0.186*** 0.181*** 0.144** 0.223*** 0.178*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.021) (0.000) (0.007) 
Cash 0.046 0.053* 0.055* 0.055* 0.064** 0.067** 
 (0.149) (0.079) (0.075) (0.086) (0.043) (0.030) 
_cons 74.239*** 55.607*** 67.740*** 77.882*** 94.16*** 85.666*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Number of obs 1,218 1,252 1,170 1,193 1,236 1,127 
Number of companies 128 128 126 128 130 127 
Wald chi2 1260.61 1363.82 1372.41 1311.26 1341.71 1398.72 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Table 4.14 (2004-2015 period) 
 
FGLS results for funding of DB schemes (%FR) (H3) 
 
This tables reports results from FGLS regressions in which dependent variable is Funding Ratio defined as the 
ratio of pension assets to the value of pension liabilities for the sub-sample of CEOs older/younger than 58 years. 
Models 1 to 2 in Panel A report results from regressions examining Annual-pension and Models 3 to 4 in Panel 
B report results from regressions examining Total-pension. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. 
 
Dependent variable - %FR      
Explanatory pension variable - Annual-pension      
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No Yes No 
 Model 1 Model 2 
     
CEO-Annual-pension -9.271*** -0.759** -8.997*** -0.747** 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.023) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -5.183*** -4.218*** -1.439 -4.248*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) 
CEO-Annual-pension *CEO-aboveCAP-member 9.486*** 0.851** 8.407*** 0.822** 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.013) 
ln (CEO-Age) -2.546 2.862 27.281*** 3.872 
 (0.777) (0.271) (0.001) (0.149) 
Accounting-background -1.864 0.432 -0.023 0.166 
 (0.240) (0.501) (0.989) (0.809) 
CFO-Annual-pension   -0.919* 0.236 
   (0.054) (0.280) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member   -1.116 0.451 
   (0.302) (0.486) 
CFO-Annual-pension *CFO-aboveCAP-member   1.037** -0.131 
   (0.045) (0.580) 
ln (CFO-Age)   -17.978*** -3.052 
   (0.000) (0.208) 
Single-scheme 0.977 4.614*** 1.894 4.210*** 
 (0.355) (0.000) (0.104) (0.000) 
%Equity -0.192*** -0.124*** -0.177*** -0.121*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.323* -0.410** -0.217 -0.374** 
 (0.087) (0.026) (0.243) (0.039) 
Maturity 0.142 0.462*** 0.402 0.524*** 
 (0.562) (0.003) (0.121) (0.002) 
ln (Company-size) -1.094*** 0.413 -0.859** 0.698** 
 (0.010) (0.119) (0.045) (0.013) 
Leverage -0.230*** -0.048*** -0.315*** -0.052*** 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.008) 
ROA -0.401*** -0.033 -0.559*** -0.023 
 (0.000) (0.299) (0.000) (0.487) 
Dividends 0.124 0.205*** -0.059 0.208*** 
 (0.132) (0.005) (0.494) (0.006) 
Cash 0.103* 0.024 0.091 0.025 
 (0.058) (0.500) (0.105) (0.490) 
_cons 128.129*** 59.383*** 78.973*** 63.770*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Number of obs 222 981 200 954 
Number of companies 61 120 54 118 
Wald chi2 3168.47 14830.04 6794.53 8615.52 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 















Dependent variable - %FR      
Explanatory pension variable - Annual-pension      
 CEO older than 58 years? 
 Yes No Yes No 
 Model 3 Model 4 
     
CEO-Total-pension -0.409*** -0.027 -0.390*** -0.024 
 (0.000) (0.287) (0.000) (0.348) 
CEO-aboveCAP-member -5.657*** -3.658*** -4.552*** -4.215*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
CEO-Total-pension *CEO-aboveCAP-member 0.444*** 0.030 0.388*** 0.026 
 (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.311) 
ln (CEO-Age) -12.475** 6.910** -2.330 7.100** 
 (0.045) (0.011) (0.775) (0.011) 
Accounting-background 0.011 0.072 0.532 -0.270 
 (0.994) (0.916) (0.728) (0.710) 
CFO-Total-pension   -0.189*** 0.012 
   (0.000) (0.428) 
CFO-aboveCAP-member   -1.043 1.591** 
   (0.435) (0.020) 
CFO-Total-pension *CFO-aboveCAP-member   0.205*** -0.011 
   (0.000) (0.483) 
ln (CFO-Age)   -26.106*** -5.460** 
   (0.000) (0.025) 
Single-scheme 3.417*** 4.665*** -3.145** 3.930*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) 
%Equity -0.185*** -0.117*** -0.137*** -0.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closure-to-FA -0.552*** -0.268 -0.057 -0.249 
 (0.004) (0.164) (0.740) (0.177) 
Maturity -0.258 0.758*** -0.167 0.921*** 
 (0.184) (0.000) (0.447) (0.000) 
ln (Company-size) -0.883* 0.298 -1.596*** 0.344 
 (0.072) (0.325) (0.002) (0.246) 
Leverage -0.285*** -0.054*** -0.337*** -0.043** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.030) 
ROA -0.410*** -0.014 -0.533*** -0.004 
 (0.000) (0.668) (0.000) (0.914) 
Dividends 0.175** 0.178** 0.251** 0.167** 
 (0.048) (0.015) (0.038) (0.028) 
Cash 0.085* 0.042 0.009 0.054 
 (0.081) (0.249) (0.872) (0.146) 
_cons 166.149*** 41.889*** 243.918*** 60.315*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
     
Number of obs 220 955 190 918 
Number of companies 57 120 51 119 
Wald chi2 30962.79 1144.67 34588.77 3248.87 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
















Table 5.6: Logit regressions of DRCs  
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension are related to the dependent variable DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise. 
Models 1 to 3 include a dummy variable aboveCAP-member that equals to 1 if CEO or CFO is a member of DB pension schemes with the pension above the compensation threshold. 
Models 4 to 6 include Annual-pension and Models 7 to 9 include Total-pension. Regressions reported in this table control for Company-tenure. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the company-level. 
Dependent variable:  
                  DRCs (dummy) 
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                      
CEO-aboveCAP-member 2.186**    2.089**                  
 (0.014)    (0.026)                
CEO-Annual-pension         0.022**    0.018*       
         (0.029)    (0.062)       
CEO-Total-pension                0.002***    0.001** 
                (0.010)    (0.035) 
ln (CEO-Company-tenure)  -0.081*    -0.053  -0.063*    -0.046  -0.063*    -0.056 
  (0.070)    (0.262)  (0.086)    (0.249)  (0.095)    (0.170) 
Accounting-background 1.717    1.814*   1.533    1.609   1.924**    1.842**  
 (0.107)    (0.088)   (0.164)    (0.131)   (0.020)    (0.039)  
CFO-aboveCAP   1.540  1.278                
   (0.207)  (0.468)                
CFO-Annual-pension           0.008  0.001       
           (0.449)  (0.893)       
CFO-Total-pension                  0.001  0 
                  (0.169)  (0.665) 
ln (CFO-Company-tenure)    -0.048  -0.044    -0.021  -0.005    -0.028  -0.007 
    (0.288)  (0.312)    (0.570)  (0.894)    (0.442)  (0.844) 
Single-scheme 1.453  1.372  1.618   1.322  1.289  1.418   1.474  1.252  1.568  
 (0.298)  (0.384)  (0.170)   (0.386)  (0.445)  (0.269)   (0.241)  (0.505)  (0.166)  
%Equity  -0.004**  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004** 
  (0.038)  (0.056)  (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.084)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.095)  (0.027) 
Closure-to-FA  0.049**  0.043**  0.050**  0.039*  0.041**  0.039*  0.045**  0.046**  0.048** 
  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.013)  (0.062)  (0.047)  (0.059)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.018) 
Maturity  0.016  0.013  0.014  0.017  0.014  0.017  0.007  0.011  0.01 
  (0.472)  (0.581)  (0.546)  (0.387)  (0.530)  (0.398)  (0.732)  (0.637)  (0.639) 
ln (Company-size)  -0.027  -0.019  -0.024  -0.038  -0.024  -0.034  -0.041  -0.029  -0.044 
  (0.407)  (0.580)  (0.478)  (0.212)  (0.439)  (0.266)  (0.188)  (0.353)  (0.173) 
Leverage  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0010  0.0000  0.0000 
  (0.932)  (0.930)  (0.928)  (0.878)  (0.932)  (0.874)  (0.787)  (0.906)  (0.957) 
ROA  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.007*  0.004  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.005 
  (0.207)  (0.218)  (0.279)  (0.063)  (0.248)  (0.120)  (0.116)  (0.397)  (0.210) 
Dividends  0.01  0.017*  0.016  0.01  0.020**  0.014  0.018*  0.020**  0.019* 
  (0.327)  (0.094)  (0.134)  (0.298)  (0.029)  (0.135)  (0.071)  (0.029)  (0.063) 
Cash  -0.006  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.169)  (0.370)  (0.403)  (0.223)  (0.278)  (0.494)  (0.611)  (0.227)  (0.609) 
FR  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.527)  (0.368)  (0.475)  (0.460)  (0.565)  (0.473)  (0.463)  (0.610)  (0.486) 
                                   
Number of obs  1,171  1,162  1,130  1,224  1,299  1,179  1,201  1,240  1,137 
Wald chi2  99.26  96.3  106.24  179.24  119.11  190.8  158.73  138.07  329.7 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.1533  0.142  0.1613  0.1555  0.1417  0.1586  0.1577  0.1421  0.1574 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 5.7: Logit regressions of DRCs  
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension are related to the dependent variable DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise. 
Models 1 to 3 include a dummy variable aboveCAP-member that equals to 1 if CEO or CFO is a member of DB pension schemes with the pension above the compensation 
threshold. Models 4 to 6 include Annual-pension and Models 7 to 9 include Total-pension. Regressions reported in this table control for Board-tenure. All variables are 
defined in Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are 
clustered at the company-level. 
Dependent variable:  
                  DRCs (dummy) 
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                    
CEO-aboveCAP-member 2.485***    2.531***              
 (0.003)    (0.003)              
CEO-Annual-pension        0.023**    0.021**       
        (0.027)    (0.036)       
CEO-Total-pension              0.002***    0.002** 
              (0.005)    (0.016) 
ln (CEO-Board-tenure)  -0.079*    -0.066  -0.071*    -0.070*  -0.066*    -0.060 
  (0.059)    (0.138)  (0.064)    (0.099)  (0.087)    (0.154) 
Accounting-background 1.810*    1.871*  1.590    1.710*  2.055***    1.949**  
 (0.075)    (0.065)  (0.129)    (0.082)  (0.009)    (0.023)  
CFO-aboveCAP-member   1.411  1.151              
   (0.272)  (0.646)              
CFO-Annual-pension          0.006  0.000       
          0.000   (0.965)       
CFO-Total-pension                0.001  0.000 
                (0.202)  (0.662) 
ln (CFO-Board-tenure)    -0.041  -0.018    -0.015  0.022    -0.024  0.002 
    (0.355)  (0.666)    0.000   (0.497)    (0.514)  (0.953) 
Single-scheme 1.452  1.355  1.594  1.318  1.285  1.416  1.437  1.245  1.528  
 (0.292)  (0.395)  (0.173)  (0.390)  (0.447)  (0.267)  (0.268)  (0.513)  (0.184)  
%Equity  -0.004**  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004** 
  (0.034)  (0.063)  (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.083)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.093)  (0.028) 
Closure-to-FA  0.051**  0.044**  0.054***  0.040*  0.041**  0.040*  0.047**  0.046**  0.050** 
  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.009)  (0.058)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.015) 
Maturity  0.013  0.014  0.015  0.014  0.014  0.017  0.008  0.011  0.011 
  (0.566)  (0.555)  (0.510)  (0.472)  (0.520)  (0.397)  (0.698)  (0.620)  (0.609) 
ln (Company-size)  -0.026  -0.02  -0.022  -0.037  -0.026  -0.035  -0.039  -0.03  -0.042 
  (0.437)  (0.567)  (0.511)  (0.229)  (0.408)  (0.254)  (0.214)  (0.333)  (0.193) 
Leverage  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.670)  (0.917)  (0.810)  (0.669)  (0.942)  (0.770)  (0.737)  (0.914)  (0.880) 
ROA  0.006  0.005  0.005  0.007**  0.004  0.006*  0.007*  0.003  0.006 
  (0.133)  (0.210)  (0.202)  (0.040)  (0.250)  (0.085)  (0.084)  (0.396)  (0.150) 
Dividends  0.015  0.017*  0.015  0.014  0.020**  0.014  0.018*  0.021**  0.018* 
  (0.136)  (0.086)  (0.145)  (0.143)  (0.027)  (0.152)  (0.074)  (0.026)  (0.064) 
Cash  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.300)  (0.320)  (0.304)  (0.355)  (0.265)  (0.467)  (0.526)  (0.204)  (0.546) 
FR  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.442)  (0.387)  (0.423)  (0.401)  (0.572)  (0.439)  (0.421)  (0.617)  (0.435) 
                                    
Number of obs  1,165  1,162  1,130  1,219  1,299  1,179  1,201  1,240  1,137 
Wald chi2  101.99  93.62  107.56  181.91  116.61  225.27  169.22  137.19  388.61 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2  0.1631  0.1414  0.1682  0.1621  0.1415  0.1637  0.1632  0.1418  0.1636 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 5.8: Logit regressions of DRCs  
This tables reports results from logit regressions on whether CEO DB pension are related to the dependent variable DRCs that equals to 1 if the company made DRCs and 0 otherwise.  
Models 1 to 3 include a dummy variable aboveCAP-member that equals to 1 if CEO or CFO is a member of DB pension schemes with the pension above the compensation 
threshold. Models 4 to 6 include Annual-pension and Models 7 to 9 include Total-pension. Regressions reported in this table control for Age. All variables are defined in 
Table 4.1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance of the estimated coefficients at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered 
at the company-level. 
Dependent variable:  
                  DRCs (dummy) 
 Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx Odds dy/dx 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                    
CEO-aboveCAP-member 2.138**    2.365***              
 (0.011)    (0.005)              
CEO-Annual-pension       0.021**    0.020**       
        (0.029)    (0.031)       
CEO-Total-pension             0.002***    0.001** 
              (0.007)    (0.018) 
ln (CEO-Age)  0.006    0.053  -0.053    -0.065  -0.173    -0.150 
  (0.984)    (0.854)  (0.840)    (0.815)  (0.525)    (0.606) 
Accounting-background 1.795*    1.946**  1.573    1.800*  1.997    1.976**  
 (0.077)    (0.046)  (0.139)    (0.056)  (0.013)    (0.021)  
CFO-aboveCAP-member  1.203  0.987              
   (0.531)  (0.966)              
CFO-Annual-pension         0.003  -0.002       
          (0.763)  (0.831)       
CFO-Total-pension               0.000  0.000 
                (0.418)  (0.880) 
ln (CFO-Age)    0.091  0.205    0.241  0.432    0.152  0.241 
    (0.759)  (0.491)    (0.322)  (0.095)    (0.550)  (0.358) 
Single-scheme 1.458  1.378  1.655  1.343  1.315  1.482  1.474  1.274  1.598  
 (0.296)  (0.368)  (0.145)  (0.363)  (0.413)  (0.220)  (0.241)  (0.473)  (0.149)  
%Equity  -0.004**  -0.004*  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004*  -0.004**  -0.003*  -0.004** 
  (0.050)  (0.066)  (0.055)  (0.034)  (0.090)  (0.056)  (0.032)  (0.089)  (0.043) 
Closure-to-FA  0.049**  0.041**  0.050**  0.040*  0.039*  0.037*  0.046**  0.044**  0.047** 
  (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.018)  (0.063)  (0.055)  (0.076)  (0.029)  (0.035)  (0.025) 
Maturity  0.020  0.013  0.015  0.021  0.012  0.016  0.011  0.010  0.011 
  (0.366)  (0.589)  (0.530)  (0.295)  (0.605)  (0.454)  (0.592)  (0.663)  (0.597) 
ln (Company-size) -0.022  -0.022  -0.021  -0.032  -0.03  -0.035  -0.033  -0.034  -0.04 
  (0.533)  (0.527)  (0.540)  (0.323)  (0.319)  (0.263)  (0.304)  (0.268)  (0.219) 
Leverage  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.859)  (0.861)  (0.809)  (0.844)  (0.950)  (0.869)  (0.773)  (0.935)  (0.958) 
ROA  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.007*  0.004  0.005  0.006  0.003  0.005 
  (0.226)  (0.256)  (0.305)  (0.074)  (0.331)  (0.179)  (0.132)  (0.460)  (0.244) 
Dividends  0.011  0.017*  0.017  0.011  0.021**  0.016*  0.019*  0.021**  0.020** 
  (0.305)  (0.078)  (0.103)  (0.265)  (0.022)  (0.096)  (0.060)  (0.022)  (0.044) 
Cash  -0.006  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.004  -0.002 
  (0.174)  (0.387)  (0.457)  (0.214)  (0.311)  (0.593)  (0.607)  (0.255)  (0.684) 
FR  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.533)  (0.445)  (0.537)  (0.475)  (0.645)  (0.555)  (0.452)  (0.662)  (0.520) 
                                    
Number of obs  1,165  1,161  1,123  1,218  1,298  1,172  1,195  1,239  1,130 
Wald chi2  91.93  94.7  109.77  170.06  124.48  218.92  167.62  143.13  367.66 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.1524  0.1402  0.1637  0.1535  0.143  0.1631  0.1583  0.1421  0.1603 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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